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General Abstract  
The growing array of scams and the ability to commit fraud from different countries via 
the Internet makes it difficult for authorities to identify and prosecute offenders, leaving 
victims without justice.  Fraud prevention often concentrates on warning victims about 
specific scams already in operation, however, such information dates quickly as new 
scams arise or scammers adapt their techniques.  Additionally, Internet security 
warnings are frequently ignored due to their abundance and the security fatigue felt by 
users.  An individual difference approach to scam prevention has not as yet been 
adopted by relevant agencies, despite the fact that scammers often focus on those 
characteristics when targeting potential victims.  This approach would allow for more 
tailor-made advice to potential and repeat victims of fraud.  
 
The aim of the present thesis was to identify individual differences that may be 
implicated in vulnerability to fraudulent offers in order to develop a valid measure of 
susceptibility to fraud.  In the first study, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with fraud victims to explore personal meanings and experiences associated with 
becoming a victim of fraud.  Using a thematic analysis, several diverse reasons emerged 
for being motivated to respond to and remain engaged with fraudulent offers.  These 
included the personal needs and attributes of the victim; their life circumstances, 
interpretation of source credibility and the type of persuasion techniques used.  These 
findings, along with available research, theories and models, were used to inform the 
development of a psychometric measure assessing individual vulnerability to fraud in 
the second study.  The newly developed Susceptibility to Fraud Scale consisted of five 
subscales measuring compliance, impulsivity, vigilance, the time invested in decision-
making and belief in justice; the Scale was found to predict previous fraud 
victimisation, the ability to recognise phishing correspondence, and real-life situations 
that may be a scam.   In the final study, the newly developed scale was tested using a 
proxy scam situation.   Susceptibility to fraud evaluated by the scale was related to the 
acceptance of false personality feedback (known as the Barnum Effect), with 
individuals who were more susceptible to fraud, compliant and impulsive, more likely 
to see themselves as inferior to others. Previous fraud victimisation was connected to 
impulsivity.  The findings also suggested that fraud susceptibility may not always be 
connected to fraud victimisation.  
 
! iii!
The newly developed Susceptibility to Fraud Scale is the first scale of its kind.  It is 
based on the various analytical concepts and supported by the evidence of three separate 
studies, offering new ways of addressing vulnerability to fraud offers.  Additionally, the 
overall findings of this programme of research were used in the formation of the 
proposed Model of Fraud Susceptibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!
 
!iv!
Declaration  
 
Whilst registered as a candidate for the above degree, I have not been 
registered for any other research award. The results and conclusions 
embodied in this thesis are the work of the named candidate and have not 
been submitted for any other academic award.  
 
 
_____________________ 
Martina Dove  
27th February, 2018 
 
 
 
Thesis Word count: 68 462 words  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
! v!
Dedication  
To grandma and grandpa Zelenić, for making my childhood magical and 
full of unconditional love.  I miss you every single day.  
 
Also, to my grandma in law Stella Dove.  You were a shining star and I am 
so grateful I got to know you.   
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
!vi!
Acknowledgements  
I would like to thank my supervisory team who have been through so much with me.  
Dr. Mark Turner, for his patience, perseverance and his perfectionism.  Dr. Alessandra 
Fasulo, who worked very hard to develop my qualitative skills and who awakened my 
passion for qualitative research.  And last but not least, Dr. Darren Van Laar, for great 
advice and kind words along the way.   
 
Special thanks go to all my participants, especially participants who shared their painful 
fraud stories with me.  Thank you.  I know it was not easy and I hope I did them justice.  
Your stories have touched me deeply and made me realise how harmful fraud 
victimisation can be and why it is important to fight it any way we can.  
 
There are also many people who helped me along the way, either by offering a kind 
word, advice or just by being an inspiration.  I was lucky to be a part of a wonderful 
department and a wonderful university.   In no particular order, I just want to thank 
some people who have made this journey so much easier without having to.  
 
Prof. Alan Costall, who is one of the nicest professors I have ever come across.  And 
always interested in everyone.  Dr. Sherria Hoskins, for supportive advice on various 
topics.  Dr. Julie Udell and Dr. Dominic Pearson, my annual reviewers who have 
provided great advice along the way year on year.  My fellow peers, especially Niko, 
Dom, Gary, Gemma, Liam and Louise, who have, at times of neuroticism and stress, 
offered a kind word, helpful advice or just an outlet for my frustrations, thank you so 
much.  I also want to thank Paul Marshman for the same.  
 
I was extremely lucky to receive invaluable advice from experts in the field during the 
course of this journey.  Prof. Stephen Lea, Prof. Stephen Greenspan, Prof. Jeff 
Langenderfer and Dr. Jacki Tapley, thank you for your valuable feedback and 
encouragement.   I would also like to thank Louise Baxter from National Trading 
Standards, as well as different regional Trading Standards who have taken keen interest 
in my research.  Specifically Stephen Greenfield from Suffolk County Council Trading 
Standards.  The work you do is crucial.   Also, detective Jonathan Frost and commander 
David Clarke at City of London police for being interested in my research, answering 
questions and offering support.   
! vii!
 
I also want to thank wonderful Tony Murray, fraud investigator with Durham 
Constabulary and talented scam tech expert Scott McGready, for endorsing fraud 
prevention with much passion, for the encouragement and for making me part of their 
scam busting family.   
 
A big thank you to my best friend Vlatka for many years of friendship, loyalty, 
encouragement, devotion and laughter.  And for that one time when a guy in a pub 
called me stupid and was then reduced to tears by the sheer strength of her arguments.  
 
And last but not least, a big thank you to my enduring husband Ben, who bravely 
remains my biggest fan and who is, no doubt, eagerly awaiting the completion of this 
thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!viii!
Dissemination 
 
Conferences  
Dove, M. Turner, M and Van Laar, D. (2013). Psychological Factors in the Reduction 
of Susceptibility to Internet Scams. First Annual Cyberpsychology Conference, De 
Montfort University, Leicester, UK. 
 
Dove, M., Turner, M., Van Laar, D. and Fasulo, A. (2015). The voices of scam victims: 
A psychological model of the experience of fraud. Social Networking in Cyberspace 
Conference, University of Wolverhampton  
 
Dove, M., Turner, M., Van Laar, D. and Fasulo, A. (2016). Predicting individual 
differences in vulnerability to fraud: the development of a scam susceptibility scale.  
Rethinking Cybercrime Conference, University of Central Lancashire 
 
Dove, M., Turner, M., Van Laar, D. and Fasulo, A. (2016). Predicting individual 
differences in vulnerability to fraud: the development of a scam susceptibility scale. 
Science Together: Science Postgraduate Research Conference, University of 
Portsmouth 
 
Dove, M., Turner, M., Van Laar, D. and Fasulo, A. (2016).  Predicting individual 
differences in vulnerability to fraud, Silence of the Scams: Progress, Practice and 
Prevention Conference, Brunel University London 
 
Dove, M., Turner, M., Van Laar, D. and Fasulo, A. (2017).  Not a victimless crime: 
Psychological effects of fraud victimisation, Scams; exposing the hidden danger to our 
health, National Trading Standards and Consumer Empowerment Alliance Conference, 
Jury’s Inn Hotel, Birmingham, 25th- 26th April.  
 
 
 
 
 
! ix!
 
Seminars and presentations 
 
Dove, M. Turner, M and Van Laar, D. (2013). Psychological Factors in the Reduction 
of Susceptibility to Internet Scams. Poster presentation, University of Portsmouth, UK. 
Dove, M. Turner, M and Van Laar, D. Fassulo, A (2014). Individual Factors in the 
Reduction of Susceptibility to Internet and Face-to-Face Scams. Oral presentation, 
University of Portsmouth, UK. 
Dove, M. Turner, M and Van Laar, D. Fassulo, A (2015). The voices of scam victims: 
A Psychological model of the experience of fraud, Oral presentation, University of 
Portsmouth, UK. 
Dove, M. Turner, M and Van Laar, D. Fassulo, A (2016). Predicting individual 
differences in vulnerability to fraud, Oral presentation. University of Portsmouth, UK. 
Dove, M. (2016). Could you spot an online scam? Seminar. University of Brighton, UK.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!x!
 
 
Contents  
 
General Abstract................................................................................................................ii 
Declaration........................................................................................................................iv 
Dedication..........................................................................................................................v 
Acknowledgements..........................................................................................................vi 
Dissemination.................................................................................................................viii 
List of contents.................................................................................................................xi 
List of Tables.................................................................................................................xvii 
List of Figures..................................................................................................................xx 
Abbreviations.................................................................................................................xxi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! xi!
List of contents  
 
Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
1.1 Field of miracles…………………………………………………….………….……2  
1.2 Thesis overview………………………………….…………….………………….…3 
 
Chapter 2: Literature review..........................................................................................6 
 
2.1 Fraud............................................................................................................................7 
2.1.1 Taxonomy of fraud.......................................................................................8  
2.1.2 Low rates of reporting..................................................................................9  
2.1.3 Fraud and the justice system.......................................................................10 
2.1.4 Human costs of fraud..................................................................................12     
2.1.5 Fraud prevention measures and support for victims of fraud.................... 13  
2.2 Scams, swindles and humbugs..................................................................................16 
2.2.1 Nigerian scams...........................................................................................17 
2.2.2 Identity fraud and identity theft..................................................................18 
2.2.3 Romance scams..........................................................................................19 
2.2.4 Phishing, vishing and smishing..................................................................21 
2.2.5 Lotteries, prize draws and sweepstakes......................................................23 
2.2.6 Psychic and clairvoyant scams...................................................................24 
2.2.7 Miracle cures..............................................................................................25 
2.2.8 Business opportunities and investment scams............................................26 
2.3 Scamming techniques................................................................................................27 
2.3.1 Evoking visceral influence.........................................................................27 
2.3.2 Liking and similarity..................................................................................28 
2.3.3 Evoking social norms.................................................................................29 
2.3.4 Authority....................................................................................................30 
2.3.5 Scarcity and urgency..................................................................................32 
2.3.6 Social proof and social influence...............................................................32 
2.3.7 Commitment and consistency....................................................................33 
2.3.8 Dishonesty and distraction principles........................................................34 
2.4 Theories and models of scam vulnerability..............................................................34 
2.4.1 Errors of judgment.....................................................................................35 
!xii!
2.4.2 Model of Scamming Vulnerability.............................................................37 
2.4.3 Models of Gullible and Foolish Action......................................................39 
2.4.4 Phishing susceptibility framework.............................................................41 
2.5 Individual differences and fraud vulnerability..........................................................43 
2.5.1 Self-control, premeditation and impulsivity...............................................43 
2.5.2 Background and scam knowledge..............................................................45 
2.5.3 Information processing...............................................................................45  
2.5.4 Assessing risks and sensation seeking........................................................48  
2.5.5 Trust and gullibility....................................................................................49 
2.5.6 Other individual differences implicated in fraud victimisation..................52 
2.5.7 Behaviours that enhance vulnerability to fraud..........................................52 
2.5.8 Life circumstances and fraud vulnerability................................................52 
2.6 Methodology in fraud research..................................................................................54 
2.6.1 Interviews with victims of fraud and family members...............................55 
2.6.2 Analysis of the scam content......................................................................56 
2.6.3 Hypothetical scam scenarios......................................................................57 
2.6.4 Simulating scam situations.........................................................................58   
2.6.5 Self-constructed and personality measures in fraud research.....................60 
2.7 Summary....................................................................................................................61 
2.8 Thesis aims................................................................................................................63 
 
Chapter 3: The voices of scam victims: A psychological model of the experience  
of fraud...........................................................................................................................65 
 
3.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................66 
3.1.1 Factors that contribute to fraud victimisation.............................................66 
3.1.2 Research aims and rationale.......................................................................67  
3.2 Methods.....................................................................................................................68 
3.2.1 Participants.................................................................................................68 
3.2.1.1 Exclusion criteria.........................................................................70  
3.2.2   Interviews.................................................................................................70   
3.2.3 Data treatment and analysis........................................................................71 
3.2.3.1 Coding.....................................................................................................72 
3.3 Results.......................................................................................................................73 
3.3.1 Precursors...................................................................................................74 
! xiii!
3.3.1.1 Time restraints and urgency........................................................74  
3.3.1.2 Dissatisfaction with one’s present circumstances.......................75 
3.3.1.3 Social influence...........................................................................76  
3.3.2 Commitment...............................................................................................77  
3.3.2.1 Factors pertaining to the perpetrator...........................................77    
3.3.2.1.1 Credibility and legitimacy............................................77   
3.3.2.1.2 Similarity, familiarity and likeability...........................79 
3.3.2.1.3 Limited availability.......................................................81    
3.3.2.2 Factors pertaining to the victim...................................................82 
3.3.2.2.1 Lack of scrutiny of available information....................82   
3.3.2.2.2 Excitement....................................................................83 
3.3.2.2.3 Social norms.................................................................84  
3.3.3 Aftermath....................................................................................................84   
3.3.3.1 Psychological and financial consequences..................................84 
3.3.3.2 Avoidance strategies....................................................................86 
3.3.3.3 Resolution and justice..................................................................87 
3.3.3.3.1 Dealing with the authorities..........................................87 
3.3.3.3.2 Need for resolution.......................................................88  
3.3.3.4 Loss of trust.................................................................................89 
3.4 Interview study Discussion: Study 1.........................................................................90 
3.4.1 Individual risk factors in fraud vulnerability..............................................91 
3.4.2 Reflexivity..................................................................................................93 
3.5 Future considerations and implications.....................................................................94 
3.6. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................96   
 
Chapter 4: Predicting individual differences in vulnerability to fraud: the 
development of a Susceptibility to Fraud scale...........................................................98 
 
4.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................99 
4.1.1 Errors in judgments..................................................................................101 
4.1.2 Gullible and foolish action.......................................................................101 
4.1.3 Trust and vigilance...................................................................................102 
4.1.4 Model of scamming vulnerability.............................................................103 
4.1.5 Susceptibility to persuasion......................................................................104 
4.1.6 Research aims and rationale.....................................................................105 
!xiv!
4.2 Pilot study................................................................................................................106 
4.2.1 Questionnaire item development..............................................................106  
4.2.2 Participants...............................................................................................108  
4.2.3 Materials and Procedure...........................................................................108 
4.3 Main study...............................................................................................................109 
4.3.1 Materials and Procedure...........................................................................109 
4.3.2 Participants...............................................................................................110  
4.3.3 Results......................................................................................................111  
4.3.3.1 Results of the factor and reliability analyses.............................111  
4.3.3.2 Reliability considerations..........................................................115  
4.3.3.3 Concurrent validity....................................................................118  
4.3.3.4 Relationship between STFS subscales and age.........................119 
4.3.3.5 Susceptibility to fraud and previous fraud victimisation...........120  
4.3.3.6 Authenticity of email correspondence; 'genuine email' vs 
'phishing email'......................................................................................121  
4.3.3.7 Confidence in classifying email correspondence......................123  
4.3.3.8 Scam scenarios..........................................................................125  
4.3.3.9 Relationship between the STFS and scam scenarios.................127 
4.4 Scale Development Study Discussion: Study 2.......................................................128  
4.4.1 Factors of the Susceptibility to Fraud Scale.............................................129  
4.4.2 Age and fraud vulnerability......................................................................132 
4.5 Future considerations...............................................................................................133 
4.6 Conclusion...............................................................................................................134  
  
Chapter 5: The Barnum effect as a measure of susceptibility to fraud..................136 
 
5.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................137 
5.1.1 Gullibility in relation to fraud...................................................................137 
5.1.2 The Barnum effect as a measure of gullibility.........................................137 
5.1.2.1 The Barnum effect manipulations.............................................138  
5.1.3 The Barnum effect as a proxy scam measure...........................................141  
5.1.4 The Barnum effect and personality attributes...........................................142 
5.1.5 Research aims and rationale.....................................................................143  
5.2 Method.....................................................................................................................145    
5.2.1 Participants...............................................................................................145 
! xv!
5.2.2 Materials...................................................................................................146  
5.2.3 Procedure..................................................................................................148   
5.2.4 Personality feedback.................................................................................149 
5.3 Results.....................................................................................................................150 
5.3.1 Results of the factor and reliability analyses……………………………151 
5.3.2 Relationship between Susceptibility to Fraud scale (STFS), Gudjonson's 
(1989) Compliance Scale, Sapp and Harrod's (1993) Locus of control scale and 
age......................................................................................................................152   
5.3.3 Susceptibility to fraud scale (STFS) and the acceptance of Barnum 
feedback as accurate of 'oneself' and 'other'......................................................153 
5.3.4 Agreement frequencies for type of Barnum feedback and STFS.............154 
5.3.5 Susceptibility to fraud and accuracy ratings for Barnum personality 
feedback for ‘oneself’ and ‘other’.....................................................................158  
5.3.5.1 Ratings for self...........................................................................158 
5.3.5.2 Ratings for other........................................................................160 
5.3.6 Susceptibility to fraud scale (STFS) and self-bias in response to Barnum 
personality feedback..........................................................................................161  
5.3.7 Fraud victimisation and the acceptance of Barnum personality feedback..... 
...........................................................................................................................164 
5.3.8 Susceptibility to fraud and previous fraud victimisation..........................166  
5.3.9 Factors involved in fraud reporting..........................................................167  
5.4 Barnum Study Discussion: Study 3.........................................................................168  
5.4.1 Susceptibility to fraud and the Barnum effect..........................................169 
5.4.2 Previous fraud victimisation and the Barnum effect............................... 171 
5.4.3 Personality factors in susceptibility to fraud............................................172 
5.5 Future considerations..............................................................................................173 
5.6 Conclusion...............................................................................................................174 
 
Chapter 6: General discussion....................................................................................176 
 
6.1 Introduction to general discussion...........................................................................177   
6.2 Aims and rationale for the research.........................................................................177  
6.3 Summary of research studies...................................................................................178  
6.3.1 Interview study: Study 1...........................................................................178 
6.3.2 Scale development study: Study 2............................................................178 
!xvi!
6.3.3 The Barnum effect study: Study 3............................................................179 
6.4 Summary of the findings.........................................................................................179  
6.4.1 Susceptibility to Fraud Scale....................................................................183 
6.4.1.1 STFS Compliance and Impulsivity as indicators of fraud 
vulnerability..........................................................................................183 
6.4.1.2 Vigilance and Decision time as moderators of fraud vulnerability 
...............................................................................................................186 
6.4.1.3 Belief in Justice.........................................................................187 
6.5 The Model of Fraud Susceptibility..........................................................................189  
6.5 Original contribution and implications....................................................................191  
6.5.1 Implications for fraud research.................................................................192 
6.5.2 Implications for fraud prevention.............................................................193 
6.5.1 Implications for future research................................................................194 
6.6 Considerations and limitations................................................................................195  
6.6.1 Difficulty in measuring scam compliance................................................195 
6.6.2 Sampling considerations...........................................................................196  
6.6.3 Other limitations.......................................................................................197  
6.7 Conclusion...............................................................................................................198 
 
References....................................................................................................................200 
Appendices...................................................................................................................222!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! xvii!
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Annual Fraud Indicator (AFI) estimates of losses incurred to fraud between 
2010 and 2017...................................................................................................................8 
Table 2.2 Some types of phishing attacks identified by Orman (2013)......................... 21 
Table 2.3 Cognitive and motivational factors involved in errors of judgment by Lea, 
Fischer and Evans (2009)............................................................................................... 35 
Table 2.4 Methodology in fraud research.......................................................................55  
Table 2.5 Scam techniques, individual differences, behaviours and circumstances 
implicated in vulnerability to fraudulent attacks.............................................................62 
Table 3.1 Participant, scam and reporting path information..........................................69 
Table 3.2 Interview schedule for Study 1.......................................................................71  
Table 3.3 Examples of coding........................................................................................72 
Table 3.4 Stages, themes and subthemes of the fraud process.......................................73 
Table 4.1 Examples of questionnaire item development using the data from Study 1..... 
.......................................................................................................................................100 
Table 4.2 Examples of questionnaire items, relevant categories and the research 
informing item development.........................................................................................107  
Table 4.3 Factor analysis using principal components extraction of the 45-item 
questionnaire..................................................................................................................112 
Table 4.4 Reliability values and means for subscales of the Susceptibility to Fraud 
Scale (N= 536)...............................................................................................................115 
Table 4.5 Mean inter-item correlations for the subscales of the Susceptibility to Fraud 
Scale (N=536) ...............................................................................................................117 
Table 4.6 Relationship between STFS and Modic and Lea (2013) Susceptibility to 
Persuasion Scale, (N =536) ….….…………………………………………….…..…119 
Table 4.7 Relationship between Susceptibility to Fraud subscales and age………….119 
Table 4.8 Comparison of groups ‘Non-victim’ (N=422) and “Previous fraud victim’ 
(N=114) and the subscales of Susceptibility to Fraud Scale using independent samples  
t-tests (534 df) ...............................................................................................................120  
Table 4.9 Comparison of groups ‘Never scammed’ (N=422) and “Scammed once or 
more’ (N=114) and the subscales of Susceptibility to Fraud Scale using one-way 
ANCOVA with age as a covariate (1,533 df) ...............................................................121 
Table 4.10 Mean STFS subscale scores for participants identifying a Genuine email  
as 'real' (N = 339) or 'fake' (N =197) .............................................................................122  
!xviii!
Table 4.11 Mean STFS subscale scores for participants identifying a Fake email as  
'real' (N = 132) or 'fake' (N = 404).................................................................................122   
Table 4.12 Participants’ mean confidence ratings when rating authenticity of email 
correspondence (534 df) ...............................................................................................124 
Table 4.13 Pearson Product-Moment Correlations showing the relationships between 
the STFS subscales and confidence when rating authenticity of email correspondence 
(rated from 1, Not at all confident to 10, Extremely confident) for previous fraud 
victims (N=422) and non-victims (N=114) ..................................................................124   
Table 4.14 Scam scenarios mean ratings and percentage of participants that ‘received’, 
‘responded to’ and ‘lost money’ to such an offer (N = 536) ........................................125 
Table 4.15 Pearson Product-Moment Correlations showing the relationships between 
the STFS subscales, age and subjective likelihood ratings that the scenario may be a 
scam (rated from 0, Extremely Unlikely to 5, Extremely Likely) (N=536) .................127   
Table 4.16 Point-Biserial Correlations between STFS subscales and age with previous 
experience of receiving or responding to one or more scams (0=No; 1=Yes) (N=536)... 
.......................................................................................................................................128 
Table 5.1 Sapp and Harrod (1993) Brief Locus of Control scale.................................147  
Table 5.2 Gudjonson (1989) Compliance Scale...........................................................147 
Table 5.3 Means, standard deviation and range of the scale scores for the measures  
used in the experiment, N = 424....................................................................................148 
Table 5.4 Positive, negative and neutral Barnum type personality feedback...............150 
Table 5.5 Correlations between Susceptibility to Fraud scale (STFS), Gudjonson  
(1989) Compliance scale, Sapp and Harrod (1993) Locus of control scale (LOC) and 
age, (N = 424)................................................................................................................152 
Table 5.6 Mean accuracy ratings for positive, negative and neutral statements for 
‘oneself’ and ‘other’, N = 424, df = 423........................................................................154 
Table 5.7 Correlations between Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS) and type of 
feedback: positive, negative and neutral when rated for 'oneself'.................................155 
Table 5.8 Correlations between Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS) and type of 
feedback: positive, negative and neutral when rated for 'other'.....................................155 
Table 5.9 Number of participants agreeing with positive, negative and neutral Barnum 
personality feedback statements....................................................................................156 
Table 5.10 Correlations between Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS) and agreement 
frequencies for positive, negative and neutral Barnum personality feedback...............157  
! xix!
Table 5.11 Comparison of groups ‘Non-victim’ (N=304) and “Previous fraud victim’ 
(N=120) and the subscales of Susceptibility to Fraud Scale using independent samples  
t-tests (422 df) …………………………………………………………………….….166 
Table 5.12 Comparison of groups ‘Never scammed’ (N=304) and “Scammed once or 
more’ (N=120) and the subscales of Susceptibility to Fraud Scale using one-way 
ANCOVA with age as a covariate (1,421 df)…………………………………………166 
Table 5.13 Personality differences among fraud victims that reported (N=47) and those 
that did not report (N=73) the victimisation (118 df)…………………………………167   
Table 6.1 Overview of research findings, with regards to subscales of the STFS.......183 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!xx!
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1 Research pathway............................................................................................3  
Figure 2.1 Nigerian (419) advance fee scam communication........................................17  
Figure 2.2 Miracle cure scam type correspondence.......................................................25 
Figure 2.3 Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) Model of Scamming Vulnerability and its 
moderators under high and low visceral influence..........................................................38  
Figure 2.4 The Model of Foolish Action proposed by Greenspan (2008)......................39 
Figure 2.5 The Model of Gullible Action proposed by Greenspan (2009)....................40 
Figure 2.6 Phishing Susceptibility framework by Parrish, Bailey and Courtney (2009)... 
.........................................................................................................................................41  
Figure 2.7 Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion.... 
.........................................................................................................................................46 
Figure 4.1 Examples of email correspondence stimuli.................................................110 
Figure 4.2 Confidence ratings reported by fraud victims (N=422) and non-victims 
(N=144) when evaluating genuine and phishing email correspondence.......................123 
Figure 5.1 Accuracy ratings for personality feedback as true of 'oneself' for low and 
high fraud susceptibility groups....................................................................................159   
Figure 5.2 Accuracy ratings for personality feedback as true of 'other' for low and  
high fraud susceptibility groups....................................................................................160 
Figure 5.3 Personality feedback accuracy ratings difference (self – other) for low and 
high fraud susceptibility groups....................................................................................163 
Figure 5.4 Personality feedback accuracy ratings difference (self – other) for previous 
fraud victims and non-victims.......................................................................................165 
Figure 6.1 The model of Fraud Susceptibility..............................................................190 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! xxi!
Abbreviations  
STFS - Susceptibility to Fraud Scale 
OFT - Office of Fair Trading 
UK - United Kingdom  
NFA - National Fraud Authority 
AFI – Annual Fraud Indicator 
SFO - Serious Fraud Office  
FCA - Financial Conduct Authority 
CPS - Crown Prosecution Service 
DVD - Digital video disc 
ID - Identity 
NTS -National Trading Standards 
CIFAS - Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System 
CEO - Chief executive officer  
VOIP - Voice Over Internet 
SMS – Short Message Service 
BBB - Better Business Bureau 
ELM - Elaboration Likelihood Model  
CRT - Cognitive Reflection Test 
IQ - Intelligence quotient 
IPIP - International Item Personality Pool 
PTS – Propensity to Trust Survey 
NEO PI-R – Revised NEO Personality Inventory 
BPS - British Psychological Society 
IT - Information technology 
TS - Trading Standards 
PHSO – Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman  
FCA – Financial Conduct Authority 
HGV - Heavy goods vehicle  
URL - Uniform Resource Locator 
StP – Susceptibility to Persuasion 
LOC – Locus of Control 
GCS – Gudjonson’s (1989) Compliance Scale  
SOSS - Sense of Self Scale 
 1 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
General introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'And to think that, by tomorrow, instead of four gold pieces they might be a thousand, 
or two thousand.  Why not follow my advice, and bury them in Field of Miracles?' 
'Impossible, today.  I'll go another time.' 
'Another time will be too late', said the fox.  
'Why?' 
'Because a rich man has bought the field, and after tomorrow nobody will be allowed to 
bury his money there.'   (Collodi, 2011, p.102) 
 
 2 
1.1 Field of miracles  
 
In the 1800s, the Italian writer Carlo Collodi wrote a fairy tale about a lovable wooden 
puppet, that dreams of becoming a real boy (Collodi, 2011).  The book follows the 
adventures of the puppet as he travels.  Along his journey, he comes across a cat and a 
fox, a pair of swindlers who manage to defraud him several times before he learns not to 
trust them.  The wooden puppet was called Pinocchio and the fairy tale became a well-
known children's story adapted many times since it was first published.  However, very 
few people today know about the original storyline, which is rather dark at times. The 
fox and the cat first present themselves as a charitable pair that only wants to help 
Pinocchio double his golden coins by telling him about the field of miracles where, if 
one plants a coin, a tree full of coins grows, maximising one's investment. The fox and 
the cat accompany Pinocchio to the field of miracles, where they watch him plant his 
coins. Expecting his coin to grow into a fortune, Pinocchio finds out that the fox and the 
cat dug out his coins in the night and left him with nothing.  These encounters are 
somewhat akin to scams in operation today and exhibit persuasion techniques frequently 
used by scammers, such as evoking greed or social norms (i.e. being helpful and kind to 
others who need help).  Pinocchio encounters the fox and the cat again, hardly 
recognisable now, dishevelled and looking pitiful.  To evoke sympathy, the fox and the 
cat pretend to be defenceless invalids, asking for help, but Pinocchio has learned his 
lesson and no longer trusts them.  Greenspan (2009) argues that such fairy tales are an 
integral part of the folklore, serving as a warning about those that are out to betray our 
trust.  It is therefore possible that these types of narratives, told through fairy tales 
across centuries, served as early scam prevention.   
 
Scams are often associated with something that is ‘too good to be true’.  Just like the 
field of miracles, they are designed to entice the victim to make an instant decision and 
the size of the fraud offer is often a powerful lure and deflects from rational thinking 
and concentrating on the negatives (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001; Lea, Fischer & 
Evans, 2009).  But they can be so much more.  Scams can be part of complex 
interpersonal relationships between the victim and the perpetrator, bonds that are not 
easily broken and which encourage compliance (Goffman, 1952; Whitty, 2013).  
Specific techniques may also be used in order to persuade the victim.  Goffman, (1952) 
argues that con artists are talented actors who systematically build social relationships, 
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in order to abuse them.  Scams are therefore not always as obvious as the field of 
miracles.  
 
 
1.2 Thesis overview  
 
This programme of research set out to develop a framework for understanding factors 
that can protect against scam compliance by exploring the personal judgment processes 
of people that make them resilient to scam information, which may help safeguard 
against future susceptibility.  Making people aware of their individual characteristics 
that may enhance their vulnerability to fraud prior to victimisation, may offer protection 
from becoming a victim of fraud.  
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis reviews the literature relevant to fraud and fraud victimisation.  
It first sets out to summarise the data estimating fraud losses in recent years and 
discusses possible reasons for under reporting.  Factors implicated in vulnerability to 
fraud and fraud compliance, relevant theoretical models, as well as techniques used by 
scammers are presented.  Finally, methodology used in fraud research is considered.  
 
Following the literature review, the thesis proceeds to present the results of three studies 
designed to develop and test a measure of susceptibility to fraud.   
 
Figure 1.1 shows a schematic overview of the three studies that form part of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Research pathway  
Chapter	3	
Study	1	Interview	victims	of	fraud	to	explore	personal	meanings	and	circumstances	surrounding	fraud	victimisation	and	its	aftermath		
Chapter	4	
Study	2	Use	the	data	from	previous	study	with	available	theories	in	order	to	develop	and	test	a	measure	which	may	pinpoint	individual	characteristics	involved	in	fraud	susceptibility	
Chapter	5	
Study	3	Test	the	newly	developed	measure	on	a	proxy	scam	situation	utilising	the	Barnum	effect	pardigm	in	order	to	test	the	new	measure	and	identify	further	individual	difference	attributes	involved	in	fraud	susceptibility		
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Chapter 3 of the thesis describes the first study in this programme of research; an 
interview study with victims of fraud.  The purpose of this study was to explore victims’ 
accounts of fraud victimisation and its consequences.  In-depth interviews with victims 
of fraud were used as a suitable way of exploring the complexities of the fraud process, 
from victims' characteristics to the sophisticated techniques employed by perpetrators.  
By exploring victims’ accounts in this study, underlying themes emerged that were 
relevant to understanding the mechanisms that underpin the fraud process.  Several 
unique scam stages are identified and themes and subthemes relevant to each stage 
explored in order to inform the next stage of the research; the development of a measure 
that would help identify an individual’s susceptibility to fraudulent communication.  
 
Chapter 4 describes the second study, the development of a Susceptibility to Fraud 
Scale (STFS), a self-report questionnaire measure designed to identify personal 
characteristics, which might indicate a person's unique vulnerability to scams.  By 
examining the data gathered from the previous fraud research as well as the interviews 
with victims of fraud in the Study 1, a questionnaire was developed, pilot tested and 
distributed to participants, along with a measure of Susceptibility to Persuasion (Modic 
& Lea, 2013), real life scenarios that may be potential fraudulent situations and 
examples of phishing correspondence.  Data on the reliability and validity of a 
Susceptibility to Fraud Scale are reported.  STFS responses were found to differentiate 
between those who had or had not previously been the victim of a scam and those that 
are able to recognise phishing correspondence.   
 
Chapter 5 describes the third and final study in this programme of research.  The 
purpose of this study was to test the newly developed measure against a proxy scam 
situation (i.e. the acceptance of false personality feedback) in order to evaluate its utility 
as a predictor of future behaviour that might be connected to susceptibility to fraud.  
This method was chosen as an ethical way of measuring participants' responses using 
simulated rather than real fraudulent attempts.  Previous research of scam experiences 
has raised some ethical considerations, which are discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.  
 
The newly developed measure, along with a scale measuring Compliance (Gudjonsson, 
1989), used as a concurrent validity measure, and a measure of Locus of Control (Sapp 
& Harrod, 1993) were distributed to participants who were told they would receive 
personality feedback based on these measures.  The same personality feedback, 
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consisting of neutral, negative and positive statements was then given to all participants, 
who were asked to rate the feedback for how accurate this was of their personality as 
well as how accurate it may be of people in general.  STFS responses indicated that 
higher susceptibility to fraud was connected to greater acceptance of negative 
personality feedback, mostly driven by impulsivity and compliance.  
 
The final chapter, Chapter 6, discusses the findings, limitations and implications of this 
research.  
 
Fraud prevention measures are getting better at concentrating on vulnerable individuals 
in order to intercept fraudulent activities, however, the fraud security advice is often 
ignored by people due to its abundance and lack of personal touch.  The present 
research findings offer a new way of looking at fraud vulnerability and contribute new 
knowledge to fraud research.  The present thesis describes the construction and 
development of the first susceptibility to fraud measure, its usefulness and applicability 
to scams, and proposes the Model of Fraud Susceptibility based on the findings of this 
programme of research.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
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2.1 Fraud 
 
The words 'scam' and 'fraud' are often used interchangeably.  In their report for Office 
of Fair Trading (OFT), Lea et al. (2009) defined scams as 'misleading or fraudulent 
practices, which are widely distributed' (p. 12).   On their website, Action Fraud defines 
fraud as; "Fraud is when trickery is used to gain a dishonest advantage, which is often 
financial, over another person".   Fraud can be committed by false representation, 
failing to disclose information or by abuse of position (The Fraud Act, 2006, p1).  
Although fraud is not a new offence, with the rise in new technologies, its delivery has 
become easier, allowing fraud to be committed on a larger scale than ever before.  Fraud 
statistics show that adults between ages of 45-54 and those in higher income households 
are more likely to be victims of fraud than younger people or those in lower income 
households.  Those in managerial and professional occupations were identified as more 
likely to be affected by fraud than full-time students, the unemployed or those in 
manual occupations (Office of National Statistics, 2016).  
 
The Annual Fraud Indicator (AFI) for 2017, estimates fraud losses in the United 
Kingdom (UK) to be around £190 billion, with £6.8 billion lost to fraud by private 
individuals (Button, Gee & Mothershaw, 2017).  Fraud estimates include frauds 
incurred in public, private and charity sectors as well as frauds incurred by private 
individuals.  Public sector fraud includes: local and central government, tax and 
benefits, National Health Service and pensions.  Private sector fraud includes: financial 
services, consumer goods, manufacturing, technology, media and telecoms, 
construction, retail and wholesale, travel, leisure and transportation, professional 
services, healthcare, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology and natural resources. 
Individual fraud is defined as all fraud perpetrated against private individuals (National 
Fraud Authority, 2010).  
 
Fraud losses have increased rapidly since 2010, across all sectors.  The true cost of 
individual fraud is also difficult to assess as estimates are based only on certain types of 
fraud and many victims of fraud choose not to report the victimisation, therefore this 
figure is likely to be much higher (National Fraud Authority, 2013).  Table 2.1 shows 
the fraud estimates for the 7-year period between 2010 and 2017. 
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Table 2.1   
Annual Fraud Indicator (AFI) estimates of losses incurred to fraud between 2010 and 2017 
 
Annual 
Fraud 
Indicator 
Public sector Private sector Charity sector Individual fraud Total 
 
2010 
 
£17.6 £9.3 £0.032 £3.5 £30.5 
2011 
 
£21.2 £12 £1.3 £4 £38.4 
2012 
 
£20.3 £45.5 £1.1 £6.1 £73 
2013 
 
£20.6 £21.2 £0.47 £9.1 £52 
2016 
 
£37.5 £144 £1.9 £10 £193 
2017 
 
£40.4 £140 £2.3 £6.8 £190 
Note.  
The values shown are in billions  
 
 
No data are available for 2014 and 2015 as the National Fraud Authority (NFA), the 
body responsible for producing the Annual Fraud Indicator, dissolved in 2014.  The 
Annual Fraud Indicator figures for years 2016 and 2017 were produced by collaboration 
of different organisations that deal with fraud (Button, et al., 2016, 2017),  
The data in Table 2.1 makes it clear that fraud has been steadily increasing since 2010, 
with largest increases happening in the private sector.  
 
While it is encouraging to see a reduction in total losses to fraud from 2016 to 2017, 
Button et al. (2017) argue this reduction may just be down to reduced levels of 
expenditure in certain sectors, as fraud rises with increases in expenditure.  Despite 
apparent reductions, higher quality data indicates an increase of £2.1 billion in fraud 
losses from the previous year (Button et al., 2017).  
 
2.1.1 Taxonomy of fraud  
The majority of fraud research concentrates on fraud perpetrated against the government 
or other organisations.  However, there is a lack of research when it comes to fraud 
perpetrated against individuals and no clear definition on how to capture information 
regarding fraud victimisation.  This is why a fraud classification scheme was developed 
by the Financial Fraud Research Centre (Beals, DeLiema & Deevy, 2015), in order to 
systematically group and organise fraud types, preventing the overlapping, confusing 
definitions and characterisations developed by fraud researchers and practitioners in the 
absence of a better system.  Beals et al. (2015) posit that a standardised coding scheme 
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would benefit fraud measurement by improving consistency, and allow for meaningful 
comparisons of results.  Therefore the framework outlined key concepts and attributes 
that ought to be captured with regards to fraud.  These include; a target, an expected 
benefit or outcome (e.g. investment or reward), and a specific type of fraudulent 
transaction (what service/product was misrepresented and in what manner).  Other tags 
may also be applied, and these include; seriousness (categorised by the amount lost and 
the incident duration), victim and perpetrator characteristics, method of advertising the 
fraud (e.g. text message, letter, face-to-face), purchase setting (i.e. how the victim 
responded to the scam) and method of money transfer (e.g. credit card, cash, etc.).  
From these attributes, additional tags may be developed to categorise fraud further into 
different types of fraud; internet or cyber fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud (using a mobile 
phone, computer or other devices that can be used for international frauds) and policy 
fraud (frauds that have policy relevance, such as fraud perpetrated against the elderly).  
The fraud framework also outlines five framework levels, some of which consist of 
several sub-categories, which can be used to capture information, offering a useful tool 
in recording and classifying fraudulent activities.  
 
2.1.2 Low rates of reporting  
Victims of fraud are often typecast by society as naive or somehow responsible for their 
misfortune and frequently feel too embarrassed to report fraud or seek help (Cross, 
2013; Titus & Gover, 2001; Walsh & Schram, 1980).  Cross (2013) interviewed victims 
and near victims of the Internet fraud and found that many cite greed as a reason for 
complying with the requests of the scammer.  Likewise, those that did not respond to 
fraud offers also saw fraud victims as greedy or wanting something for free.  The notion 
of greed as a prevalent factor in fraud victimisation may be to blame for the dominant 
discourse of victim blaming (Cross, 2013).   A study by Citizens Advice (2017) found 
that 72% of adults have been targeted by fraud in the past two years, yet 68% of the 
people targeted never tell anyone about it.  The negative views of fraud victims 
mentioned by Cross (2013), might account for the low rates of reporting.  
 
Another reason for low reporting might be down to not knowing whom to report 
different types of fraud and the belief that it is a waste of time.  Research looking into 
attitudes of victims and repeat victims of all crime, found that low reporting rates and 
low victim satisfaction with reporting is particularly high among repeat victims, many 
of whom have no confidence in the police and feel they would not be listened to (Van 
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Dijk, 2001).  Kerley and Copes (2002) conducted a phone fraud victimisation survey 
looking into fraud reporting rates and found that the reporting rates were around 22% 
with only 10% of one time victims and 5% of repeat victims reporting to the police.  
Instead participants said they reported the fraud to other official fraud reporting 
agencies.  The strongest predictor of reporting fraud was the amount lost, with those 
that lost larger amounts of money reporting more readily (Kerley & Copes, 2002).   
 
In their interviews with victims of fraud, exploring fraud support agencies, Button, 
Tapley and Lewis (2013) found that victims refrain from reporting fraud due to the 
belief that nothing would be done about it and in some cases, not knowing whom to 
report it to.  The amount of support received by friends and family may also be 
implicated in how likely it is that victimisation will be reported.  Research found that 
individuals that report fraud more frequently tend to have stronger social ties (Mason & 
Benson, 1996).  Additionally, some fraud victims may not be aware they were 
defrauded, such as when donating money to a good cause or by participating in a 
fraudulent lottery or an investment scheme (Button, Lewis & Tapley, 2009a).  
 
Not all frauds go unreported.  Almost all identity (ID) frauds are reported (Button et al., 
2009a).  One explanation for this fact may be since there is no cooperation between the 
victim and the perpetrator; identity fraud victims may not feel as culpable as victims of 
other fraud types where cooperation is needed.  Reporting fraud is vital in the fight 
against fraud.  Under reporting leads to inaccurate data and difficulties in estimating the 
true scale of the problem.  Not knowing who the fraud victims are means that there are 
fewer opportunities to learn from their experiences.  Therefore, making sure that fraud 
victims get the same treatment as other crime victims is a fundamental step in 
encouraging them to report fraud.  
 
2.1.3 Fraud and the justice system  
Response to fraud varies depending on the agency the victim chooses to report the fraud 
to, such as The Police, the Office of Fair Trading, Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the 
Financial Services Authority (now Financial Conduct Authority or FCA), or the 
national or regional Trading Standards (Button, Lewis & Tapley, 2009b; Button et al., 
2013).  Having multiple agencies for reporting fraud often means the relevant agencies 
may try to pass the problem onto another agency and there is no clear, publicly 
available guidance on where to report different types of fraud.  Additionally, victims of 
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fraud report not knowing where to report the fraud (Button et al., 2009b; Button et al., 
2013).  The launch of Action Fraud in 2009 was meant to simplify the process of 
reporting fraud by coordinating with the National Fraud Authority.  It was also meant to 
address weaknesses in the support for victims of fraud, by publicising different types of 
fraud.  The launch of Action Fraud meant that victims could no longer report fraud to 
the police (Loveday, 2017) and despite making the process of reporting fraud simpler, 
Button et al. (2013) questioned whether Action Fraud would be able to fully address the 
needs of fraud victims.  According to Loveday (2017), the experience of fraud victims 
that chose to report their victimisation to Action Fraud has been substandard.  Victims 
have received no help, they were not kept informed on the progress of their case and 
many cases of fraud were never passed on to the police.   Many victims of fraud wish 
for their case to be investigated and the perpetrator to be punished, but they are often 
told to pursue justice through civil courts, and many do not have the funds to do so, 
even when they know the perpetrator. Victims defrauded online may not even be able to 
find out who defrauded them without an investigation; therefore, the civil route may not 
be viable for them (Button, et al., 2013).  
 
Button, Lewis, Shepherd, Brooks and Wakefield (2012) looked at the numbers of 
prosecutions and convictions of fraud cases, supplied by the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) and estimated that only 0.4% of frauds end in a sanction being applied, leading to 
a lack of deterrence and decriminalisation of fraud.  They argued that, in order to deter 
fraud from happening, penalties for fraudulent activities must happen quickly and be 
inevitable, unavoidable and severe.  But, this is proving difficult, as the numbers of 
fraud Police Officers have declined since the 1980s, resulting in lower number of frauds 
reported to criminal justice system (Button et al., 2012).  Although Button et al. (2012) 
research did not seek to find out the exact number of dedicated fraud officers for 
England and Wales, they noted 4.2% decrease in police officers between January 2011 
and January 2012, which is likely to have an impact in all areas, including fraud (also 
Button, Blackbourn & Tunley, 2014).  
 
Research based on interviews and focus groups with victims of fraud indicate that it is 
extremely important to victims of fraud for the crime to be investigated and the 
perpetrator to be punished, either through custodial sentences, community orders or 
fines and that the punishment is not only influenced by the financial amount lost 
(Button et al., 2009b; Button et al., 2013; Button, McNaughton Nicholls, Kerr & Owen, 
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2015).   Frauds that result in small losses are also less likely to be prosecuted and if 
caught, the perpetrator may not get a tough sentence (Button et al., 2012, Button et al., 
2015).  However, fraud cases that are investigated tend to be prioritised according to the 
amounts lost and the complexity of the fraud, which suggests that the police have a 
choice of which victims deserve protection, at a disadvantage of other victims (Doig, 
Johnson & Levi 2001).  
 
Getting their money back is also a high priority for victims of fraud.  Victims that 
managed to receive their money back were more satisfied as it meant that justice had 
been done.  Where necessary, seizure of assets gained by fraud was suggested, making 
the perpetrator unable to profit (Button et al., 2009b; Button et al., 2013; Button et al., 
2015).   Finally, victims expressed a desire for restorative justice.  With much of fraud 
being perpetrated online, anonymity means that many victims never know who 
committed the crime against them.  An opportunity to meet the perpetrator would allow 
the victims to understand why they were defrauded as well as forcing the perpetrator to 
see the extent of the damage they had caused (Button et al., 2015). 
 
2.1.4 Human costs of fraud  
The costs associated with fraud cannot be summarised only in terms of financial loss.  
Titus and Gover (2001) argued that fraud often causes considerable harm to victims as it 
involves deception and this degrades the 'moral fibre' of the society.  Despite this, the 
psychological effects of fraud are frequently not taken seriously and fraud victims are 
less likely to receive sympathy or support from others, something that is often extended 
to crime victims with visible injuries (Titus & Gover, 2001).  
Fraud has devastating impact on the victims.  Frequently, fraud victimisation affects 
individual's self-esteem.  For example, Cross (2015) conducted interviews with elderly 
fraud victims and near victims and found that the discourse around fraud victimisation 
tends to concentrate heavily on victim blame and that even the victims themselves 
participated in this discourse.  Many did not fully appreciate the fact that scammers 
utilise highly sophisticated methods in identifying and targeting vulnerable victims 
(Cross, 2015).  
 
Research also found that considerable loss of funds may have detrimental effects on the 
quality of life as victims are left unable to afford luxuries or even food (Cross, Richards 
& Smith, 2016).  In other cases, it may lead to bankruptcy or problems with credit 
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(Button et al., 2009a).  Fraud may therefore, have an indirect but detrimental effect on 
psychological wellbeing and health through the pressure associated with money loss.   
 
Other research, much of which is based on interviews with victims of fraud, has 
examined the different consequences fraud can have on victims including anger, self-
blame, depression, stress, anxiety, humiliation, fear, breakdown of relationships, health 
problems (e.g. Button.et al., 2009a; Button, Gee, Lewis & Tapley, 2010; Button et al., 
2013; Button, Lewis & Tapley, 2014; Citizens Advice, 2017; Spalek, 1999).  The 
National Trading Standards (NTS) work with the most vulnerable victims in the UK.  
Based on their work with elderly fraud victims, they found that people defrauded in 
their own homes are at risk of dying or needing residential care within a year of the 
crime.  They also suggested that 53% of those aged 65 and older are repeatedly targeted, 
leading to multiple losses, bullying or potential intimidation (National Trading 
Standards, 2016).  In rare cases, fraud victimisation can lead to suicide.  In their report 
on fraud trends, Cross, Smith and Richards (2014) outlined several cases where a fraud 
victim committed suicide following fraud victimisation.  
 
2.1.5 Fraud prevention measures and support for victims of fraud 
Fraud victimisation can be extremely harmful; therefore, it is essential that fraud 
prevention measures and the support offered to victims of fraud are effective.  Research 
into support agencies for victims of fraud (Button et al., 2013), found that most of the 
agencies dealing with fraud offer some information on fraud and the Office of Fair 
Trading was previously identified as a good provider of information on fraud.  It offered 
different types of information, from leaflets to DVDs, targeting different audiences (i.e. 
fraud victims, those who may become victims and those who work with victims).  Its 
work was also proactive, frequently mimicking fraudulent offers in order to warn 
against fraud.  As most people do not think about fraud until they are defrauded, a 
proactive approach may be beneficial to potential victims (Button et al., 2013).  
However, the Office of Fair Trading closed in 2014, which means that victims and 
potential victims of fraud may not be able to access quality fraud prevention advice 
when needed.  
 
Support for victims of fraud also depends on whether the case reaches the courts with 
greatest support being offered to victims who testify in court, but even this is not always 
the case (Button et al., 2009b; Button et al., 2013).  Police led investigations are bound 
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by the Victim's code of practice, which means that from an early stage, the victim is 
likely to have his or her needs assessed, after which they are offered enhanced support. 
However, the Victim's code of practice does not extend to other bodies dealing with 
fraud, such as local authorities, SFO or private bodies, therefore many fraud victims are 
left with no support from the authorities as only a small percentage of fraud cases are 
investigated by the police (Button et al., 2009b; Button et al., 2012).  Victims of identity 
fraud fare better, as banks or other financial organisations that deal with that type of 
fraud tend to have dedicated fraud departments offering direct help to victims (Button et 
al., 2013).  While most victims of ID fraud recoup their losses, victims of other frauds 
rarely do (Button, et al., 2009a), which makes effective fraud prevention fundamental in 
the fight against fraud.    
 
New ways of fraud prevention are emerging.  In her report on fraud prevention, Cross 
(2016), outlined some of the new, victim centered prevention measures implemented by 
the Australian authorities.  These included using the financial intelligence available, 
such as obtaining details of people sending the funds to Nigeria and other West African 
countries and calling them to enquire about the details of the transactions.  This 
intervention indicated that some of the fraud victims have been sending money for as 
long as a decade.  These measures also included making sure that the victims are put in 
touch with a relevant fraud agency, removing the likelihood of victims being passed on 
to different agencies.  This research also found that once contacted by the authorities, 
six out of ten victims stop sending the funds, indicating that proactive, victim orientated 
measures can be effective in the fight against fraud. While the preventive measures 
mentioned by Cross (2016) are good at identifying victims of fraud and intercepting 
fraudulent transactions, they do not prevent victimisation in the first place.   
 
Scams are continually adapting to current practices and human behaviour and are 
becoming sophisticated and prolific, which makes developing effective and up to date 
warnings difficult (CIFAS, 2014; Experian, 2016).  Additionally, the majority of people 
only take action or seek advice on how to avoid fraud after they are personally affected 
(Citizens Advice, 2017) and fraud warnings are often ignored, despite their abundance 
(Furnell & Thompson, 2009; Modic & Anderson, 2014b).  Some authors have 
suggested that non-compliance with online security advice may be due to security 
fatigue (Furnell & Thompson, 2009).  The time available for decision-making in the 
real world is often limited.  When people are over-exposed to security information, 
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constant warnings can lead to security fatigue and therefore less caution online.  
Stanton, Theofanos and Prettyman (2016) argue that security warnings should, 
therefore, consider the complexity and amount of the existing security advice and its 
role in the general feelings of resignation experienced by users.   
 
Evidence suggests that certain types of security warnings work better than others. 
Research by Egelman, Cranor and Hong (2008) compared the effectiveness of different 
phishing warnings.  They found that passive phish warnings (e.g. a warning bar above 
the email or a single box with only an option to dismiss it) were largely ineffective.  
Often a bar might appear when the user is typing and is dismissed accidentally as the 
user is concentrating on the keyboard and not on the screen.   In addition, participants 
who gave their details to a fraudulent website created for the purpose of the study, 
reported that they did so because they did not fully understand the risks.  The same 
participants also reported they regularly ignore security warnings. 
 
 Modic and Andersen (2014b) manipulated security warnings in order to examine what 
would make security warnings more effective.  They used existing warnings and 
included cues to authority (e.g. security team has identified the site is dangerous) and 
social influence cues (e.g. your friends have already been scammed).  They also made a 
threat vague (e.g. a message saying access is blocked due to security concerns) or 
concrete (e.g. explanation of what malware does to the computer).  They found that 
using authority and a concrete threat has a greater effect.  Therefore, providing 
ineffective security warnings or continuous advice on new scams or scam techniques 
may have a counter effect, as their abundance may make people less attentive to them.   
 
Whilst the surface details of scams may change, scams often have underlying features 
that are stable (Lea et al., 2009).  Scam content or narratives are frequently updated to 
reflect current events, leaving people vulnerable to new variants even when they keep 
up to date with fraud prevention.  For example, even the widely known Nigerian scam, 
in which a bank official or a solicitor contacts the victim, requesting help in getting 
funds out of the country, is still successful today, thanks to the new variants (Dyrud, 
2005; Hiss, 2015).   Fraud prevention may be more efficient if victims and potential 
victims were made aware not only of different scam features but also how they link with 
their individual characteristics, circumstances and behaviours to increase fraud 
vulnerability.  For example, Egelman and Peer (2015) looked at individual differences 
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and how they impact privacy attitudes.  Participants were given Need for Cognition 
measure (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984), General Decision Making Style measure 
(Scott & Bruce, 1995) and measures of risk (Blais & Weber, 2006) and privacy attitudes 
(Buchanan, Paine, Joinson & Reips, 2007; Malhotra, Kim & Agarwal, 2004).  The 
study found that decision-making styles (Intuitive and Rational) and social risk-taking 
predicted privacy attitudes, suggesting that privacy attitudes are a result of rational 
decision-making and an ability to challenge social norms, but can also be down to ‘gut 
feelings’ about not wanting to share private information.  Egelman and Peer (2015) 
conclude that privacy and security outcomes may be improved by designing the security 
messages around individual differences.  
 
 
2.2 Scams, swindles and humbugs  
 
In the book The Humbugs of the World (1866), the 19th century circus founder and 
hoax creator Phineas Taylor Barnum talked about scams or humbugs, as he called them, 
perpetrated at the time.  These old-fashioned humbugs included fake lotteries, miracle 
cures, financial, clairvoyant and psychic scams many of which are still in operation 
today and are often perpetrated on the phone or online (Lea et al., 2009).  The Action 
Fraud website's list of currently known frauds is extensive and includes among others; 
impersonation of officials, ticket fraud, health scams, holiday fraud, recruitment scams, 
rental scams, tax fraud, insurance fraud, doorstep fraud, courier fraud, pension scams, 
pyramid scheme fraud, inheritance scams (also Button et al., 2009a).  
 
The diversity of frauds operating today suggests that frauds evolve quickly, proliferate 
and flourish in current climate and trends indicate that fraud is becoming more 
organised (CIFAS, 2014).  With the invention of the Internet, the delivery of fraudulent 
offers to prospective victims became anonymous, global and more cost effective for the 
perpetrator (Cukier, Nesselroth & Cody 2007; Dyrud, 2005; Smith, 2010).   The cross-
border element, which is often part of online scams, may be responsible for the low 
detection and prosecution of fraud perpetrators (Button et al., 2012) and email remains 
the most popular delivery method for scams delivered to all age groups (Citizens 
Advice, 2017).   
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Most scams require a degree of communication and cooperation from the victim, 
however some frauds require none at all (Lea et al., 2009; Titus & Gover, 2001).  
Identity fraud victims are defrauded without any knowledge that the crime is taking 
place, while other scams rely on communication.  For example, dating scams, work by 
building interpersonal trust through lengthy communication with the victim, akin to 
'grooming'.  This results in an emotional commitment, making it hard to refuse 
compliance with the requests for money (Whitty, 2013).  Examples of different scams 
are examined below.  
 
2.2.1 Nigerian scams  
Nigerian scams (also known as advance fee or 419 scams) are a long standing, 
widespread and easily recognised type of scam delivered via email.  For example, an 
email from a high-ranking Nigerian official needing help getting funds out of the 
country is received and victims are promised a sum of money for help with transfer of 
these funds (Figure 2.1).  However, before this can proceed, victims are asked to pay 
various fees, such as legal fees (Dyrud, 2005).  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Nigerian (419) advance fee scam communication  
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Although it is most frequently associated with the Internet, Glickman (2005) posits that 
Nigerian scams can be traced to the 1970s but Zuckoff (2005) argues that it goes as far 
back as 16th century, which shows how this type of scam has evolved through time.  
Nigerian scams are often designed to appeal to emotions, evoke sympathy and often put 
the recipient in a position of power (i.e. a helper) and variants are common (Dyrud, 
2005; Cukier et al., 2007).  Recent 419 type scams tend to vary in narratives and the 
identities they construct, with scammers adopting either a private (e.g. war refugee, 
widow) or an institutional (e.g. bank official, lawyer etc.) role in order to engage the 
recipient and justify the contact (Hiss, 2015).  Nigerian scams, which used to be 
delivered by postal means or via telephone and fax at a considerable cost to the 
scammer (Glickman, 2005) are now delivered online, incurring little cost to the 
scammer (Button et al., 2015).  
People may often laugh at Nigerian scams as they are deemed obvious and implausible. 
For example, possibly the most entertaining variant of this scam is the Nigerian 
astronaut stranded in space and needing funds to come back home (Molloy, 2016).  
However, Herley (2012) argues that such scams, specifically mentioning they are from 
Nigeria, are used solely to identify the most gullible and vulnerable victims, whose 
details can then be passed on to other scammers (Nikiforova & Gregory, 2013).  These 
victims are then repeatedly targeted.  In extreme cases, Nigerian scams may end in a 
victim travelling to meet the scammer, being kidnapped for ransom or even killed 
(Cukier et al., 2007; Dyrud, 2005; Glickman, 2005).  In some cases, victims have also 
ended up being charged with fraud themselves (Zuckoff, 2005).  
2.2.2 Identity fraud and identity theft  
Identity fraud involves unlawful use of an individual's personal details to get goods and 
services.  It is often committed by redirecting victim's mail to a different address, 
although cases where mail is intercepted (e.g. where there is a shared hallway or 
letterbox) are also common.  This is why frequent movers or those who live in property 
with shared hallway, where mail can be easily stolen are more at risk.  Many victims 
only find out they are a victim of an identity fraud when they receive a letter chasing a 
debt they know nothing about (Experian, 2010; Pascoe, Owen, Keats & Gill, 2006).   
Perpetrators may open new bank accounts or apply for credit, take over the existing 
account of the victim or use the information gained to make payments online.          
They may also have ways of cloning credit cards (Button, et al., 2009a; Saunders & 
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Zucker, 1999).  
More sophisticated ID fraud may include an identity theft, where a perpetrator 
permanently assumes the identity of the victim or someone that is deceased (Button, et 
al., 2009a; Rege, 2009).  The new identity is often used to procure a birth certificate, 
passport and/or other important documents, which are needed to secure employment or 
large loans, such as a mortgage.  This may also aid other criminal activities, such as 
funding terrorism (Button, et al., 2009a). 
 
Identity fraud perpetrators often utilise publically available information, such as 
registrations for company directors.  Information about businesses and business 
directors are publically available via Companies House, a website for registration of 
companies in the UK and can be used to add legitimacy to a scam (Button, et al., 
2009a).  For example, there are recent cases of a ‘CEO’ fraud, where the scammer 
contacts the company staff, pretending to be the chief executive and requesting 
payments to be made to fraudulent accounts (Button et al., 2017).   
 
According to Experian (2010), the people most vulnerable to identity fraud include; 
company directors and business owners, individuals with successful careers, high-
income earners, wealthy retired couples and young singles living in rented 
accommodation.  Those living in London and affluent surrounding areas are also more 
at risk (also Pascoe et al., 2006).  Romance scams can also, sometimes, lead to ID fraud 
(Rege, 2009).  Having such a diverse range of victims makes it harder to design 
effective fraud protective measures fit for all.  
 
2.2.3 Romance scams  
Victims of romance scams are usually contacted through online dating sites or social 
media.  The perpetrator develops a relationship with a victim and may claim to be in 
love with the victim very early on.  The ensuing communication is frequent, lengthy and 
intense (Buchanan & Whitty, 2014).  A strong bond is created by daily communication 
between the victim and the perpetrator, as it becomes a routine part of the victim's life.  
The scammer presents himself or herself as the ideal partner and grooms their victim 
until they are ready to be defrauded.  If the victim denies a request for funds, the 
perpetrator may threaten to leave the relationship in order to influence compliance 
(Whitty, 2013).   
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Whitty and Buchanan (2012a) conducted interviews with victims of romance scams and 
examined large number of posts on an online peer support group.  They found that those 
who held romantic beliefs, with a greater tendency to idealise romantic partners were 
more likely to be victims of romance scams and lose funds in the process.  Men were 
also more likely to be victims of romance fraud than women and the likelihood did not 
differ for men of different sexual orientation; however, women lost more money and 
reported more emotional distress than men.  Whitty (2013) found that romance fraud 
victims did not ignore the warning signs, often requesting to see proof (e.g. boarding 
passes they paid for) or asking the perpetrator about the country they said they were 
living in and trying to check facts.  However, scammers often went to great lengths to 
present victims with fake information to make the scam look as authentic as possible.  
 
Romance scams frequently use elaborate scenarios that vary according to the gender of 
the victim.  For example, male fictitious characters may be presented as having a high 
standing such as an army general or a businessman, recently widowed and often with a 
child to care for.  Female characters tend to be young and vulnerable and in need of help 
(Whitty & Buchanan, 2012a).   The scam also follows a certain progression; developing 
trust, where the scammer may do things to prove their love with a goal of creating an 
intense relationship with a victim.  The online relationship is often more intimate than 
relationships that develop face-to-face, grooming the victim for later stages of the scam 
(Whitty & Buchanan, 2012a; Whitty, 2013).  In the grooming stage, victims are 
encouraged to discuss their deepest thoughts, feelings and fears, fostering trust between 
the perpetrator and the victim until they are ready to be defrauded.  Any financial loss 
does not happen until after the victim has been groomed for some time.  First, the 
perpetrator may ask for a small gift, after which a crisis occurs (e.g. the romantic 
partner is in a car accident) and the victim is asked for a larger sum of money.  A 
maintenance stage may also be introduced after the crisis, where a third party is 
involved, in order to add plausibility, such as a doctor telling the victim that their love 
interest is ill and needs funds for hospital bills (Whitty & Buchanan, 2012a).  
 
Victims often find it hard to believe the relationship is fake, even after being told by the 
police that they have been defrauded, which may leave them open to being defrauded 
again.  Additionally, the impact on the victims of this type of fraud is extensive, as they 
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come to terms with the loss of funds as well as the loss of a relationship (Buchanan & 
Whitty, 2014; Whitty & Buchanan, 2012b; Whitty & Buchanan, 2016).   
 
2.2.4 Phishing, vishing and smishing  
New types of fraud and techniques that enable fraud delivery online, on the phone and 
via mobile phones are emerging (Kerr, Owen, McNaughton Nicholls & Button, 2013). 
These are outlined in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2  
Some types of phishing attacks identified by Orman (2013) 
 
Type of attack Description 
 
Phishing and pharming 
 
Personal information obtained via fake websites 
 
Smishing Personal information obtained via SMS 
 
Vishing Personal information obtained over the phone 
 
Spear phishing Highly targeted spam emails 
 
Koobface (social media) Virus sent via messages on social media 
 
Malware Computer/smartphone taken over externally to steal personal details 
 
 
 
Phishing is a form of social engineering attack or a request for compliance, which uses 
social interaction as a means to persuade (Mouton, Leenan, Malan & Venter, 2014).  It 
is usually delivered via email or a text message, which purports to be from a legitimate 
source in order to procure personal information.  Often such emails do not stand out 
from other emails users receive from known organisations and contain appropriate 
logos.  Such emails will also contain a demand or a compliance request luring the 
potential victim to click a link (Cross et al., 2014; Orman, 2013; Parrish, Bailey & 
Courtney, 2009).  Phishing attacks, according to Orman (2013) have certain common 
characteristics; an email that appears to be from a legitimate business, a website that 
mimics a legitimate business, a large list of intended victims, an IP address for the 
website server, malware collecting information from users and may also have malware 
that tricks users to install it on their computers (Orman, 2013).    
 
Increases in Internet use have meant that the likelihood of phishing attacks is also 
higher (Hutchings & Hayes, 2008). With the increased sharing of links via social media, 
users are also increasingly familiar with and therefore less cautious about clicking links 
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without thinking about the potential dangers, therefore phishing attempts are now also 
increasingly prevalent on social media platforms (Frauenstein & Flowerday, 2016). 
 
Spear phishing attacks are targeted phishing attacks that are highly personalised, usually 
designed to look as if they are coming from a person known to the victim.  As such, 
they look more credible and legitimate.  Spear phishing attacks are behind some of the 
very high-profile breeches (e.g. Google).  Although more costly and time consuming, 
they have a much greater rate of success (Parmar, 2012).  This suggests that scammers 
are now designing highly sophisticated and very specific attacks, rather than casting a 
wide net.  
 
Jagatic, Johnson, Jacobsson and Manczeret (2007) simulated a phishing attack in order 
to see whether an email coming from a friend rather than from a stranger would 
influence compliance with a phishing request.  Students selected for the study were 
specifically chosen based on the amount and the quality of the information they shared 
about themselves online, as this is often how scammers choose their victims.  One 
group of participants received an email purporting to be from a person known to them 
(i.e. a spoof email), with the goal of redirecting them to a phishing site where they were 
asked to enter their university details.  Another group received an email from a person 
they did not know but who had a university email from the same institution.  They 
found that phishing emails were more successful when they came from a friend than 
from a stranger.  Emails were also more successful when they purported to come from 
an opposite gender, with this effect being stronger for men.  
 
More sophisticated phishing attacks may also target specific individuals.  Collecting 
information about the intended victim prior to the attack can often mean that the attack 
may be more lucrative than just casting a wide net.  These types of phishing attacks are 
known as 'whale phishing', because they target those in high positions in an 
organisation, such as directors of chief executives (Button et al., 2017; Orman, 2013).   
 
Voice phishing or vishing are telephone scams designed to procure information from a 
victim.  The delivery of a voice phishing email is usually done through Voice Over 
Internet (VOIP) calling and while this costs more to execute than sending an email, it is 
also more effective and equally anonymous (Maggi, 2010).  Typically, the perpetrator 
uses stolen personal information about the victim, in order to make them believe the call 
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is from a legitimate source (e.g. a bank).   Further security information is then harvested 
from the victim, such as the personal identification numbers or other security data 
(Chang & Lee, 2010).  Voice phishing scams are difficult to research due to the fact that 
there is no physical trace of the phishing attack, such as an email, and reports rely on the 
victim’s account (Maggi, 2010).  
 
With the increasing use of mobile phones and smartphones, fraud is now also 
perpetrated by smishing, or SMS phishing.  Smishing works similarly to ordinary 
phishing attacks, by asking users to click links embedded in the message, often 
impersonating legitimate organisations by manipulating the address information (Yan, 
Eidenbenz & Galli, 2009).   Smartphones are particularly vulnerable to phishing attacks, 
as they run complete operating systems, allowing users to install different applications 
and to bank via mobile banking.  As such, smartphones often contain more sensitive 
data (Jeon, Kim, Lee &Won, 2011).  In addition, smartphones aid different ways of 
delivery for phishing communication.  Reviewing the data on phishing attacks affecting 
mobile phones, Foozy, Ahmad and Abdollah (2013) identified four different phishing 
attack strategies; via Bluetooth, SMS, by vishing (i.e. phone phishing) and by mobile 
web applications.   These attacks may result in users exposing their personal 
information through phishing links or even in the perpetrator gaining partial or full 
control of the victim’s smartphone (Jeon et al., 2011).  Frauenstein and Flowerday 
(2016) argue that the automated behaviour of clicking and sharing links on social media 
platforms means people are less cautious regarding the information they receive, 
making phishing attacks more successful. 
 
2.2.5 Lotteries, prize draws and sweepstakes  
Fake lotteries, prize draws and sweepstakes follow a similar pattern.  Victims are 
usually sent emails or a letter informing them that they have won a prize or a lottery.  In 
order to claim the prize or access the lottery win, the victims are asked for an 
administration fee (Button et al., 2009a; Cross et al., 2014).  
 
Lea et al. (2009) conducted interviews with fraud victims examining the scam 
communication and found that sweepstake scams utilise three main persuasive 
techniques; perception of authority, quoting large sums of money and stressing the 
urgency to respond.  Communcations often contained barcodes, seals or watermarks 
making them look official and legitimate and also frequently used the victim's name 
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throughout.  The large prizes are used specifically and often in a cheque form, in order 
to evoke excitement and urging the victim to respond by a deadline, which is likely to 
reduce the recipient's motivation to carefully consider the information.  
 
Lottery scams also often utilise several psychological techniques.  Similar to 
sweepstakes and prizes, they offer large prizes in order to entice the victim, stress the 
urgency to respond and give perception of authority (Button et al., 2009a; Lea et al., 
2009).  According to Lea et al. (2009), a key distinguishable feature of lottery scams is 
that they typically do not ask for money, but instead, urge the potential victim to get in 
contact with an agent to begin the claim.  Contact with the scammer is likely to 
encourage commitment.  In one case, the victim contacted the agent only to be told to 
contact the bank manager, after which the victim was told that there would be a fee to 
access the win, as she did not reside in the country.  After that fee, the victim was 
contacted again and asked for further fees.  Scammers may also contact people that 
usually participate in lotteries in order to make it more convincing (Button et al., 
2009a). 
 
2.2.6 Psychic and clairvoyant scams  
Psychic or clairvoyant scams fall under 'sale of bogus products and services' and affect a 
great number of people.  Typically, victims are targeted by mail and offered predictions 
of the future for a small fee with female and younger populations being more vulnerable 
to this type of fraud (Button et al., 2009a; Lonsdale, Schweppenstedde, Strang, 
Stepanek & Stewart, 2016).   
 
Lea et al. (2009) report that these types of scams use several specific psychological 
techniques.  The communication often mentions deadlines, which may reduce 
motivation to process information carefully, and contains perceived authority cues, such 
as mentioned qualifications (e.g. parapsychologist, cosmologist etc.).  Sometimes 
psychic scams evoke fear by mentioning references to danger or a threat and offering 
protection from the same but can also promise large monetary gains by removing bad 
luck from the victim.  The psychic frequently claims to have a secret knowledge of the 
victim and to be looking out for them.  
 
The National Centre for Post-Qualifying Social Work and Professional Practice (2016) 
identified bereaved individuals as particularly vulnerable to this type of scam (also 
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Olivier, Burls, Fenge & Brown, 2015).  Victims of psychic scams can find themselves 
in a relationship of 'emotional dependence' with the perpetrator (Lea et al., 2009), with 
some victims blackmailed into paying a fee to protect them or their loved ones from 
harm (Button, et al., 2009a; Loxton, 2008).  
 
 
2.2.7 Miracle cures  
Miracle cure scams tend to target people with chronic or embarrassing conditions, who 
are desperate for improvement in their condition.  An example of a miracle cure type 
scam can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Miracle cure scam type correspondence 
 
By analysing the contents of different scams, Lea et al. (2009) found that miracle cure 
letters most commonly offer cures for obesity, diabetes, impotence, loss of libido, 
arthritis, baldness and cancer.  Lea et al. (2009) suggest these types of scams use social 
proof cues, such as fake testimonials from other people, to encourage potential victims 
to purchase the products. 
 
Miracle cure scams may also have a professional and legitimate appearance, but the 
cures they offer are largely ineffective and could also be dangerous.  These types of 
scams tend to affect women more than men and are rarely reported (Button et al., 
2009a). 
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2.2.8 Business opportunities and investment scams   
Another type of a business opportunity scam is a pyramid scheme.  Victims are asked to 
pay a fee to enter a pyramid and by recruiting others, they would earn substantial sums 
of money.  Both these types of scams try to evoke excitement by offering large rewards 
for little effort although some work from home opportunities keep the amount offered 
modest, possibly so that it would not arouse suspicion.  Scammers often describe 
themselves as having been in a similar situation to the victim in order to appear similar 
and often target people who may have difficulty finding a conventional job, either due 
to disability or family commitments (Lea et al., 2009).   Button et al. (2009a) suggests 
that pyramid or Ponzi schemes tend to target groups of people who work, socialise or 
attend the same groups and activities together in order to target one victim who would 
then recruit others, taking advantage of the social influence friends or coworkers may 
have on one another.  
 
Investment scams are also known as 'boiler room fraud' due to the fact that scammers 
target victims with high-pressure tactics, often impersonating or cloning legitimate 
companies in order to add credibility to the scheme.  Frauds falling under this category 
include high-risk investments, property investment schemes (Button et al., 2009a; Kerr 
et al., 2013) with victims of this type of fraud often having some degree of financial 
knowledge, making them more confident about their decisions in this area (Lea et al., 
2009). 
 
Although the scam examples above are by no means exhaustive; they outline the more 
frequent fraudulent practices in operation today.  However, where there is money to be 
made there is fraud.  To illustrate just how harmful fraud can be, a review by Mohapatra 
(2012) outlined cases of surrogacy fraud, in which potential surrogates from poorer 
countries were promised large sums of money to carry a child for a family they had 
never met, without a surrogacy agreement.  After a certain time, they were told the 
would-be parents had changed their minds and the infants were advertised for adoption.  
The surrogacy agreements were falsified, leading to problems with legalising the 
adoption process.  This illustrates just how harmful fraud can be and how inventive and 
callous perpetrators of fraud are becoming.  
The interview study in this programme of research (Study 1), considered diverse range 
of frauds; face-to-face frauds, online frauds using fake websites, pyramid scheme, 
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investment scam, online auction scam and scams offering jobs and professional training 
online.  The exclusion of the romance scams was made based on the fact that romance 
scams often include continuous communication over period of months, designed to 
create deep emotional bonds.  Romance scams are, therefore, different from frauds, 
which require a decision based on the evaluation of the scam offer and were excluded 
from this programme of research, despite sharing some common elements with other 
scams (e.g. persuasive techniques such as authority cues, reciprocity etc.).  
 
2.3 Scamming techniques  
In a review of different types of Internet fraud and the deceptive techniques each 
employs, Rusch (1999) found several aspects of social psychology that may explain 
how certain scams work, such as engaging alternative routes to persuasion, persuasive 
techniques employed by scammers as well as attitudes and beliefs affecting social 
interaction.  Chang and Chong (2010) analysed the content of different fraudulent e-
mails and found that scammers use several coercive techniques to influence potential 
victims.   These included asserting authority and expert status to adopt a position of 
power over the victim, creating urgency or implying scarcity, sending communications 
that are very complex in nature and require a great deal of effort to understand, 
soliciting small commitments to influence bigger commitments at a later time and 
evoking positive emotions in relation to the scam offer in order to influence the 
decision-making process.  Several of these are common persuasion techniques (Cialdini, 
2001) and have been identified by past research (Cukier et al., 2007; Langenderfer & 
Shimp, 2001; Lea et al., 2009; Rusch, 1999; Zuckoff, 2005).  These techniques will now 
be discussed.  
 
2.3.1 Evoking visceral influence 
Using data on consumer fraud and behaviour, conducted by an American Organization 
for Retired People’s interests and by surveying the employees of the Better Business 
Bureau (BBB), a non-profit organization that promotes ethical business conducts, 
Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) proposed a theoretical model of scamming 
vulnerability that outlined visceral influence as a factor that contributes to scam 
vulnerability, by directing the victim's attention away from rational thinking (Figure 
2.3).  
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Lowestein (1996) describes visceral influences as primal drive states, such as fear, 
hunger, greed, sexual desires etc. (also Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006).  A person under 
visceral influence is likely to divert their attention from careful information processing 
towards the attainment of an object or an activity that would satisfy the visceral need 
(e.g. a hungry person tends to think about food).   For example, positive emotions 
evoked by an attractive scam offer lead to a lowered risk perception and increase the 
likelihood of impulsive behaviour (Slovic & Peters, 2006).  Scams are frequently 
designed to evoke visceral influences to compromise careful thinking (Langenderfer & 
Shimp, 2001; Rusch, 1999).  Due to the fact that visceral influence tends to be 
temporary, many scams also emphasise quick decision making by imposing time limits 
to scam offers (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001).  
 
Visceral influence can be triggered by the thought of high prizes (e.g. a lottery win) or 
the promise of a cure that would alleviate pain (Lea et al., 2009).  Visceral influence is 
greater when the scam reward appears close in time and space, and is vivid.  Vividness 
can be manipulated by telling the potential victim someone similar to them has also 
received the scam reward and has profited from it (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001).  
  
Many frauds perpetrated online are designed to trigger strong emotional responses in 
order to detract from rational thinking (Cukier et al., 2007).   For example, phishing 
emails suggesting the account of a victim has been compromised to evoke fear or panic, 
making the victim more likely to use the links provided in the email to correct this.  
 
2.3.2 Liking and similarity  
Scammers are often skilled at appearing likeable and pretend to like their victims in 
order to persuade them; as people like those who like them (Lea et al., 2009).  Giving 
compliments and having frequent contact with a victim is also thought to facilitate 
liking.  Since people are thought to like those similar to them in some way, scammers 
may dress or act similar to the potential victim or pretend to have similar interests, 
problems or background (Cialdini, 2001).  For example, in her interview study with 
romance fraud victims, Whitty (2013) found that scammers often told their victims that 
they had the same interests as them or liked the same things and this similarity enhanced 
the feeling of closeness.  Analysing scam communication, Lea et al. (2009) found that 
some types of scams use similarity to influence the potential victim, by using phrases 
such as 'I was just like you' or 'I was in your situation'.  
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Research also found that similarity could reduce the perceived threat.  Silvia (2005) 
conducted an experiment in which participants were given an essay to read on a certain 
topic.  The essay was manipulated to either include threatening elements (e.g. sentences 
strongly expressing opposing attitudes) or exclude threatening elements.  Participants 
were asked to rate certain values (e.g. accomplishment, true friendship, justice) on how 
important they were to them and these answers were used as a similarity manipulation 
for the essays.  Some participants received an essay with a profile of the author, which 
was based on their own ratings of certain values, while other participants received the 
same essay but the profile of the author was dissimilar to them.   They then completed 
the questionnaire measuring agreement with the author of the essay, opinions on 
whether the author was trying to persuade them or stop them from making up their 
mind.  The study found that when similarity between the participants and the author of 
the essay was low, participants did not agree with essays containing the threatening 
elements as much as they agreed with essays containing no threats.  But when the 
similarity was high between the participants and the author of the essay, participants 
agreed with the author of the essay, regardless of whether it contained the threatening 
elements or not.  Additionally, when similarity was high, the communication was 
perceived as less coercive than when the similarity was low.  Similarity, Silvia (2005) 
argues, can reduce the perceived threat as well as enhance liking, which can influence 
compliance by minimising the difference in opinions.  
 
2.3.3 Evoking social norms  
People tend to prize several socially benevolent characteristics, such as being a good 
citizen, being charitable, helpful or kind.   These attributes are often exploited by 
scammers who may pretend they are vulnerable or in need of help (Lea et al., 2009; 
Titus & Gover, 2001; Witty, 2013).   
 
Another socially desirable behaviour is reciprocating a favour.  Scammers may exploit 
this by giving a small gift to a victim in order to facilitate reciprocation later.  For 
example, Whitty (2013) found that in some cases of romance fraud, the perpetrator 
would send the victim a gift, such as flowers or other love tokens, and this act would 
facilitate compliance with a subsequent request for money.  One victim reported that 
this gesture even convinced her friend that the scammer was a genuine person, and this 
was the moment that she started sending funds.  
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Another way reciprocation can be exploited is by making an extreme request, likely to 
be immediately rejected, in order to make a smaller request, which then appears as a 
concession and is more likely to be accepted (Cialdini, 2001).  In the study by Benton, 
Kelley and Liebling (1972), participants were told to decide, with an opponent, how the 
money they were given should be divided between them.  If a decision could not be 
reached, the money would be withheld.  The opponent (research assistant) would either 
make a demand for a large sum of money and refuse to lower the amount, request a low 
sum of money and maintain this through negotiations or make a demand for a large sum 
and when rejected, slowly reduce the demanded amount.  The study found that 
participants made more generous offers when their opponent first demanded large sums 
of money and then reduced their demands than compared to the other two conditions.  
Participants also reported feeling more satisfied with the outcome in this condition.  
 
2.3.4 Authority  
Scams often purport to be from someone in a position of authority, such as a solicitor, 
doctor, police officer or a bank official, in order to facilitate compliance.  People tend to 
trust and obey authoritative figures, as this constitutes correct conduct, and are therefore 
more likely to comply (Cialdini, 2001; Lea et al., 2009; Modic & Lea, 2013; Whitty, 
2013; Whitty & Buchanan, 2012b).  
 
Examining different scam communications, Lea et al. (2009) found that scam offers 
often purport to be from someone in a position of authority (e.g. in a position to 
facilitate the offer).  Conducting interviews with romance fraud victims, Whitty and 
Buchanan (2012a) found that in the later stages of a romance scam, a victim is often 
told the romantic partner is in trouble and a third person is introduced to the scam.  This 
person is often in a position of authority; a doctor, a police officer or a lawyer.  They 
argue that this technique is deliberate as people are more likely to comply with authority 
figures.  
 
Workman (2008) investigated security breaches in a large organisation.  Employees 
were given questionnaire items based on previous research, measuring commitments 
(Allen & Meyer, 1990), reactance/resistance (i.e. motivational reaction to rules, offers 
or people, perceived to threaten behavioural freedoms) and obedience to authority 
(Massi Lindsey, 2005; Weatherly, Miller & McDonald, 1999) and trust (Gendall, 2005).  
In addition, Workman (2008) conducted a field study over a period of 6 months, 
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consisting of objective observations, where participants were not aware what was being 
studied.  Participants were sent previously successful phishing emails, which were 
followed up by phone calls pretending to be from internal employees or trading 
partners, utility companies and financial institutions in order to gain confidential 
information from participants using persuasive techniques.  They found that obedience 
to authority, high normative commitment (e.g. reciprocity) and trust lead to greater 
vulnerability to social engineering attacks such as phishing or phone phishing.   
These findings are consistent with findings by Fischer, Lea and Evans (2013), who 
analysed the data from a series of fraud research studies conducted by Lea et al. (2009).  
Fischer et al. (2013) found that scam victims were more influenced by fake signs of 
authority, often used by scammers to enhance compliance.  Using interviews transcripts 
to identify words most frequently mentioned, Fischer et al. (2013) found authority as 
one of the words frequently mentioned by victims when recounting their experience.  
Additionally, Fischer et al. (2013) simulated a postal scam, followed up by a 
questionnaire asking for reaction to the same scam.  They found that trust associated 
with the scam offer varied according to whether symbols of authority were present.  
However, this was not confirmed in the consequent study, and the authors suggested 
that this may be due to the complex ways in which content factors interact in order to 
make a scam offer attractive.  However, it could be argued that these differences may 
also be attributed to individual differences.  For example, in their study, Modic and Lea 
(2013) developed a measure of susceptibility to persuasion, which was administered to 
participants who were also asked to evaluate real life situations that could potentially be 
scams.  Participants were asked if they thought it was likely that each scenario was a 
scam and whether they had ever found themselves in, responded to, or lost money in 
such a situation.  They found that authority (e.g. being influenced by authority figures) 
predicted whether someone is likely to respond to fraud offers.  Therefore, personal 
attributes may also play a role in how affective scam content factors are in persuading 
one to respond or comply with fraudulent offers.  
 
2.3.5 Scarcity and urgency 
When something is scarce or not easily available, people will assign more value to it.   
Limiting the quantity or limiting the duration of an offer can simulate scarcity.  When 
something desired is not easily available, it becomes even more desirable.  Scarcity also 
makes things appear more valuable by skewing the perception of quality (Cialdini, 
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2001).   For example, Kramer and Carroll (2009) conducted several experiments, which 
explored out of stock options on purchase intention.  In one of their studies, they asked 
participants to imagine they are at a store deciding to purchase a mobile phone that was 
described as being an average size with an average battery life.  Some participants were 
told other phones were out of stock (e.g. larger phone with longer battery life or smaller 
phone with shorter battery life) while the control group was not given this information.  
Participants then had to rate the likelihood of purchasing the phone.  The study found 
that when participants were told other phones were out of stock, they were significantly 
more likely to purchase the average phone.  Kramer and Carroll (2009) suggest this is 
due to scarcity cues.  
 
Scammers are often thought to emphasize the uniqueness of the scam offer and urge the 
potential victim to make an instant decision in order to avoid losing the opportunity.  
Stajano and Wilson (2010) researched different scams in order to examine techniques 
used by scammers, as well as behavioural patterns of fraud victims.  They found that 
scammers often emphasise that the offer is a 'one time offer' and the potential victim 
needs to act quickly.  This approach is also used in some phishing scams, such as those 
that urge the victim to urgently confirm their details or their account access will be 
blocked.  However, research by Fischer et al. (2013) found that scarcity cues in scam 
correspondence might have the opposite effect, making the potential victim more 
suspicious.  This suggests that while some people may be influenced by these scamming 
techniques, others are able to recognise them and apply caution.  
 
2.3.6 Social proof and social influence 
People shape their beliefs and behaviour by looking at how others behave and what they 
believe, therefore scam offers that have bogus testimonials or the backing of other 
people tend to be more successful (Cialdini, 2001; Stajano & Wilson, 2011).   
 
Lea et al. (2009) found that social proof can be a feature of some business opportunity 
scams as they often contain fake testimonials of people who have previously benefitted 
from the opportunity.   Stajano and Wilson (2011) found that social proof or what they 
call 'herd principle' is often used as scamming techniques as people let their guard down 
when they see others taking risks.  For example, in auction scams, shills, or fake bidders 
may bid on items for sale and leave the feedback for the seller.  This bogus feedback 
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will inspire confidence in others who want to buy from the same seller.  Scammers also 
frequently set up fake aliases on social media or other online communications 
platforms, in order to convince potential victims that there are others who share the 
same opinion.   
 
Research by Modic and Lea (2013) also found that those who scored more highly on a 
measure of social influence (i.e. being influenced by their peers or social circle) were 
more likely to respond to fraud offers.  They suggested that scammers might exploit this 
by pretending to have a close relationship with potential victims in order to prompt 
compliance.  
 
However, in some cases, scams may encourage avoidance of social influence, possibly 
to stop the victim from discussing it with others and becoming suspicious.  Lea et al. 
(2009) found that lottery scams frequently urge the potential victim to keep the win 
confidential by stating that the leaked information may result in double claims by 
others, and this would make the win void.   
 
2.3.7 Commitment and consistency  
In his review of known persuasion techniques, Cialdini (2001) suggests that personal 
consistency is a desired and culturally valued personality trait, referring to one’s 
personal beliefs being in accordance (i.e. consistent) with one’s behaviour.  People 
appreciate when theirs and others’ beliefs and behaviours are consistent, therefore a 
person who exhibits inconsistent beliefs may be viewed as two-faced or confused.  
Scammers exploit this.  For example, once a scammer succeeds in persuading the 
potential victim to respond, it makes it easier to also get them to comply with future 
requests (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).  Scammers often request a response without 
asking for money first for that reason.  Lea et al. (2009) found that lottery scams often 
ask potential victims to get in touch with various different people so that the lottery win 
can be processed.  This fosters commitment.  Fischer et al. (2013) examined a large 
body of different scam communications and found that scammers often asked for small 
commitments from the victim, such as returning a letter or sending a small fee.  These 
small commitments make it more likely that the victim will cooperate further in the 
future.  Additionally, Modic and Lea (2013) found that consistency (i.e. the need to 
honour previous commitments) predicted responding to scam offers.  
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2.3.8 Dishonesty and distraction principles 
By analysing different scams and scamming techniques, Stajano and Wilson (2011) 
found that some scams are based on declared dishonesty and distraction principles.  
Scammers sometimes openly tell their victim that what they are getting involved in is 
illegal and that this is the reason the victim is getting a 'good deal'.  For example, 
Nigerian or 419 scams sometimes use this technique (e.g. money laundering) and 
victims, once defrauded, may feel they have no recourse because they did something 
illegal.  Additionally, scammers are good at distracting victims from thinking about 
negative issues.  For example, distraction can be applied by emphasizing the size of the 
reward in order to detract from the warning signs. 
 
Successful deception relies on rational beliefs people have about the world and the way 
they respond to it, therefore a deceiver needs to know what the victim perceives as 
‘regular’ in order to act accordingly.  This requires extensive knowledge that 
incorporates psychology, cultural conventions and regular life patterns of the victim 
(Mitchell, 1996).  As such, scams can be extremely sophisticated events.  Identifying 
techniques employed by scammers offers an insight into the scam process, however this 
process also depends on other components, such as individual differences, which may 
increase vulnerability to fraud.  
 
 
2.4 Theories and models of scam vulnerability  
 
The literature reviewed above shows how fraud techniques, social mechanisms and  
other situational factors have an impact on scam victimisation, however a different way 
of approaching the phenomenon is at the individual level.  In addition to different 
scamming and social engineering techniques frequently used to encourage scam 
compliance, different theories and psychological models have been proposed to assist 
the understanding of how different factors combine to influence compliance with 
fraudulent offers.  
 
2.4.1 Errors of judgment  
Research by Lea et al. (2009), which consisted of four large-scale studies, including 
extended interviews with victims of scams and the text mining of scam communication 
materials, identified different factors involved in errors of judgment connected to scams. 
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These errors are separated into two groups; motivational and cognitive (Table 2.3).    
 
 
Table 2.3.  
Cognitive and motivational factors involved in errors of judgment by Lea, Fischer and Evans (2009) 
 
Motivational Factors  
 
Cognitive Factors  
Factor  Description Factor  Description 
 
Visceral 
influence 
 
Basic human desires and  
needs (e.g. greed, fear etc.) 
 
Reduced 
cognitive 
abilities 
 
 
Cognitive abilities are 
necessary for decision making 
and to distinguish legitimate 
offers from scams 
 
 
Reduced 
motivation for 
information 
processing 
Triggered by scam 
communication such as scarcity 
of the offer or visceral 
influence, but can be a result of 
cognitive impairment 
 
 
Positive 
illusions 
Tendency to see oneself in a 
positive light and 
overestimate one’s abilities 
Preference for 
confirmation 
Tendency to seek information 
that confirms one’s preferences 
Background 
knowledge and 
overconfidence 
Background knowledge can 
lead to overconfidence in 
one’s decisions 
 
 
Lack of  
self-control 
Inability to regulate emotional 
responses 
Norm 
activation 
Scams often target specific 
social norms, such as helping 
others, being polite etc. 
 
 
Mood 
regulation  
and phantom 
fixation 
Attempt to control mental 
states, such as trying to avoid  
a negative mood by shopping 
False 
consensus 
Overestimating the reliability 
and validity of an offer 
because it has a backing of 
other people 
 
 
Sensation 
seeking 
Emotional effects which elicit 
excitement and arousal, 
associated with risk taking  
 
 
Authority Tendency to obey authority 
Liking and 
similarity 
Tendency to like those that like 
us and are similar to us 
Social proof Tendency to look to others to 
define our reality 
 
 
Reciprocation Basic tendency to want to 
reciprocate the favour 
Altercasting Scammers often place their 
victims in complimentary 
roles (e.g. a friend) 
 
Commitment 
and 
consistency 
Exploiting people’s desires for 
consistency in the behaviour, 
theirs and other’s by initiating 
communication before asking 
for money 
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For example, scams evoke visceral influence by offering high rewards for little effort on 
the victim’s part, while the authority is established by purporting the offer is backed by 
someone in a position of authority (e.g. bank official, solicitor, director etc.).   These 
techniques are used in order to detract from careful information processing, to evoke 
errors in judgments in order to facilitate scam compliance.  
 
The following two studies by Lea et al. (2009) compared susceptibility of these errors 
of judgment in victims of scams and those that have not been scammed in the past.  The 
first study involved constructing a questionnaire consisting of statements that identified 
different errors of judgment connected to scam vulnerability and asking participants to 
indicate their feelings about the scam offers received in the past in connection with 
these errors.  Participants were separated into two groups; those that have never been a 
victim of a scam and those that were scammed in the past.  The findings indicated that 
the two groups differed in their tendency to commit judgment errors, with those classed 
as non-victims showing no or very little agreement with the statements, whereas victims 
and near victims report medium agreement with the statements.  They postulated that 
victims have a general vulnerability to persuasion, not just a specific weakness towards 
the type of scam offer they responded to.  
 
The following study was a simulated scam experiment, in which a scam letter, designed 
to include the content cues affecting errors in judgment (e.g. high prize, official looking 
letter, urgency cues etc.) was sent to unsuspecting participants.  Differences emerged 
between those who report previously responding to scams and those who do not, with 
previous responders more likely to respond again and showing less dislike of the scam 
situation.  Lea et al. (2009) suggest this means that certain people may be particularly 
vulnerable to repeat victimisation.   
 
Lea et al. (2009) studies explain how certain scamming techniques work to affect 
people’s judgments when evaluating fraudulent communication.  The studies also 
demonstrated that individual vulnerability varies between people, with some people 
being more likely to respond to fraudulent offers, however, the study did not measure 
personal attributes that may underlie the likelihood of responding when simulating a 
fraudulent situation.  
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2.4.2 Model of scamming vulnerability  
The theoretical model of scamming vulnerability by Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) 
was based on the large-scale research conducted with elderly victims of fraud by the 
American Association of Retired People and their own survey of scam experts from 
Better Business Bureau (BBB), a non-profit organisation, promoting ethical business 
conduct for elderly people.  By evaluating the available data, several distinguishing 
characteristics that distinguished fraud victims from non-victims emerged; trusting 
nature, gullibility, being fantasy prone, advanced age, greed and social isolation.  
 
Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) posit that differences in the attention people pay to 
fraudulent messages can be considered in the context of Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of persuasion, which has two routes of 
information processing; peripheral and central (Figure 2.7).  The peripheral route 
utilises little elaboration or evaluation of message content and relies on persuasive cues 
such as the attractiveness of the scam offer, while the central route concentrates on the 
arguments provided.  Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) suggest that when the elaboration 
likelihood is high but visceral influence is low, attention is directed at the arguments in 
the message rather than the rewards, which would help spot deception.  When the 
elaboration likelihood is high and the degree of visceral influence is also high, attention 
is directed at the reward arguments and away from cues that may help detect deception.  
The authors also argue that visceral influence is greater when the prize seems close in 
time and space (proximity) and when it can be imagined easily (vividness), and this can 
be manipulated by telling the victim about other people, similar to them, who have 
enjoyed the same opportunity.  Langenderfer and Shimp's (2001) theoretical Model of 
Scamming Vulnerability explains how the attention is directed under high and low 
visceral influence and can be found in Figure 2.3.  
 
Under high visceral influence, the focus is on the scam reward (e.g. the size of the 
prize), rather than on scam cues, which may alert to potential danger.  In this state, self-
control acts as a moderator of scamming vulnerability.  In situations where the degree of 
visceral influence is low and the attention is on the scam cues, there are still factors that 
can contribute to vulnerability to scams.  These factors are assumed to include social 
isolation, cognitive impairment, gullibility and consumer susceptibility to interpersonal 
influence.  Moderators of scam vulnerability, when the degree of visceral influence is 
low are scepticism and scam knowledge.  
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Figure 2.3. Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) Model of Scamming Vulnerability and its moderators under 
high and low visceral influence  
 
 
Although Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) theoretical model offers a detailed 
explanation of scamming vulnerability under low and high visceral influence and in 
presence of certain individual attributes, it has not been empirically tested.  
Additionally, the data used for the development of this theoretical framework was based 
on the consumer fraud affecting elderly consumers.   Given the fact that the elderly 
individuals may be more vulnerable to scams due to diminishing cognitive functions 
(Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001) and may be more likely to have a preference for positive 
over negative information (Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007; Reed & Carstensen, 2012), 
the findings may not be generalizable across different scam contexts and age groups.   
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2.4.3 Models of gullible and foolish action 
In his review of foolish action, Greenspan (2008) described ‘foolish action’ as a human 
behaviour found in everyone, which has a high likelihood of backfiring at times.   
Greenspan (2008) further proposed theoretical Model of Foolish Action, divided into 
socially and practically foolish actions.  Practically foolish actions usually result in 
physical danger (i.e. smoking at the petrol station) and socially foolish actions have 
interpersonal consequences and is sub-divided into induced and non-induced.  Induced 
foolish action happens in the presence of manipulation by person(s), usually on the 
basis of false information against one’s best interests and this induced foolish action 
manifesting itself as “gullibility” (Greenspan, 2008).  The Model of Foolish Action is 
found in Figure 2.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 The Model of Foolish Action proposed by Greenspan (2008) 
 
 
Furthermore, Greenspan, Switzky and Woods (2011) posit that common sense relates to 
a sound judgment or awareness of obvious social or practical risk.  It is intuitive and not 
dependent on special knowledge and cannot be mistaken for intelligence quotient (IQ).  
 
Social risk refers to danger of harm from other people or a society and practical risk 
refers to physical harm (e.g. from objects).  They suggest that ‘foolishness’ is a frequent 
term that describes unawareness of obvious risk, whereas common sense is awareness 
of obvious risk.  Although their theory concentrates on populations with intellectual 
disabilities, the idea of common sense may also be applied to general population.  
 
In his review on gullibility, Greenspan (2009) suggests that gullibility is something that 
almost anyone can relate to, yet not much exists on this topic in scholarly literature.  
Defining gullibility as “an unusual tendency toward being duped or taken advantage of’ 
(p.2), Greenspan (2009) argues that gullibility and credulity are different in that 
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gullibility usually results in some type of action.  He proposed an explanatory model of 
gullible action, consisting of four components; situation, cognition, personality and state 
(Figure 2.5).   Any combination of these components or even one strong component can 
influence people to engage in acts that are against their best interests.  An identical 
model, citing the same four components as the model of Gullible action, is proposed by 
Greenspan (2008) as a model of Foolish action.  This may suggest that foolish action 
and gullible action may share the same components.   
 
 
Figure 2.5 The Model of Gullible Action proposed by Greenspan (2009) 
 
Social situation (e.g. persuasiveness of the scammer or others recommending him), 
cognitive processes (being bad at reading people or naïve about the offer), personality 
(victim being too trusting or too agreeable) and affect or state (i.e. being infatuated with 
the scammer) may influence gullible action (Greenspan, 2009). 
 
Referring to cognitive processes in his model, Greenspan (2009) suggests that 
‘intelligence’ is not always connected to gullible action.  Gullibility does not reflect an 
inability to think, but it can be a product of lazy thinking.  Highly intelligent people may 
also be lacking social and practical intelligence, making them unable to recognise 
deceptive cues.   
 
Greenspan (2009) also suggests that rushing decisions or making decisions when one is 
under the influence of strong emotions is more likely to result in gullible action.  
Thinking without the influence of the strong emotion (i.e. cold cognition) is more likely 
to be rational than thinking under the influence of the strong emotion (i.e. hot 
cognition).  In order to avoid being gullible, one must understand the limitations of 
one’s knowledge and when in misleading or dangerous situations, be prepared to 
postpone decisions.  The Model of Gullible Action, therefore, offers support for 
Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) Model of Scamming Vulnerability, in which 
information processing under the visceral influence leads to hot cognition (i.e. under the 
influence of emotion) and the prospect of missing the scam cues.  Although the model 
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of Gullible action has not been empirically tested and Greenspan (2008) does not 
specify how the model could be practically applied, its components could be useful in 
explaining factors that interact to encourage compliance with fraudulent offers.   
 
2.4.4 Phishing susceptibility framework 
Parrish, Bailey and Courtney (2009) proposed a phishing susceptibility framework, 
using the Big-Five personality factors, suggesting that scams target certain human traits 
and that individuals who are high in those traits may be more susceptible. As well as 
personality traits, their framework also outlines personal (e.g. gender, age, culture) and 
experiential factors (past events and experience that shape individual’s personality).  
They argue that each of these factors is implicated in an individual’s vulnerability to 
phishing attacks and that each factor may be implicated in the development of another 
factor.  For example, personal factors such as age and culture, may influence an 
individual’s experience and both, personal and experiential factors may play a role in 
personality development.  The framework proposed by Parrish et al. (2009) can be 
found in Figure 2.6.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6.  Phishing Susceptibility Framework by Parrish, Bailey and Courtney (2009)  
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Experiential factors include general experience, which can be positive or negative, 
technological experience (e.g. internet usage or experience) and professional 
experience, such as a career or academic experience.  Attack factors include the lure 
(e.g. security upgrade, financial incentive, false account updates etc.) and the hook (e.g. 
link to a website or a reply to email, text message etc.)  Phishing susceptibility includes 
the likelihood to respond and the time it takes to respond. 
                                                       
Personal factors, such as culture, gender and age influence factors of the Big-Five 
personality profile, as well as experiential factors.  Culture and age may, in some cases 
have moderating effects on gender, while the Big-Five personality factors have a direct 
effect on experiential factors and vice versa.  They also directly influence phishing 
susceptibility.  Phishing susceptibility is further influenced by factors pertaining to the 
attack, such as the type of lure and hook they contain.   
 
Looking at the Big-Five personality profile factors, Parrish et al. (2009) suggest that 
agreeableness may be associated with susceptibility to phishing attacks due to the trust 
dimension it contains, while extraversion is implicated in susceptibility due to the fact 
that extraverts may be more likely to share information with others.  General openness 
to experience, may also be implicated in susceptibility to phishing attacks.  However, 
conscientiousness, they argued, may prevent susceptibility to phishing if a person has 
received some security guidelines, as they are more likely to follow those guidelines.  
Neuroticism, too, may prevent susceptibility to phishing as those high on neuroticism 
may be less eager to share their details online and even have less online exposure than 
those that are lower on neuroticism.  
 
Although focused on phishing scams, their theory leads to a broader hypothesis which 
might be applied to all types of scams, that there are certain individual difference 
variables that may predict which people may be more vulnerable to fraud.  For example, 
research by Modic and Lea (2012) looked at the personality traits that may influence 
scam compliance.  In their study participants completed scales measuring the Big-Five 
personality traits, self-control and impulsivity.  Participants also received life scenarios 
that could be potential scam situations and asked to evaluate how likely is it that a 
scenario is a scam and how likely it is that people would respond favourably to it.  
Participants were also asked if they experienced, responded and lost money to such a 
scenario.   Contrary to Parrish et al. (2009) prediction that extraverts would be more 
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vulnerable to phishing attacks, Modic and Lea (2012) found that extraversion was a 
good predictor of increased scam response, but in the opposite direction, with more 
introverted individuals being more likely to respond to scams.  They suggested that this 
might be due to the fact that they prefer impersonal contact, such as communicating 
online, which makes it difficult to tell whether a person is trustworthy.  It could also be 
that they have fewer friends and family members they regularly communicate with.  
Modic and Lea (2012) also found agreeableness to be a predictor of responding to a 
scam, suggesting this is due to the fact that agreeable individuals tend to be considerate 
and friendly, therefore, they may believe others are too.  
 
 
2.5 Individual differences and fraud vulnerability 
 
Receiving fraudulent offers does not automatically mean one will become a victim of a 
scam and identifying what makes one vulnerable to fraud is not always easy.  Research 
indicates that some fraud victims are highly educated, fully functioning adults and seem 
to be unlikely victims (Cacciottolo and Rees, 2017; Lea et al., 2009; Zuckoff, 2005), so 
what are the factors influencing compliance with fraudulent offers?  
 
2.5.1 Self-control, premeditation and impulsivity 
Inability to control one’s impulses has been found to compromise decision making 
(Bayard, Raffard & Gely-Nargeot, 2011).  It has also been found to influence likelihood 
of fraud victimisation.  Lack of self-control has also been found to increase the risk of 
criminal victimisation in general (Schreck 1999; Schreck, Stewart & Fisher, 2006).  A 
meta-analysis of 66 studies on crime victimisation, by Pratt, Turanovic, Fox and Wright 
(2014) found that self-control is a consistent predictor of victimisation and is 
significantly stronger when victimisation takes place without a contact, such as online.  
Self-control has also been implicated in fraud victimisation.  Some authors have 
suggested that scam victims lack emotional control when it comes to their interpretation 
and engagement with scam offers (Lea et al., 2009).  For example, Langenderfer and 
Shimp (2001) interviewed experts working in an organisation offering consumer 
protection to the elderly and found that scam vulnerability is often greater in those who 
cannot control their emotional responses.  This is consistent with research based on 
telephone surveys with those over the age of sixty by Holtfreter, Reisig, Pratt and 
Holtfreter (2015).  They found that elderly people who have lower levels of self-control 
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were more likely to make a purchase from an unknown vendor, after receiving an 
unsolicited email.  Making such purchases can be risky and leave them open to identity 
theft.  However, Holtfreter et al. (2015) noted that their study used a two-item measure 
of self-control and further studies, with valid measures of self-control are needed.  
 
In their study, Holtfreter, Reisig, Piquero and Piquero (2010) gave student participants 
hypothetical offending and victimisation scenarios based on some methods scammers 
use to target potential victims, as well as a measure of self-control.  After each scenario, 
students were also asked to indicate the likelihood of engaging in such behaviour.  They 
found low self-control to be positively related to fraud victimisation, suggesting that 
those with lower levels of self-control were more likely to report they would engage in 
behaviours that lead to fraud victimisation.  This is consistent with Modic and Lea 
(2012) who found that premeditation (part of an impulsivity scale), or the ability to 
foresee future consequences, was a good predictor of whether someone is likely to 
respond to fraudulent offers.   
 
Holtfreter, Reisig and Pratt (2008) conducted phone interviews in order to explore 
remote purchases and fraud victimisation and fraud targeting.  Participants were also 
given items measuring preference for risky behaviours and immediate gratification, 
which would pinpoint low self-control.  They found that those who made more remote 
purchases (e.g. purchases online) were more likely to be targeted by fraudulent offers 
and also more likely to have been victims of fraud.  Although lack of self-control did 
not predict being targeted by fraudulent offers, it did predict fraud victimisation and   
Holtfreter et al. (2008) suggest this may be due to the fact that those low in self-control 
are likely to be impulsive and more likely to act when presented with fraudulent offers.  
 
Impulsivity has also been found to affect decision-making.  In a study by Frederick 
(2005), participants received the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) measure (a measure 
that tests reliance on logic versus intuition), measures of their decision-making 
characteristics and self-reported measures of impulsivity.  The study found that those 
who achieved higher scores on CRT measures were more patient (i.e. less impulsive) 
and less likely to opt for paying more money to get the desired items delivered quicker 
(time preference).  They were also less likely to take risks in the gambling task.   
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2.5.2 Background and scam knowledge  
People lacking general interest in current events may be more vulnerable to fraudulent 
offers, as they may not be aware of current scams or related developments (Titus & 
Gover, 2001).  Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) found that lack of scam knowledge or 
knowledge of an area relevant to a particular scam (i.e. investments), may be implicated 
in scam vulnerability, however Lea et al. (2009) suggest that background knowledge 
enhances vulnerability by leading to less caution.  For example, investment scams often 
affect those that have background knowledge in the same area of expertise.  
 
2.5.3 Information processing  
Differences in the attention people pay to fraudulent messages can be considered in the 
context of Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of 
persuasion (Figure 2.7).  
 
When a persuasive message is received, one of the two routes will be chosen depending 
on the motivation and the ability to process the relevant information.  Using the 
peripheral route, one is likely to concentrate on superficial cues, such as how attractive 
the offer is, instead of seeking evidence to support the claims in the persuasive message.  
The central route is likely to concentrate on the message arguments and lead to an 
attitude change based on the argument quality.  Cacioppo and Petty (1982) argued that 
individuals low in the psychological construct, 'need for cognition' (who do not enjoy 
effortful cognitive activities) tend to process information via the peripheral route, unlike 
those with high need for cognition, who rely less on peripheral cues and process 
information by exerting greater cognitive effort.  
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Figure 2.7 Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion 
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In the study by Cacioppo, Petty, Kao and Rodriguez (1986), participants were given a 
Need for Cognition measure (Cacioppo et al., 1984) and were asked to listen to a 
recorded message about tuition fees.  The arguments in the message were purposely 
made weak or strong and participants were asked specific questions about argument 
quality after they listened to the message, as well as being asked their opinion on the 
subject of tuition fees.  They were also asked to recall their thoughts while they were 
listening to the message and to write down as many arguments they remember from the 
message they heard.  Participants were also asked to report how much effort they put 
into evaluating the message.  The study found that individuals low in 'need for 
cognition' were less discriminating when evaluating weak and strong messages, were 
less affected by argument quality and recalled fewer arguments when asked.  They also 
reported expending less effort evaluating arguments than those high in need for 
cognition.  
 
Research by Kaufman, Stasson and Hart (1999) found that people high in need for 
cognition are less likely to be influenced by source credibility.  In their study, 
participants were given an article to read that varied in argument strength.  The 
arguments were either weak (ambiguous and lacking in facts and references to credible 
sources) or strong (factual statements with credible references and written more 
eloquently).  Participants were also told that the article came from reputable newspaper 
(credible source) or a low credibility magazine.  The study found that those low in Need 
for Cognition rated weak arguments more highly when they came from a reputable 
source.  However, they paid more attention to argument strength when they were made 
to believe the article came from a non-reputable (low credibility) source.  Kaufman et 
al. (1999) suggest this means that untrustworthy sources may motivate greater 
information processing among those low in need for cognition.  Scammers often 
impersonate legitimate sources, which could mean that those with lower need for 
cognition might be more likely to accept fraudulent offers that look authentic rather than 
process the information relevant to the offer.  This interpretation is supported by the 
analysis of phishing attempts, which mimic bank communications, by Blythe, Petrie and 
Clark (2011).  The authors found that blind participants were better at spotting phishing 
emails since they were not visually primed by familiar company logos.  Instead their 
computer reading software read the message, alerting them to warning signs, such as 
phrasing or spelling mistakes, which made them suspect the correspondence may not be 
genuine.   
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Other research, however, has suggested that scam victims report analysing scam offers 
more thoroughly than non-victims and that this may be making them vulnerable.  While 
some people discard unsolicited scam offers without reading them, reading the scam 
offer may elicit curiosity to respond (Lea et al., 2009).  
 
Information processing may also be influenced by individual characteristics.  For 
example, Haddock, Maio and Huskinson (2008) found that when the content of a 
message is matched to an individual’s personality, it is found to be more persuasive.  In 
their study, participants were given messages about a new drink to evaluate, which were 
either cognition-based (message describing a drink as pleasant) or affect-based 
(message citing facts about the drink).  Those high in need for cognition found a 
cognition-based message more persuasive, while those high in need for affect found an 
affect-based message more persuasive.  This suggests that scam offers may be perceived 
as more attractive if they contain cues that accommodate certain individual attributes.  
 
2.5.4 Assessing risks and sensation seeking  
It has been suggested that some fraud victims see scam offers as a long odds gamble.  
They recognise there may be risk involved but decide to go ahead with it hoping it will 
pay out.  If the promised reward is sufficiently large, the offer may seem worth the risk 
(Lea et al., 2009).  Olivier et al. (2015) interviewed a small number of fraud victims as 
well as professionals from different agencies dealing with fraud and found that victims 
saw the small amount asked for by the scammer as 'worth the risk' of winning the big 
prize.  This is also present in some romance scams.  Some romance scam victims view 
the experience as a near win, hoping that the next person will be a genuine love interest 
(Whitty, 2013).  In addition, Fischer et al. (2013) found that victims often recall positive 
emotions and the size of the prize when talking about the experience, which suggests 
that positive emotions may detract from the assessment of risk when it comes to scams.  
This is consistent with Greenspan's (2009) model of gullible action, which suggests that 
decisions made in the presence of strong emotions are less likely to be rational and 
therefore, more likely to lead to gullible action.  
 
Fischer, Jonas, Frey and Kastenmüller (2008) asked participants to make decisions on 
probability-based (risky) or fixed investment (definite) outcomes after asking them to 
read a passage about the investor facing a loss.  The decisions presented to participants 
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to choose from were designed to concentrate on gains or losses.  They found that 
participants in gains condition chose fixed outcomes and those in condition 
concentrating on losses chose probability-based outcomes.  Participants were then told 
there was additional information available to them (short articles), some of which 
contradicted risky options and some, which contradicted definite outcomes, which they 
could use to make a final decision.  Fischer et al. (2008) found that participants in gain 
condition chose more information that was consistent with their decisions, than 
inconsistent.  They suggest that when people make decisions with losses instead of 
gains in mind they were less likely to exhibit confirmation bias (i.e. the tendency to 
interpret information as confirmation of their beliefs).  Therefore, it seems that although 
some victims are aware there may be risks involved with certain offers, they purposely 
choose to concentrate on the positive rather than negative aspects.  Scam victimisation 
in some instances might therefore be influenced by contributory emotional effects, such 
as excitement at a prospect of winning a prize (Lea et al., 2009).  
 
Some scam victims may simply be attracted to scam offers.  Research found that people 
who are not tempted by small amounts are also not tempted by larger amounts whereas 
repeat fraud victims are attracted to scam offers and more motivated to respond, despite 
otherwise making good decisions (Fischer et al., 2013; Lea et al., 2009).  
 
 
2.5.5 Trust and gullibility  
In their review of literature on trust, Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer (1998) defined 
trust as "psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another" (p.395).  They suggest 
that trust is a psychological condition that can cause or be the result of certain behaviour 
(e.g. cooperation) or a certain choice (e.g. taking a risk) and that without risk, trust 
would not be needed.  Therefore, trust entails accepting the uncertainty when it comes 
to intentions and motives of others (Kramer, 1999).   Nowhere is that more true than 
dealing with purchases on the Internet, where this uncertainty is multiplied.  In order for 
a scam to be successful, the scammer or the scam offer must appear trustworthy.  In 
their study, Grazioli and Jarvenpaa (2000) demonstrated how trust is enhanced on 
fraudulent websites, through specific manipulations, and how this impacts risk 
perceptions.  Participants were asked to imagine a friend asked them for advice about a 
purchase and were then asked to review a website the friend wanted to purchase a 
laptop from.  Half the participants were directed to a real website and half were directed 
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to a cloned website created for the purpose of the study, which contained manipulations 
to increase trust, such as third-party seal of approval, unlimited warranty, fake news 
clips praising the shop, customer testimonials etc.  All of the manipulations were 
created to raise suspicion, such as the third-party seal of approval did not have the 
company registered on their website, customer reviews had discrepancies, links to the 
magazines quoted did not exist etc.  Grazioli and Jarvenpaa found that only a very small 
number of participants rated the website as fraudulent, in fact the warranties given on 
the fake website were seen as more assuring than warranties on the legitimate site, as 
were the seals of approval, and this influenced the perceived risk.  Similarly, Kim, 
Ferrin and Rao (2008) found that consumers' purchasing intentions are affected by trust.  
Third party seals (e.g. endorsements by other bodies), reputation, product information 
quality as well as privacy or security protection offered by the vendor, influence trust.  
They also found that with greater perceived risk, intention to purchase diminishes, 
however perceived benefit (e.g. a good deal) may increase the intention to purchase 
even when trust is low.  
 
Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) argue that gullibility and a trusting nature distinguish 
scam victims from non-victims.  Rather than examine a scam offer carefully, a victim 
may concentrate on how trustworthy the scammer appears to be.  Greenspan (2009) 
suggests that gullibility involves trusting someone or something.  It is more prevalent in 
children and those with cognitive impairment and learning difficulties, which is why the 
existing laws have special measures for protection of such populations.  Gullibility may 
also be applied to fraud victimisation in certain contexts.  For example, Greenspan 
(2009) argues that even smart people can sometimes engage in gullible action (i.e. acts 
that are against individual’s best interests) due to certain situational, cognitive or 
personality factors, or the emotional state they are in (Figure 2.5).   
 
Other research reports that fraud victims believe that the reason they were defrauded 
was down to them being too trusting or naive (Whitty & Buchanan, 2012b).  This is 
consistent with Fischer et al. (2013).  By using transcripts of interviews with victims of 
fraud, they text mined for words that reoccur frequently and found that participants 
often alluded to the trustworthiness of the scammer.  Additionally, Fischer et al. (2013) 
conducted a large-scale survey, using self-constructed short scales to measure different 
psychological constructs, one of which included trust.  They found that scam 
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compliance, measured by asking participants about previous fraud victimisation was 
associated with the trust in the scammer (also Workman, 2008).  
 
The research by Evans and Revelle (2008) shows that trust may be influenced by 
personality traits as well as situational factors, such as reciprocity, which is a known 
scamming technique.  It may also support Greenspan (2009) model of gullible action, 
which cites trusting nature as a possible personality trait that, in combination with other 
factors, could influence propensity to engage in a gullible act.  
 
Is trust connected to gullibility?  Rousseau et al. (1998) suggest that trust would not be 
needed if outcomes were certain; therefore, risk creates an opportunity for trust, and 
trust leads to risk taking.  The connection between risk and trust occurs in reciprocal 
relationships, due to the uncertainty of the other's behaviour (i.e. if the other will act 
appropriately).  Luhman (2000) suggests that trust is a component of cooperative 
relationships, and that without it, many daily activities would be severely limited.  For 
example, trust is extended each time people shop online, as the goods paid for are not 
immediately collected.  Instead, we take a risk and trust others to fulfil their obligation 
by sending the goods that were paid for.  Although it is clear how scammers may 
exploit the extended trust in such situations, is trusting others an indication of 
gullibility?   Rotter (1980) argues that trusting someone in the absence of warning signs 
is not the same as trusting someone in the presence of warning signs or evidence that 
the person is not trustworthy, and that only the latter is connected to gullibility.   
 
This is supported by Markóczy (2003), who found that people high on trust differ in the 
amount of vigilance they exhibit and that vigilance makes a difference in how prudent 
one is likely to be in the situations when they have to predict other’s behaviour.  
Markóczy (2003) used the electricity shortages in California to examine if higher trust 
would make participants better or worse at predicting others' behaviour.  The capping of 
prices led to blackouts in certain parts of California during the excessive demand.  Not 
in a position to increase the supply, the only way out of the blackouts was through 
appeal for voluntary reduction in electricity usage, causing a widespread social dilemma 
as people needed to sacrifice their usage for the greater good (i.e. so there would be no 
blackouts).  Participants were given a statement measuring their beliefs of how their 
behaviour compares to others in regards to electricity usage.  These were then compared 
with the participant’s actual electricity usage and those of others.  Accuracy of 
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expectations of others’ behaviour was measured by how accurately participants 
predicted the cooperation of others to reduce their electricity usage.   
As well as measuring trust, Markóczy (2003) gave participants a vigilance scale and 
found that people high on trust differ in the amount of vigilance they display.   
Those high on trust but low on vigilance were categorised as ‘naive trusters’ and those 
high on trust and vigilance were categorised as ‘prudent trusters’.  Prudent trusters (i.e. 
high in vigilance) were found to be better at correctly predicting others’ behaviour.  
 
2.5.6 Other individual differences implicated in fraud victimisation 
Other individual differences connected to fraud vulnerability that have been considered 
in previous research include: greed, being fantasy prone or susceptible to flattery, 
having romantic beliefs, being easily intimidated and a tendency to act without 
deliberation (e.g. Buchanan & Whitty, 2013; Holtfreter et al., 2008; Langenderfer & 
Shimp, 2001; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001; Whitty, 2013).  
 
2.5.7 Behaviours that enhance vulnerability to fraud  
The research examined so far in this review suggests that there are certain behaviours 
that may enhance the risk of fraud victimisation.  Titus, Heinzelmann and Boyle (1995) 
conducted a large-scale telephone survey, asking people about fraud victimisation and 
the specific details of frauds they had encountered.  
The same data were used for a review on fraud victimisation by Titus and Gover (2001), 
who identified that joining online groups, entering contests and free prizes, making 
purchases on the internet or over the phone and even giving to charity as behaviours that 
increase the likelihood of fraud victimisation.  Use of social media is a popular way of 
staying in touch with friends and sharing our experiences with others around the world.  
This means that personal data is available to wider audiences and this may increase the 
likelihood of being targeted by fraudulent offers (Parish et al., 2009).  Another 
behaviour associated with vulnerability to phishing attacks is sharing and sending links 
via social media, as it is not always easy to discern what is a legitimate link and what 
may be a phishing attempt (Frauenstein & Flowerday, 2016).  
 
2.5.8 Life circumstances and fraud vulnerability 
Some research has also suggested that loneliness might also be a factor implicated in 
fraud victimisation.  For example, Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) found that elderly 
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scam victims, although socially active, were more likely to live alone than non-victims 
(also Olivier et al., 2015).  However, research by Buchanan and Whitty (2014) failed to 
find a relationship between loneliness and romance fraud victimisation.   
 
Ageing has been associated in vulnerability to fraud.  Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) 
suggest that reduced cognitive abilities are a part of an ageing process and due to this, 
elderly people are more prone to being defrauded.   This is consistent with Smith 
(1999), who, in his review of fraud literature, suggested that dementia in elderly people 
leaves them open to being deceived and manipulated by scammers.  He also found cases 
of financial fraud perpetrated against elderly people by those appointed as legal 
guardians or agents managing their financial affairs.   
 
Some research has found that elderly people are more likely to be lonely or socially 
isolated, which enhances their vulnerability (Lea et al., 2009).  Other authors have 
suggested otherwise; for example, James, Boyle and Bennett (2014) used data from a 
longitudinal study looking into conditions of ageing to examine correlates of 
susceptibility to scams.  Participants were elderly adults without dementia.  
Susceptibility to scams was measured with questionnaire items relating to unsolicited 
phone calls by telemarketers as well as awareness that people over 65 tend to be 
targeted by scammers.  Participants were also given tests to measure cognitive function, 
depression, health and financial literacy.  They found that those most susceptible to 
scams were older participants, those with lower levels of cognitive function and lower 
levels of psychological well-being, as well as those with poorer health and financial 
literacy.  These findings were irrespective of the educational and income levels of the 
participant.  Regardless of their cognitive abilities, knowledge of financial concepts 
helped to prevent scam victimisation, as false information is rejected.  James et al. 
(2014) also argued that the idea that vulnerability to scams in elderly people is down to 
them being socially isolated and physically frail is wrong, as these variables were not 
associated with susceptibility to scams in their study, and that active, healthy elderly 
people were equally susceptible.  
 
Research also suggests that elderly people tend to be targeted by scammers more than 
other age groups (Harries, Davies, Gilhooly, Gilhooly & Cairns, 2013; Muscat, James 
& Graycar, 2002; Reisig & Holtfreter, 2013) and that this increases the likelihood of 
fraud victimisation.  However, some research has produced different findings.  Kerley 
 54 
and Copes (2002) conducted phone interviews in which they asked participants about 
previous fraud victimisation and reporting behaviour.  They found that elderly 
participants who are not property owners and lack financial stability were the least 
likely to be defrauded and suggested that this may make them less suitable targets for 
scammers.  Titus et al. (1995) also found that elderly people are less likely to be 
defrauded and suggest that fraud victimisation cannot be predicted by demographics.  
 
Certain life circumstances, such as a major medical treatment, marriage, birth or death 
in the family may also increase the likelihood of being targeted by scammers as this 
information is often kept by legitimate and illegitimate businesses to target consumers 
with specific offers (Titus et al., 1995; Titus and Gover, 2001).  This may mean that 
younger populations may have reduced exposure to fraudulent offers, as they will have 
experienced fewer life events outlined above, across their lifespan.   
 
Life events, such as bereavement, divorce or illness in the family may lead to extreme 
emotional vulnerability, which is then exploited by scammers.  For example, Olivier et 
al. (2015) found that some victims engaged in scams because at the time, they were 
emotionally vulnerable or socially isolated.  The communication allowed them to 
escape their grief, as regular contact with a sympathetic scammer was comforting.  It 
also provided a meaningful activity.  Titus and Gover (2001) argue that likelihood of 
engaging with fraud offers comes down to personality characteristics, demographics and 
life events.  
 
 
2.6 Methodology in fraud research  
 
Fraud victimisation has been researched extensively in recent times, allowing for better 
understanding of factors that influence vulnerability to fraud.  However, measuring 
fraud compliance in a research setting is not easy without simulating fraudulent 
activities, which raises serious ethical considerations, but new approaches to 
investigating fraud are emerging as fraud continues to thrive.  Table 2.4 outlines some 
of the key methodologies used by researchers examining fraud, which are then 
discussed below.  
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Table 2.4  
Methodology in fraud research  
 
Methodology 
 
Research study  
 
Interviews and focus groups with  
fraud victims and their friends and 
family  
 
Button et al. (2009b), Button et al. (2013), Button et al. 
(2015), Cross (2013, 2015), Fischer et al. (2013), Olivier et 
al. (2015), Whitty and Buchanan (2012a), Whitty (2013) 
 
Interviews with professionals and 
experts working with fraud victims  
 
Button et al. (2012), Langenderfer & Shimp (2001), Olivier 
et al. (2015) 
Phone or online surveys looking at  
fraud victimisation in general population 
 
Buchanan and Whitty (2014), Holtfreter et al. (2008), 
Hutchings and Hayes (2008), Kerley and Copes (2002) 
Interviews with representatives of 
private sector (e.g. banks) and public 
sector (e.g. Trading Standards) 
 
Button et al. (2012) 
Interviews and surveys with law 
enforcement bodies or professionals and 
analysis of existing crime surveys or 
longitudinal studies  
 
Button et al. (2012), James et al. (2014), Muscat et al. 
(2000) 
Examining postal and online scam 
content 
 
Chang and Chong (2010), Lea et al. (2009), Nikiforova and 
Gregory (2013), Rege (2009), Whitty and Buchanan (2012a) 
 
Using hypothetical scam situations 
 
Modic and Lea (2012), Modic and Lea (2013) 
Simulating a scam situation  Fischer et al. (2013),  Jagatic et al. (2007), Lea et al. (2009), 
Scheibe et al., 2014, Workman (2008), 
 
Existing personality measures used to 
compare to fraud victimisation or test 
fraud compliance  
 
Buchanan and Whitty (2014), Modic and Lea (2012), 
Workman (2008) 
Purpose built measures used to compare 
to fraud victimisation or test fraud 
compliance  
 
Fischer et al. (2013), Modic and Lea (2013) 
 
 
 
 
2.6.1 Interviews with victims of fraud and family members  
Many studies have found interviews with victims of fraud to be an effective way of 
gathering data on processes that underline fraud victimisation (e.g. Button et al., 2013; 
Lea et al., 2009; Olivier et al., 2015; Whitty, 2013).  Interviews access the rich details of 
individuals' experiences during and after fraud victimisation and the data can be used in 
variety of ways, either by generating themes and subthemes of the process or 
constructing typologies.  Interview transcripts have also been used to data mine for the 
words related to fraud experience that occur most often through the interviews.  For 
example, Fischer et al. (2013) used the interviews conducted by Lea et al., (2009) for 
data mining, to create psychologically meaningful categories or themes, running 
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through the interview transcripts.  They found evidence of certain psychological 
processes recurring frequently through fraud literature; positive emotions and the size of 
the prize referring to superficial processing; trust cues and securing behavioural 
commitment.  In depth interviews can, therefore, be a good way to gather information 
on psychological processes that underlie scam compliance, however, they can be time 
consuming to execute and transcribe.  
 
2.6.2 Analysis of the scam content 
Analysing scam content and communication has proven to be a good way of examining 
the latest techniques scammers employ when they contact the victim.  Lea et al. (2009) 
were able to collect and analyse a large number of scam letters, such as scams 
purporting to be lotteries, prize draws, business opportunities, clairvoyants offering 
their services etc.  They were able to identify specific psychological techniques 
scammers use in scam correspondence, such as urgency, social proof, authority, evoking 
visceral influence, soliciting small commitments from the victim to influence bigger 
commitments later on etc.  Fischer et al. (2013) also examined a large corpus of scam 
communication including mailings, emails and website content and used text mining to 
categorise words recurring in scam correspondence.  This enabled them to examine, 
which techniques appeared most frequently in scam correspondence.  One important 
finding from their study was that these categories enabled them to see that although 
cues to scarcity and uniqueness are frequently used in scam correspondence, this was 
not picked up in the interview with fraud victims.  Fischer et al. (2013) suggest that it 
could be that scammers use this technique even though it may not be effective, or 
victims may be influenced by them but may not be aware of that influence.  
Text mining seems to be an effective way to process and categorise data collected by 
different methods, in order to explore shared commonalities.  
 
Chang and Chong (2010) analysed the content of different fraudulent e-mails and found 
that these coercive techniques are also used in online communications.  Whitty and 
Buchanan (2012a) studied internet posts on the romance fraud support site and were 
able to gain insight into how the scams work as victims posted details of the fraud 
online.   
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2.6.3 Hypothetical scam scenarios 
Modic and Lea (2012, 2013) conducted research in which participants were given 
personality measures, after which they were asked to consider different text-based 
scenarios that could potentially be fraudulent situations. These included written 
descriptions of an online auction, a phishing bank email, a potential romance scam 
communication, a Nigerian or 419 scam, and a pyramid scheme.  Participants were 
asked to decide how likely it was that each situation was a scam, how likely is it that 
people would respond favourably to it and if they had ever found themselves in such a 
situation, or responded to and lost money to such a situation.  Although these studies are 
one of the first that specifically looked at scam compliance and personal characteristics, 
using hypothetical scam scenarios presents certain problems.  In the first study, 
participants were asked to report if they have previously responded and lost money to 
the scenarios presented, measuring scam compliance over their lifetime, while 
personality characteristics were measured in the moment.  The authors tried to control 
for this in their second study by asking participants to report if they had responded to 
and lost money to such a situation in the last three years but this still does not measure 
scam compliance in a given moment.  
 
Additionally, the study reported that not many participants reported losing money to the 
specific situations mentioned, therefore compliance was measured by previous response 
or loss of funds to given scenarios.  A possible problem with this may be that although 
responding to scam correspondence often leads to becoming a victim, this may not 
always be true for every scam situation in the Modic and Lea (2012, 2013) studies.  
Some scenarios were more obvious fraudulent situations, such as Nigerian scam or a 
pyramid scheme, while others were ordinary life situations that could be exploited by 
scammers.  For example, responding to someone regarding a classified advert or an 
online auction may not be the same as responding to an unsolicited Nigerian scam 
offering rewards for help with transferring funds or to a letter stating a lottery win.  The 
events used may not therefore, have equal prevalence in society.  Some fraudulent 
situations closely mimic real-life situations, such as offering items to buy in online 
auctions, therefore the only way one may realise it is a scam is after some 
correspondence with the scammer.  Therefore, in some situations, responding to a real-
life situation, which could also be fraudulent, may not necessarily lead to greater scam 
compliance.  Another possible problem with this methodology is that people may not 
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always know if the real-life situation they responded to was indeed, fraudulent or not, 
unless they lose funds.  
 
Asking participants to report how they would behave in a potential scam situation may 
not be an accurate way of predicting what people would actually do when they find 
themselves in a fraudulent situation, especially as some scams are increasingly 
sophisticated.  Although using scam scenarios may not be the ideal way to capture scam 
compliance, these studies were one of the first to try to experimentally explore 
individual differences implicated in compliance with fraudulent offers.  
 
2.6.4 Simulating scam situations  
Several researchers have attempted to simulate a real-life scam situation in order to 
examine how people behave when they encounter scam communications (Fischer et al., 
2013; Jagatic et al., 2007; Lea et al., 2009; Scheibe et al., 2014).  What people think 
they would do in a certain situation and what they actually do in such a situation is often 
incongruent, therefore simulating scam situations may be a good way of capturing 
people's behaviour in real scam situations.   
 
Lea et al. (2009) sent unsuspecting participants scam type offers in two separate studies.  
In one, participants received a letter with a simulated prize draw and a questionnaire 
asking about their reaction to it and in the other, participants were sent the same type of 
scam simulation but the questionnaire was not immediately apparent.  Only if the 
participants were sufficiently interested to read about the scam offer, would they find 
the questionnaire asking for their reactions.  Lea et al. (2009) suggest that the first study 
was able to capture cold responses or what people are likely to do and the second study 
was able to capture hot responses or how people felt whilst they evaluated the offer.  
The scam content was manipulated to look official or not, the prize was manipulated to 
be large or moderate, and some included visceral triggers whilst others did not.  
They found that when reflecting on the scam communication (cold response), people 
reported being influenced by the size of the prize but this was not evident in the second 
study measuring hot responses, where significant effects were down to content cues, 
such as visceral triggers and official status.  These studies indicate that people may 
think they know what would influence them in a certain situation; however, the 
psychological techniques used by scammers may be more subliminal.  
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Jagatic et al. (2007) also simulated a phishing attack, coming from a friend and coming 
from a stranger, and found that that phishing emails were more successful when coming 
from a friend.  But additional data came from a blog they created for participants after 
debriefing, so that they could discuss the study.  The blog posts showed that several 
participants expressed anger and called the experiment fraudulent and unethical, 
illustrating that many participants felt their privacy had been violated.  This 
demonstrates that fraudulent attacks, even when no funds are lost, have an impact on 
victims.  Although the blog comments were plentiful, no participants who left 
comments admitted they have been phished, despite 77 out of 96 participants falling for 
the phishing attack coming from a friend.  Jagatic et al. (2007) argues that this denial 
illustrates that people often do not want to admit their own vulnerability.  Many 
participants also did not understand that publically posted personal information is easily 
accessible to fraudsters who may use it to influence scam compliance.  
These findings highlight the fact that much can be gained from simulating fraud 
situations in order to examine how people behave when they are presented with real life 
situation, rather than with a hypothetical one.  However, there are ethical implications in 
conducting studies where participants are scammed as Jagatic et al. (2007) study shows.  
 
Scheibe et al. (2014) aimed to conduct a study that would mimic a real telemarketing 
scam but which would take ethical implications into consideration.  Some of the 
unsuspecting participants were called and warned about a certain scam only, while 
others were warned about different scams.   Weeks later, the same participants, as well 
as others that were not forewarned about the scam, were called by a telemarketer 
offering to sell an information package, which would allow participants to apply for a 
governmental stimulus grant.  Since collecting the payment on the spot would have 
been unethical, an agreement to receive a package and pay a fee was taken as a 
compliance with the scam instead.  However, this means that the number of participants 
that would have honoured the agreement by sending the payment remains unknown.  
Although the study found that forewarning about scams may be effective fraud 
prevention, difficulty in knowing how many participants would have agreed to pay the 
fee on the spot (i.e. comply with the scam) means that the generalisability of the results 
is limited.  For example, positive emotions associated with the attractive offer (i.e. hot 
response) may wane by the time participants receive the information package with an 
invoice, making the offer less attractive.  Therefore, conducting ethical experiments, 
which mimic real life scam situations is extremely difficult.  
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2.6.5 Self-constructed and personality measures in fraud research 
The research reviewed in this chapter suggests that personal characteristics may play a 
part in individual vulnerability to fraud.  Therefore, further research in this area is 
needed in order to improve advice given to victims of fraud in order to prevent repeat 
victimisation.  This would also benefit those that have not been defrauded as yet, to 
understand their vulnerabilities. It is evident from existing literature and crime data, that 
fraudsters are becoming more sophisticated in their approaches and using psychological 
techniques in order to enhance compliance, often specifically targeting desired victims.  
  
Research by Modic and Lea (2012, 2013) explored personality characteristics with 
regards to scam compliance. They gave participants numerous psychometric measures 
in order to assess what personality traits may influence scam compliance.  In their first 
study this included a measure of self-control, the Big-5 personality measure and a 
measure of impulsivity and in their second study, the newly developed Susceptibility to 
Persuasion scale, which consisted of four subscales; authority, social influence, 
consistency and self-control.  Participants also received descriptions of real life 
scenarios that could end in fraud victimisation and were asked if they had responded 
and lost money to each scenario given to them to evaluate.  Due to a lack of participants 
that lost money to hypothetical scenarios, scam compliance was measured by whether 
participants responded to fraudulent scenarios in the past.  The studies found several 
predictors of scam compliance, including extraversion, premeditation and agreeableness 
(Modic and Lea, 2012), and in the subsequent study; lack of self-control, authority, 
social influence and need for consistency (Modic and Lea, 2013).  Modic and Anderson 
(2014a) further developed their Susceptibility to Persuasion scale, by using items from 
existing measures, containing 10 subscales; premeditation, consistency, sensation 
seeking, self-control, social influence, similarity, risk preferences, attitudes towards 
advertising, need for cognition and uniqueness.  The scale has not been experimentally 
tested in real contexts.   
 
One of the studies conducted by Lea et al. (2009), used self-constructed short scales to 
measure different psychological constructs.  Participants were asked about previous 
fraud victimisation and feelings about receiving scam offers in the past, if no 
victimisation occurred.  Analysing the data from this study, Fischer et al. (2013) found 
several psychological constructs, such as high motivation, positive emotions, trust, 
susceptibility to persuasion, susceptibility to social influence, scarcity, confidence in 
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knowledge etc.  Fischer et al. (2013) also found that scam compliance, measured by 
asking participants about previous fraud victimisation, was associated with high 
motivation (e.g. size of the scam offer), positive emotions, trust in the scammer and 
susceptibility to persuasion.  While it is encouraging to see the use of self-constructed 
items created specifically to address scams, previous fraud victimisation is not an ideal 
measure of general scam compliance.  Although repeat victimisation is common in 
some fraud victims, there are many victims of fraud that become more aware of 
fraudulent practices following fraud victimisation.  Therefore, a measure of scam 
compliance, such as a simulated scam situation, in conjunction with individual 
characteristics measures, such as those used by Modic and Lea (2012, 2013) would be 
beneficial. 
 
 
2.7 Summary   
 
The wealth of research discussed in this chapter has shown that scammers are getting 
increasingly sophisticated in orchestrating scams that exploit human attributes, 
behaviours and circumstances.  As fraud perpetrated online, over the phone and via 
postal means, becomes increasingly difficult to investigate and solve due to the cross-
border element, the number of victims is likely to soar, causing great distress to victims 
and their families.  Therefore, it is paramount that fraud prevention focuses on the right 
messages and targets the right audience.  Although many people are aware of dangers of 
fraud, not many people are aware of the underlying factors that govern scam 
compliance, some of which are evoked by sophisticated scamming techniques, or in 
what way their individual attributes make them more likely to respond or comply with 
fraudulent offers.  Several different forms of scam influence as well as individual 
attributes, circumstances and behaviours that seem to influence or moderate scam 
compliance have been identified in this chapter and are summarised in Table 2.5.  In 
addition, several theoretical models and theories have been proposed in order to explain 
how these different vulnerability factors, when combined, influence scam compliance, 
indicating that individual attributes may be facilitating or moderating vulnerability to 
fraudulent offers (Greenspan, 2008; Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001; Parish et al., 2009).  
However, despite this, there are, at present, no widely used measures that measure 
individual attributes associated with susceptibility to fraud.  The present thesis aims to 
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develop and test a psychometric measure, which might pinpoint areas of individual’s 
vulnerability to fraud.   
 
Table 2.5.   
Scam techniques, individual differences, behaviours and circumstances implicated in vulnerability to 
fraudulent attacks  
 
Scam techniques  Individual differences  Behaviours  Circumstances  
 
 
Visceral influence 
 
 
Self-control 
 
Use of social media  
 
Living alone  
Liking and similarity  Impulsivity and 
Premeditation 
 
Online or phone 
purchases 
Ageing 
Evoking social norms  
 
Background and scam 
knowledge 
 
Entering contest and 
free prizes 
Bereavement or 
divorce 
Authority Information processing  Giving to charity  Marriage, birth or 
death  
 
Scarcity and urgency  Assessing risks   Major medical 
treatment or illness 
 
Social proof and 
social influence 
 
Sensation seeking   
Commitment and  
consistency 
 
Trust and gullibility  
 
  
Dishonesty and 
distraction principles 
 
   
 
 
In addition, much of fraud prevention and the Internet security advice are disregarded, 
whether because people are used to such advice and are no longer paying attention to it 
or due to the fact they find it does not apply to them.  For example, Fischer et al. (2013) 
found that while some scam techniques work for some people, they do not work for 
others, therefore it is reasonable to assume that people discard certain advice because 
they may feel that it does not apply to them.  Egelman and Peer (2015) found individual 
differences to be connected to privacy attitudes, and suggested that security warnings 
may be more effective if they considered user’s individual traits and were framed in a 
way that works for a given user.  Therefore, fraud prevention may be improved by 
identifying individual attributes implicated in vulnerability to fraud and making fraud 
advice more personal and possibly more interesting.  However, this is currently missing.  
One reason for this gap might be down to difficulty in studying scams.  While 
interviews with fraud victims are a good way of identifying possible attributes that 
made them more likely to comply with the scam, developing and testing a measure 
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which would identify these attributes is challenging.  As previous studies have found 
(Jagatic, et al., 2007; Modic & Lea, 2013; Scheibe et al., 2014), measuring scam 
compliance is difficult without employing unethical practices (e.g. deception and 
persuasion), such as those used by scammers.  As Jagatic et al. (2007) have found, this 
has a potential to cause distress to participants, especially if participants were selected 
without asking for consent.  Therefore, frequently, different scam simulations have been 
used, however, this may mean that the results may not represent what people would do 
in a real-life scam situation.  The present thesis aims to address some of the limitations 
affecting the measurement of scam compliance.  
 
 
2.8 Thesis aims  
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine individual differences that might predict 
susceptibility to fraud, and in doing so whether an individual difference approach is 
suitable to the study of fraud victimisation.  In order to do that, the present thesis draws 
from a wide range of fraud research, as well as relevant theories and theoretical models 
and builds on research looking into individual attributes as predictors of scam 
compliance (Modic & Lea, 2012, 2013).  The general aim of this programme of 
research may be broken down into 3 related primary aims:  
 
• To identify factors and personal attributes which contribute to making judgment 
errors in scam situations by conducting interviews with victims and near victims 
of fraud (Study1, Chapter 3).  
• To construct and develop a psychometric questionnaire designed to indicate an 
area of individual susceptibility to fraudulent offers (Study 2, Chapter 4).  
• To test the utility of the newly developed measure of fraud on a proxy scam 
situation (Study 3, Chapter 5).  
 
The measurement and evaluation of the factors underlying compliance with fraudulent 
offers are important for a number of reasons.  The measure can be a practical way of 
engaging victims and potential victims of fraud to take an active role in fraud 
prevention by understanding their own vulnerability when it comes to fraudulent offers.  
It may offer a way of indicating individual strengths and weaknesses, allowing for more 
tailor-made advice that could be combined with awareness of scamming techniques that 
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exploit certain individual attributes. This would allow for incorporation of external as 
well as internal factors that contribute to scam compliance and offer a better protection 
than general scam prevention advice.  Finally, fraud prevention practitioners could use 
the measure as an instrument for evaluating the vulnerability of the victim when fraud is 
reported, in order to determine what course of action may be most suitable. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The voices of scam victims: A psychological model 
of the experience of fraud 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the psychological precursors and personal consequences of fraud 
through interviews with victims of fraud.  Exposure to fraudulent schemes, cons or 
scams has become a widespread experience for individuals within modern society.  
Whilst many forms of scams are known to predate widespread use of the Internet 
(Glickman, 2005; Zuckoff, 2005), the ease and anonymity of online communication has 
undoubtedly increased the range of fraudulent offers, increasing the volume of people 
who are potentially exposed (Smith, 2010).  In addition, well-known scams, (e.g. 
Nigerian scams) may now be used by scammers to identify and target the most 
vulnerable individuals (Herley, 2012).  The Internet not only affords fraudsters greater 
anonymity but also distances the perpetrator from the victim, resulting in reduced 
empathy for the victim.  As a result, fraud is thriving.  The UK Annual Fraud Indicator 
estimates a total annual loss to the economy due to fraud of around £190 billion, with 
individual losses of around £6.8 billion (Button et al., 2017).  In addition, the number of 
fraud offences recorded in England and Wales by the National Fraud Intelligence 
Bureau in 2016, rose to 641,535; largely driven by online banking and non-investment 
fraud (Office for National Statistics, 2017).  Given that cost estimates are based only on 
certain categories of fraud and that many instances of fraud are often not reported by 
victims, it is likely the true personal losses arising from individual fraud will be higher.   
 
3.1.1 Factors that contribute to fraud victimisation  
The risk of being targeted by fraudsters has been shown to vary across different life 
circumstances.  For example, entering prize draws, reaching retirement age, moving 
home, making big purchases, buying insurance, medical treatment, marriage, and the 
occurrence of births or deaths in the family have all been shown to increase risk (Titus 
et al, 1995; Titus & Gover, 2001).  The personal vulnerability created by such events is 
attractive to scammers who may actively search for people in these categories.  
 
Several psychological traits have also been identified which may directly lessen 
protection from a fraud once presented, or indirectly through their influence on life 
events (Parrish et al., 2009).  People who are susceptible to flattery, easily intimidated, 
who possess risk-taking tendencies or exhibit less self-control have been found more 
prone to being defrauded (Holtfreter et al., 2008; Schreck, 1999).  Langenderfer and 
Shimp (2001) have similarly identified lack of self-control as a factor in vulnerability to 
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scams but suggest that scepticism and greater knowledge about scams may moderate 
vulnerability.  A disinterest in current affairs and carelessness of information processing 
also seem to offer advantages to scammers since individuals are less likely to learn from 
news about current fraud practices (Titus et al., 1995).  
 
A number of dispositional differences between victims and non-victims have also been 
identified, including positive emotional reactions to high-value incentives, a reliance on 
signs of authority and self-confidence (Fischer et al., 2013; Langenderfer & Shimp, 
2001; Lea et al., 2009).  Previous scam victims have also been shown to exhibit greater 
susceptibility to social influence and a greater need for consistency with their own 
preferences in order to commit to an offer.  Reduced premeditation, or a lack of 
deliberation when making decisions, was also found to be highly predictive of scam 
compliance (Modic & Lea, 2012, 2013).  As fraud is increasingly prevalent and difficult 
to investigate and prosecute, as well as having a financial and psychological impact on 
victims (Button et al., 2010, 2012, 2014; Cross et al., 2014; Whitty & Buchanan, 2012b; 
Whitty & Buchanan, 2016), taking an individual approach to understanding processes 
that govern compliance with fraudulent offers could assist future fraud prevention and 
educational measures and potentially reduce the number of victims.  
 
3.1.2 Research aims and rationale  
The present study explores the interplay of factors in scam events using a narrative 
approach, with the events reconstructed from the victim’s perspective.  
The main aims of this study are: 
 
• To ascertain what processes underlie scam compliance and identify factors (if 
any) that facilitate or moderate fraud vulnerability 
• To organise the newly gathered data into themes and subthemes associated with 
vulnerability to fraudulent offers 
• To use the themes and subthemes as a guide to help inform questionnaire 
development in the subsequent study 
 
Interviews enable exploration of complex issues that are difficult to capture through 
quantitative means (Burman, 1994).   As such, interviews have been proven to be an 
effective way of gathering data on processes that underlie fraud victimisation (Button et 
al., 2013; Cross, 2013, 2015; Fischer et al., 2013; Lea et al., 2009; Olivier et al., 2015; 
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Whitty, 2013; Whitty & Buchanan, 2012a).  Interview transcripts have been used in a 
variety of ways: as a way of generating themes and subthemes to identify the key 
elements needed to explain the research phenomena, to construct typologies or to mine 
for recurrence of certain words (Cross, 2015; Fischer et al., 2013; Whitty, 2013).  As 
such, they were deemed as the most appropriate method for exploring intricacies of the 
scam process and the eventual reasons for compliance.  
 
 
3.2 Methods 
 
Scam narratives were gathered through twelve semi-structured interviews designed to 
cover specific themes, however, natural story telling was encouraged.  Narratives 
incorporate the facts and the individual’s making sense of them as they unfold, 
preserving the interrelations between different facets of one's life and the scam that lead 
to certain outcomes.  Furthermore, alongside the recollections of past events, narratives 
present psychological scenarios relative to different moments in the scam process, 
crucially including the fantasies and future-oriented reasoning that the fraudulent offer 
might have elicited (Bruner, 2003).  Whilst no claims are made about the factual truth of 
each and every detail recollected by the interviewees, experiences are uniquely 
positioned to offer pictures of how the scam had presented itself, had been lived through 
and was evaluated afterwards.  
 
3.2.1 Participants 
A total of 12 participants, 7 men and 5 women were interviewed.  All interviewees were 
volunteers who were recruited by advertising the study through various social media 
sites, online fraud information and support sites, and direct email to students and 
employees within the University of Portsmouth.  No participants were approached 
directly.   
 
All participants had been victims of at least one scam.  One victim had been able to 
recognise the fraud before losing funds.  The extent of the financial loss and scam 
delivery method varied (i.e. online, phone, face-to-face).  Details are presented in Table 
3.1.    
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Table 3.1  
Participant, scam and reporting path information 
 
Participant† Age Occupation Scam type Amount lost / 
recouped 
Reporting 
path 
 
Chloe 
 
26 
 
Admin  
 
Purchased tickets from a 
fraudulent website  
 
Lost: £190 
Recouped: £0 
 
 
Bank 
Bill  35 Design Defrauded in the street by a 
scammer who asked to 
change money 
Lost: £20 
Recouped: £0 
 
Not reported 
Kate 46 IT 
consultant 
Invested in a pyramid scheme 
through a friend 
Lost: £500 
Recouped: £0 
 
Not reported 
 
Robin  50 IT 
consultant 
Invested in a pyramid scheme 
through a friend with Kate 
Lost: £500 
Recouped: £0 
 
Not reported 
Peter 52 Out of work  
due to 
disability 
Approached by a scammer 
pretending to be a mechanic 
offering to fix his car  
 
Lost: £60 
Recouped: £0 
Not reported 
Rob 57 Software  
engineer 
Bought a heavy goods vehicle 
training from a fraudulent 
company  
 
Lost: £1200 
Recouped: £0 
Police, AF, 
TS, Civil 
court, PHSO 
 
Greg  27 Researcher Realised it was a scam when 
booking a travel tour abroad 
 
Lost: £0 
Recouped: £0 
Not reported 
Jane 41 Book editor Paid for a passport and 
driving license on a 
fraudulent website  
 
Lost: £90 
Recouped: £0 
Not reported  
Henry 64 Artist Invested in shares of a 
fraudulent company after 
being contacted by telephone        
         
Lost: £25,000 
Recouped: £0 
Police, FCA, 
solicitor 
Nina  44 Accounts Bought items from a 
fraudulent website and 
received only part of the 
order 
 
Lost: £200 
Recouped: 
£75 
 
PayPal and 
Mastercard 
Fred  26 Construction Bought a camper van on eBay 
and paid through the fake 
PayPal invoice asking for a 
bank transfer 
 
Lost: £3500 
Recouped: £0 
Bank, eBay,  
PayPal, AF 
Sam  34 Sales Bought a job training pack 
after being promised a job if 
she completed the training  
Lost: £20 
Recouped: £0 
AF,  
Bank 
Notes. 
AF – Action Fraud 
FCA – Financial Conduct Authority 
TS – Trading Standards  
PHSO – Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman  
† Participant names have been altered to protect anonymity 
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3.2.1.1 Exclusion criteria  
Participants under 18 years of age or those with mental impairment or mental illness  
were excluded due to their vulnerability, as outlined by British Psychological Society 
(BPS) code of ethics.  Those over 65 years of age were also excluded based on previous 
research findings.  Research suggests that those over the age of 60 are more likely to  
suffer diminishing cognitive functions that can be part of an ageing process  
(Callahan, Unverzagt, Hui, Perkins & Hendrie, 2002; Griffiths & Harmon, 2011; 
Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001; Zamarian, Sinz, Bonatti, Gamboz, & Delazer, 2008).  
Elderly people may also be more vulnerable due to other factors related to old age, such as 
loneliness and loss of independence (Martin, 2009), therefore they may not represent 
general population.  
 
Victims of romantic scams were also excluded from the study, as romance scams have 
been extensively studied (Buchanan & Whitty, 2014; Whitty & Buchanan, 2012a, 
2012b; Whitty, 2013; Whitty & Buchanan, 2016).  They also differ from other scams in 
that they rely on the lengthy communication with the victim, which is akin to grooming 
(Whitty 2013).  In addition, romance scams have been found to cause victims great 
distress so any recollection of events for research purposes, unless necessary, might 
have caused further distress. 
 
3.2.2   Interviews   
The study’s aim was to	explore personal, social and situational factors related to the  
scam event as they were seen by the interviewees.   Due to the personal and potentially 
sensitive nature of the interviews, participants were given the option to be interviewed  
face-to-face or by telephone according to which they felt more comfortable with 
(Legard, Keegan & Ward, 2003).  In some cases, face-to-face interview was not 
possible due to distance.  As a result, 7 face-to-face and 5 phone interviews were 
conducted.  The quality of the phone interviews was good, however, two interviews had 
few short inaudible periods.  The interviews were designed to cover all stages of the 
scam process; beginning with the circumstances the victims found themselves in at the 
time.  The natural flow of the story-telling was encouraged by asking participants to 
describe the experience from beginning to end and prompts were used to encourage and 
support participants to expand on their answers only where needed.  Participants were 
also asked to reflect on their feelings during the experience, what they think made them 
vulnerable and what they think might have helped them to avoid such a situation in the 
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future.  Finally, participants were asked about what they did upon discovering the fraud 
and about the emotional impact of the events.  The main themes covered in the semi-
structured interviews are shown in Table 3.2  
 
 
Table 3.2  
Interview schedule for Study 1 
 
Type  Questions 
 
Warm up  
 
• Can you tell me something about yourself and your everyday life in 
general?    
 • What kind of things do you enjoy doing in your spare time?   
 
Main question 
 
• Please can you tell me about what happened in the scam in as much detail 
as possible, starting with what was going on in your life at the time?  
 
Questions to cover 
the themes  
 
Communication 
• What form did the communication take? (verbal/written?)  
 
• What were your thoughts about the information you were given at the time?   
• How long did it go on for? 
 
• Please tell me as much as you can remember about the scammer? 
Scammer  • What were your thoughts about the person you were dealing with?  
• How was it when you had contacts with them?  
• What was the tone of the exchange with them?  
• How did the relationship develop? 
 
 
Processes  
• How did you feel about the relationship with them? 
 
• Can you remember your feelings, emotions, gut feelings at the time? 
• What do you think led you to trust the situation/scammer?  
 
Reflections • Looking back at the events, what might have helped you to avoid it?  
• How did people close to you react when (if you did) you told them what 
had happened? If not, what are the reasons you didn’t tell anyone?  
• Do you feel changed by the experience? In what way? (feelings, thoughts, 
attitudes) 
• Have you changed your behaviour in any way after this episode? How?  
• How do you feel now about speaking about your experience to others?  
 
Ending questions  • Is there anything else you would like to tell me about your experience? 
• Are there any questions you feel are important to ask that I have not 
covered?  
• Did you experience any negative thoughts or feelings during the interview? 
Please tell me about it? What could I do different to minimise that in the 
future?  
• Do you still have the correspondence?  May I have a look at that? 
 
 
3.2.3 Data treatment and analysis 
All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim without the use of 
software, retaining conversational features such as repetitions, hesitations, pauses and 
laughter.  Any information that could potentially reveal the participant’s identity was 
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changed or omitted (King & Horrocks, 2010; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).  As a first 
step into the analysis, each interview was summarised to provide a synopsis and 
rendition of the key points covered.  Despite differences in the range of frauds the 
interviewees had been victims of, from brief, single contact frauds causing the loss of 
limited sums of money to prolonged communication exchanges between the victim and 
perpetrator involving much higher financial loss, three stages to each scam process 
could be consistently identified for all, which included: 1) the precursors of the scam, 2) 
the committing to the scam and 3) the aftermath.  Thematic analysis was then applied to 
the narrative segments relative to each stage (Braun & Clarke, 2006), in order to 
identify the main elements for each chronological stage of the scam, preserving their 
connection with the whole experience, in order to unearth what individual attributes 
contribute to fraud vulnerability.  The quotes presented in this chapter were treated by 
removing word repetitions and speech overlap.  
 
3.2.3.1 Coding 
The first phase was familiarisation, which entailed reading and re-reading the interview 
transcripts.  Units of meaning (excerpts that could be assigned a single code) were then 
identified and assigned preliminary codes.  These were adjusted as the analysis 
proceeded; a first level of emerging themes and subthemes; that would grasp the 
essence of clusters of codes, were then formulated.  An example of the coding process is 
outlined in Table 3.3.   
 
Table 3.3  
Examples of coding  
 
Unit of meaning Preliminary  
codes 
Emerging themes 
and subthemes  
Final theme or 
subtheme 
 
I received the confirmation email, 
which looked to me very, kind of, 
official. 
 
 
official 
legitimacy 
 
 
Trusting legitimate 
looking material 
 
Credibility and 
legitimacy 
I feel like I was, in a way, stupid and  
I feel like I failed. I have failed. 
feeling foolish 
failure 
Erosion of self 
esteem 
 
Psychological 
consequences 
 
Most people that stop me, stop me to 
try and talk to me or I can detect any 
kind of request for anything uhm, are 
greeted by considerably less open and 
generous and understanding person 
than back then. 
loss of trust, loss of 
empathy, 
consequence of 
fraud 
Consequences of 
fraud 
Loss of trust in 
society 
Loss of trust 
 
A further examination of the interview transcripts was conducted in order to see 
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whether the themes were the best fit for the data, and if they represented, to a 
satisfactory level, the different trajectories narrated by the participants.  The themes and 
subthemes were finalised in this stage. 
 
 
3.3 Results 
 
The primary themes and subthemes identified for each stage of the scam process are 
shown in Table 3.4 and presented in detail in the text below, illustrated with fragments 
from the participants’ narratives.  
 
Table 3.4  
Stages, themes and subthemes of the fraud process 
 
Stage  Primary Theme  Subthemes Description  
 
Precursors 
 
Time constraints  
 
 
Urgency 
 
Lack of time to consider 
information 
 
Lack of time to consider the 
information needed and a 
preference to make a quick 
decision  
 
Dissatisfaction with 
one's present 
circumstances 
  
Personal circumstances that 
make a scam offer appear more 
attractive (e.g. lack of funds)  
 
 
Social Influence  
 
  
Opinions or backing of other 
people that has a bearing on the 
decision making 
 
 
 
Commitment 
 
Factors pertaining 
to the perpetrator  
 
 
Credibility and 
legitimacy 
 
Similarity, familiarity 
and likeability 
 
Limited availability 
 
Urgency 
 
 
Manipulations used by 
scammers in order to elicit 
compliance, such as appearing 
likeable and trustworthy, 
producing legitimate looking 
communications and limiting 
the time the offer is valid for 
 
 
Factors pertaining 
to the victim 
 
Lack of scrutiny of  
available information 
 
Excitement  
 
Social norms  
 
Factors influencing compliance, 
such as emotional reactions 
elicited by a scam offer, 
insufficient information 
processing and compliance due 
to social norms. 
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Stage  Primary Theme  Subthemes Description  
 
Aftermath  
 
Psychological and  
financial 
consequences 
 
  
Financial hardship and 
emotional distress experienced 
by victims  
 
Avoidance 
strategies 
 
  
Behavioural changes 
implemented in order to avoid 
future victimisation 
 
Resolution and 
justice 
 
Dealing with authorities 
 
Need for resolution 
Difficulties and lack of attention 
experienced by fraud victims 
when fraud is reported to the 
authorities and a need for 
closure after fraud victimisation 
 
Loss of trust 
 
 Loss of trust in the authorities 
and the society as a whole 
 
 
3.3.1 Precursors 
This section presents the different sets of situational or personal circumstances that 
participants reported as driving their engagement with the fraudulent offer in the first 
place. 
 
3.3.1.1 Time restraints and urgency 
Time restraints refer to urgently needing to resolve a situation, purchase a product or a 
service.  It also refers to the lack of time needed to carefully consider the information, 
which is not imposed by the scammer but rather by personal circumstances.  Time 
restraints can lead to fraud victimisation even when people are usually cautious.  Jane 
was in a rush to renew her passport and driving licence, and did not consider in detail all 
of the information on the website through which she paid for a service that should have 
been free of charge.  
 
Jane: "Uhm, in a kind of snatched 15 minutes I thought; right, I'm just gonna go online and I'm 
gonna sort it out before I pick up the kids from school.  Uhm, so it was classic case of being in a 
hurry, and I uhm, clicked renew driving licence, uhm, online and I was, as many other people 
have been, directed to a false site.  I read through it and thought; that's funny, I can't imagine 
why you have to pay to renew your driving licence, maybe that's changed, it's been such a long 
time since I had a driving licence uhm, so merrily clicked through uhm, and thought right, great, 
that's that ticked off my list." (P1, lines 28-35) 
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Jane’s reconstruction portrays the conditions under which her purchase occurred, a 
common scene in the busy life of a parent who, using a limited time window to carry 
out a task that needed to be completed, follows the first link coming up on internet 
without checking its validity, despite being surprised by some elements of the 
procedure.   
  
Situations of urgency can present in face-to-face scams as well.  On returning to his car 
after shopping in a supermarket, Peter was met by a man who told him that his car 
engine was faulty as it had smoke coming out of it.  As Peter has a physical disability, 
which means that he has difficulty standing for long periods of time, he accepted the 
man’s offer to fix the car for a fee, only to find out later from a local newspaper, that 
this had been a scam.  He explains his decision as follows:  
 
Peter: "Something at the back of my mind said; you are a member of a breakdown service, 
call them.  But it was that time issue, you know.  I would have to wait for them to arrive 
would have to wait for them to fix it, if they could fix it.  Uhm, and that would mean waiting 
              around.  Uhm, I just wanted to get home." (P3, lines 130-133) 
 
Similar to Jane’s position before, Peter weighs time against the possibility of saving 
money, the desire to solve the situation rapidly stopping him from considering the 
possibility of the situation being inauthentic.  
 
3.3.1.2 Dissatisfaction with one’s present circumstances 
A different type of precursor has to do with challenging life circumstances.  The need or 
desire to improve the current situation often makes fraudulent offers look more 
attractive, so they may be grasped without too much reflection.   
 
Desperate to find another job, Sam purchased a training pack online, under the promise 
that she would be offered a job if she completed the training.  The training pack never 
arrived and Sam later discovered on the Internet that the company was fraudulent. 
 
Sam: "You see, unfortunately, the way I was feeling on Monday, had I seen it I probably 
would have still gone ahead with it coz sometimes you're feeling desperate, […] d'you 
understand what I mean?  You don't feel, you don't think to think so clearly, your emotions 
running." (P5, lines 205-208) 
 
Sam describes her state of mind as refusing to apply rational judgment even if she had 
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seen the information beforehand, hoping that the job might be genuine, as she was eager 
to change her circumstances. 
 
Henry, a self-employed artist, invested a large amount buying shares in a bogus 
company, for similar reasons to Sam.  Starting with five thousand pounds, after frequent 
conversations with the scammer, Henry was encouraged to take a loan for a further 
twenty thousand pounds.  His circumstances at that particular time in his life, he says, 
made the scam look extremely appealing to him.  
 
          Henry: "Uhm, my situation really is that it is pretty hand to mouth, uhm, you know, it's a 
precarious business being a self-employed artist as you might imagine, and I had brought up my 
family just about, from proceeds of my endeavours.  And I got to this point in my life where I was 
living separately from my family, uhm.  I was living alone, uhm, and work wasn't as forthcoming 
as it had been and there was an opportunity to make some money, is what it amounted to. [...]  
           I was also going through some very difficult times with my wife, uhm, there was that dimension to 
it as well.  Yeah, it's hard to fully articulate but I think it's possible that when you're stressed about 
one situation, your natural guards maybe not be in the position they would've been otherwise. And 
so you kind of embark on a route that leads you down a more troubled path than you 
            might've taken had your err, instincts been at a finer tuned level."  (P8, lines 385-391 and P11, 
lines 513-521) 
 
Henry’s reconstruction of what led him to embark on the scam, and persist in it, 
presents a more complicated picture; it did not only imply solving immediate financial 
issues but also alleviating the psychological hardship of prolonged financial 
uncertainties and relationship troubles.  As he explains, he feels that stress and 
loneliness may have dulled his judgment, lowering the threshold at which his “natural 
guard” would be triggered. 
 
3.3.1.3 Social influence  
Life dissatisfaction may sharply increase vulnerability to fraud but this is by no means a 
necessary or sufficient condition for becoming a victim.  Knowing that an opportunity 
has backing from other people, especially those from the same social circle, can be 
enough to raise interest and make someone commit to a fraudulent offer.  Introduced to 
a pyramid scheme by close friends, Robin describes his reasoning when he decided to 
proceed despite his initial doubts.  
 
Interviewer: "So why would you say you went along with it?  What would be the reason?"  
 
Robin: "To an extent it may have been [...] I don’t know if some of it was peer pressure, and I 
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don’t mean that Mark was, that he and his partner were particularly pressuring us, it just, you 
know the peer pressure to fit in, to be part of the group, uhm, partly peer pressure, partly uhm, 
you know, it could work.  It’s only five hundred quid to find out if it works and if it works, you 
get seven and a half grand.  [...] But yeah, I think it was probably peer pressure and conforming 
and little bit of greed.  Thinking, you know, we may get something for nothing and then realising 
that, uhm, it’s not for nothing." (P6, lines 286-303) 
 
In societies permeated by individualistic values, it is easy to underestimate the extent to 
which social conformity, i.e. following the lead of others, plays a role in individual 
choices.  Robin was introduced to a seemingly high-profit scheme by his close friends 
(who lost money just as he did).  Despite his friends not being particularly insistent, he 
recalls a desire to “fit in”, to act in accordance with his social circle. 
 
Interestingly, Robin also described that being scammed with his friends meant he did 
not feel as humiliated about being scammed, as it was an experience shared with his 
peer group. 
 
Robin: "If you make the same mistake with somebody that you trust or somebody that you 
respect or somebody that you like uhm, you probably don’t feel as humiliated, you don’t feel as 
gullible."  (P4, lines 151-153) 
 
 
3.3.2 Commitment  
Once initially attracted, staying engaged with a scam and eventual compliance to the 
point of financial loss relies on a varied set of factors; some of which pertain to the 
perpetrator and some to the victim. In this section, the different components that may 
influence scam engagement after the initial interest are explained.   
 
3.3.2.1 Factors pertaining to the perpetrator    
Scammers employ different techniques to entice their victims, some oriented to avoid 
generating suspicions, and others to enhance the desirability of their offer.  Three 
strategies identified in participants’ narratives that are used by scammers are considered 
below.  
 
3.3.2.1.1 Credibility and legitimacy   
The success of the scam relies on appearing trustworthy and legitimate as a means of 
avoiding suspicion. For example, scammers imitate genuine companies in their outlook, 
 78 
whether face-to-face or online, create material that looks professional or adopt a 
respectable personal style.  Online, this may include professional looking websites with 
credible content; face-to-face, scammers may appear immaculately presented, likeable 
and friendly, and generate positive first impressions.    
 
The following illustrates how carefully credibility can be constructed.  Rob needed a 
driving licence for a heavy goods vehicle (HGV) he had bought.   The licence involves 
a training package, including lessons with an instructor that can be purchased online.  
Prior to paying by bank transfer, Rob checked the company he was dealing with on the 
UK Government’s Companies House website.  The company was registered and 
nothing stood out, but Rob found out later that the company was fraudulent.   
 
Rob: "Generally the companies are registered with Companies House, real companies, real  
people uhm, the directory pointing to the real director's address.  But this company 
uhm, the company's registered address was a mailbox in Reading where they never had any 
contact.  The only director that this company had is a completely fictitious person.  The 
website registration was done through somebody that doesn't exist, uhm, and so their trading 
address was a firm of managed offices, uhm, where they never actually set foot in [...] and I 
was quite amazed that people could create a limited company, with completely fake addresses." 
(P2, lines 65-74)  
  
Rob’s account illustrates the ways scammers enhance the credibility of their offer by 
creating false information through trustworthy sources.  Even a conscientious customer 
could be reassured, only to discover when things go wrong that such information might 
be fabricated and that even official websites are not exempt.  Besides creating a 
legitimate commercial identity, the bogus company had also equipped itself with latest 
technology, projecting a picture of commercial success:  
 
Rob: "I noticed that he knew who I was right away.  You’d call 0870 and he picks up the 
phone and says; hello Rob.  My first impression on that was; ooh, these people have got 
customer management software, they’ve got phones connected to computers so when 
somebody calls straight away you’ve got customer details.  I was quite impressed by that." 
(P8, lines 352-356) 
 
A credible presentation, such as a good website with convincing logos, is a condition 
for engagement, as anything looking less than professional may raise suspicion.  The 
example above, and a similar scam reported by another participant in which a foreign 
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company held a UK-based URL, show that scams can be extremely sophisticated in 
appearance.  As the victims reported, only when typing ‘fraud’ or ‘scam’ in association 
with the company name or goods being sold, did bad reports appear on the Internet 
search engines.  Moreover, this can be offset by online customer review sites carrying 
fake reviews of such companies in order to make the services they offer seem attractive.   
 
Credibility as a pre-condition to scam success is influential in face-to-face situations as 
well, as the example below illustrates.  On vacation in Brazil, Greg and a friend were 
trying to organise a tour of the Amazon, which proved difficult.  Eventually, as Greg 
explains, they were persuaded by someone’s credible demeanour. 
 
Greg: "The first impressions were that he was really nice, he was in a suit, he was well presented, 
he spoke good English.  You imagine that you’ve got this nice, ehm, streets where they all sell  
Amazon tours, it wasn’t like that at all.  We had to walk round a massive city trying to find 
individual shops in the middle of random shops.  So it was actually really difficult to find these 
places, so when we saw him and he was really friendly, yeah, you’re straight away drawn to him." 
(P3, lines 108-120)  
 
These excerpts demonstrate that, in order for a scammer to be taken seriously and 
reduce suspicion, they must embody the characteristics that a genuine provider of a 
service would possess.  When the perpetrator of a scam is able to projects competence, 
through smart attire or being well-spoken, fraudulent attempts are more likely to 
succeed.   
 
3.3.2.1.2 Similarity, familiarity and likeability 
 First impressions can also be driven by scammers giving out information about 
themselves and presenting themselves as being socially close to the victim, either 
belonging to the same community or sharing some common characteristic.  This may 
influence a person to extend trust towards someone they have never encountered before.  
 
In the case of Peter, who had accepted a car repair from a complete stranger, the bid to 
trust relied on the disclosure of personal information and especially the fact that the 
fraudster was ‘living locally’. 
 
Peter: "I think he sort of put me at my ease by saying he was a mechanic and, uhm, by 
giving me some information about his family coz he said his daughter has just had a baby 
and, you know, strangers just don’t do that and I think now, now thinking back I think it was 
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to put me at my ease to say that, you know, I’m a good fellow who, you know, I’m a 
family person and I live locally and I think that was to put me at my ease really."  
(P3, lines 120-125) 
 
Feeling “put at ease”, to use Peter’s words, is consistent with the idea that a fraud 
perpetrator would look different from a typical person, and especially, that they would 
not belong to the same social group or background as the victim.  
 
People are more likely to trust what is familiar to them.  Kate and Robin, victims of the 
same pyramid scam, explain that it was trusting the judgment of their friends that 
introduced them to the scheme that subsequently led them all to lose the funds. 
Knowing her friend for many years, gave Kate confidence in the venture:  
 
Kate: "Had it been somebody you didn’t trust or I thought wasn’t that bright, if I spoke to 
somebody I didn’t know, I knew nothing about them and they went oh yeah, give me a cheque 
for five hundred quid, I’ll give it to this person and in X amount of time you’ll get some cheques 
for five hundred quid, I would just say no.  Talking to people you trust about it, yeah it did, 
it’s a confidence thing really." (P5, lines 231-238) 
 
Robin further explains his trust in the judgment of his friends and the fact that the 
perpetrator was someone who lived and worked in the same community and was 
therefore considered trustworthy.   
 
Robin: "Uhm, some other friends were involved in it and they were involved in it by somebody 
they met in a quite a formal situation, it was a woman that worked in the Bang & Olufsen shop 
in the town where they lived, a very small town, so a small community. The woman was 
working in a decent shop uhm, they were good customers there and I think that gave them a 
sense of security in putting their money in and I kind of trusted the judgment of my friends and 
thought: well it may work."  (P2, lines 49-55) 
  
Kate points out how she would not have considered participating in the scheme if the 
proposal had not come from someone she knew.  In these cases, trust is already present 
in the relationship so it is hard to withdraw it or question the good faith or judgment of 
the proponent of the opportunity.  
 
Scammers may also cultivate interpersonal relationship with a victim in order to 
encourage compliance and reassure the victim.  Investing a large sum of money in 
company shares, Henry was promised a quick return of investment.  As the weeks went 
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by, he began feeling uneasy about the investment, as he had not received the return.  
After complaining, he was assigned a liaison person that would contact him daily, and 
who built a relatively intimate personal relationship with him.  After a while, it became 
harder for him to complain about his investment.   
 
Henry: "I thought that actually if I met him I'd probably quite like him. I didn't feel the same way 
about the first guy who contacted me. [...] I felt sort of warmth with the other guy and a sort of 
sense of genuine, I mean, it felt as if he was genuinely kind of concerned to do the right thing, is 
what it felt like.  Uhm, now whether he was much cleverer kind of manipulator of people or 
quite why it felt like that, it would be hard to summarise in a few words.  Uhm, but the first guy I 
did feel that he was just a bit of a smoothie I suppose.  And I didn't know anything about him 
personally whereas I sort of, somehow, even if it was delusionary, I felt as if I did know 
something about the other guy." (P5, lines 233-235 and P7, lines 332-339) 
 
3.3.2.1.3 Limited availability    
Scammers exploit a scarcity of goods, or manipulate the perception of scarcity by 
limiting the time their offer is valid for, thus putting the potential victim in the position 
where they might miss out on the purchase they aspire to make. Fred’s account shows 
how this impacted on his decision-making.  He was defrauded through an online auction 
site, trying to purchase a van, which fitted his needs at the time, and for a good price.  
He felt uneasy about a lack of communication with the seller, but did not want to miss a 
good opportunity.  
 
Fred: "Well we were very excited, initially we were very excited that, what he was offering 
because it was exactly what we were looking for uhm, and it was within our budget as well.  
Initially yeah, we were very excited about it and then an excitement probably took us over a wee 
bit.  However, I did have a little bit of concern over the emails, uhm and I asked them numerous 
times to uhm, for a contact phone number so I can call them up and discuss the van and further 
details.  They said they were out of the country, that they were err, not contactable till next week, 
however next week it was gonna be sold so, uhm, it was gonna have to be now or never."  
(P4, lines 149-157) 
 
Offering goods at a convenient price and limiting the time the offer is presented for, can 
push buyers towards completion, as they may have already emotionally committed to 
the offer.  Giving up at that point would mean renouncing the opportunity, creating a 
lack of closure and mean that more time resource would be needed to start the search 
afresh for a similar opportunity.  
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3.3.2.2 Factors pertaining to the victim 
Regardless of the actions of the perpetrator, once a person finds a fraudulent offer 
enticing, different personal attributes of the victim can facilitate whether they decide to 
comply with or reject the scam. Two factors identified in the narratives of scam victims 
are discussed below.  
 
3.3.2.2.1 Lack of scrutiny of available information   
The amount of information different people gather about a product or service provider 
and the opportunities they present varies. In the present sample, the amount of 
preliminary investigation participants performed did not seem related to the amount of 
money they were going to invest, with some interviewees admitting to having skipped 
even the basic checks, as Jane explains: 
 
Jane: "Of course people don't, I mean, I'm sure that I'm not alone.  Do you read your terms and 
conditions when you pay anything online, uhm, you know.  Or when you buy something from 
Amazon, twenty pages long?  Of course, you don't.  Of course, you should.  I'm a lawyer's 
daughter and when I first signed my first bank account, I absolutely read terms and conditions 
and showed it to my father but do I do it now?  No." 
 
Interviewer: "Is there a reason for that?" 
 
Jane: "Time." (P5, lines 213-222) 
   
While regretting not having read the small print on the website, Jane feels confident in 
describing her conduct as typical.  She points to something scams clearly rely on, 
namely that routine dealings with Internet companies have socialised web users to trust 
providers without reading through terms and conditions.  This acquired trust is 
exploited by scammers who count on a number of customers completing a procedure 
without questioning its legitimacy, especially when there is an additional urgency factor 
at play.   
 
The interplay of urgency, scarcity and lack of scrutiny can also be observed in Chloe’s 
story.  The last amongst her friends to buy tickets for a music festival that appeared sold 
out, she used a link to a ticket website sent by one of her friends (who purchased tickets 
elsewhere), without checking the website's legitimacy.     
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Interviewer: "What do you think might have helped you to avoid it?" 
 
Chloe: "Taking my time. To actually research a company, which I do now with any kind of 
transactions I do online but it did put me off buying anything online for at least four years."  
(P7, lines 321-325) 
 
3.3.2.2.2 Excitement 
While some transactions have to do with completing an undesirable task or getting 
something out of the way quickly, other fraudulent opportunities can involve the 
anticipation of positive emotional prospects such as securing goods, money or even a 
new job.  Such prospects elicit optimistic images of possible futures in which such 
things have been obtained.  Our participants recall the insurgence of feelings concerning 
similar promised events.  
 
Kate: "I mean, gosh, can you imagine it, if a few people would send you a cheque for a thousand 
pounds each or even five hundred quid each, you know what I mean, that would be like such a 
nice bonus and you do kinda think ooh if I got a bonus of few thousand pounds I could go out 
and treat myself, I could have a holiday or I could buy myself something for the house, or you 
know what I mean, there’s a certain like ‘oooh’, you know what I mean, yeah a niceness, what 
can I do, how can I improve where I am, could I have a nice holiday, could I have a nice, I don’t 
know, TV or could I buy a new car or whatever it is.  There was that kind of oooh that sounds 
nice, that sounds like I want to get involved." (P5, lines 206-217) 
      
Having entertained such images makes the prospect of not “getting involved” seem like 
a loss, prompting further risky behaviours to resolve a fear of missing out.  Henry, who 
invested twice in worthless shares, explains in detail below: 
 
Henry: "Uhm...it seemed like within weeks I was gonna get money from this first one and that 
I'd be kicking myself if I didn't take the opportunity to get the money from the second one and it 
was enough money to make it, sort of, life changing situation."  (P8, lines 367-370) 
 
In Henry’s words, it was the anticipation of regretting a missed opportunity that wins 
him over, after having envisioned a different life for himself.  Exercising caution would 
make that image vanish, and this is how such future scenarios act in favour of the 
scammer and create a facilitated route to persuasion.  
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3.3.2.2.3 Social norms  
Social norms such as being polite or helpful can elicit compliance in certain situations, 
even when there are no external pressures to comply with a request.  In the excerpt 
below, Greg explains why saying no makes him uncomfortable.  
 
Interviewer: "What would be the reason that you can’t just say to somebody 'I’ll think about it', 
and walk out of the shop?" 
   
Greg: "I’m stupid. For me it’s all about being polite.  So I think it’s rude to.  So I often say oh 
great, I really like it, I’ll come back, I’ll just go get some money or need to check with, uhm, 
friend who is buying it as well.  It’s really silly and my friends often say to me it’s really fake, 
uhm, to do that.  For me it’s really rude to just say no to someone."  (P8, lines 348-352) 
 
3.3.3 Aftermath   
Victims of fraud are greatly affected by their experience and these feelings can be 
extensive and long lasting.  This section illustrates the most common reactions after the 
event has been realised as a scam. 
 
3.3.3.1 Psychological and financial consequences 
Some participants endured a significant financial loss, which had repercussions on their 
subsequent life situation.  However, most participants reported lingering feelings of 
anger and resentment against the perpetrator even when little or no money was lost.   
 
Nina lost money buying hair styling tools online from a fake website.  Paying by 
PayPal, she believed she would have fraud protection, but found she was not covered as 
the scammer persuaded her to cancel the complaint.  Later, she found out that this is a 
frequent scamming technique, which made her angry at PayPal for not eradicating the 
loophole.  
 
Nina: "I suspect that most people feel pretty angry when they've been scammed. So, I mean 
that's a normal response, I'm just surprised that I still feel as much as I do so far down the line, 
when really at the end of the day, it's a long time ago.  Actually, it's three years ago. [...] So I 
guess, yeah, when somebody really pisses you off, it stays with you."  (P8, lines 358-363) 
 
Other participants also expressed their ever-lasting desire for revenge against the 
scammer.  
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Bill: "I still bring it up in my memory, I still have fantasies about getting justice somehow and 
being like Bruce Willis, chase him down and giving him a smack [laughs].  But I guess that 
doesn’t go away [laughs]." (P7, lines 318-320) 
 
Most participants also reported negative emotions directed towards themselves such as 
feelings of humiliation and shame, which prevented them from telling others about their 
experience.  Additionally, some participants expressed strong self-judgments such as 
being gullible, greedy, or inattentive. Henry recalls the impact the scam had on his self-
perception:  
 
 
Henry: "I didn't like the person that had done all this, I didn't like that aspect of my personality 
which was being greedy enough to kind of go and try and get this money for very little effort on 
my behalf. I didn't like the fact that I was greedy enough to allow myself to be persuaded, or 
gullible enough, to allow myself to be persuaded to spend another 20 thousand, which I didn't 
have.  Particularly didn't like that. Uhm, I didn't like my own gullibility [...] I suppose a sense of 
greed and gullibility combined were aspects of myself that I didn't, uhm, enjoy coming to terms 
with I suppose."  (P9, lines 437-444) 
    
For Henry, the financial consequences were also considerable, and had an impact on the 
future.  
 
Henry: "In some ways it was quite life changing on all sorts of levels coz the money that I spent, 
I then couldn't afford to maintain the house that I had and I ended up selling that house that I had 
at the time that I shouldn't really have sold it.  And you know, in a way they were a life changing 
amounts of money involved and so my life hasn't perhaps got the access to the funds that I might 
have had, had that not have happened."   (P10, lines 483-489) 
  
Even when no funds are lost, being deceived can have a profound effect on self-esteem.  
Even though Greg realised he was about to be defrauded before he lost any money, he 
describes being angry at himself for believing the scammer at the time.  
	
Greg: "I was so annoyed at myself for being caught up in that moment, ridiculously annoyed 
[...] I, like, when we left that room, we shook his hand and I was like; thank you so much for 
booking me this hotel and it really still annoys me to this day, I get bitter about it coz I 
shook his hand, coz I thought he was a nice person.  And he was just lying, completely."  
(P7, lines 308-325) 
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3.3.3.2 Avoidance strategies 
The experience of fraud leads victims to implement a variety of avoidance strategies to 
protect themselves from similar situations in the future.  The most commonly adopted 
strategy consisted of being aware of the details of different scams in operation and their 
sophistication, whether online or face-to-face.  Many participants in the sample reported 
having held a belief that becoming a scam victim would never happen to them, such that 
even a general awareness that scams can happen to anyone, might provide protection 
from victimisation.  Some participants also formed strategies specific to their 
experience, usually concentrating on the details of the scam or scam delivery.  The 
excerpts from Fred and Henry illustrate this.  Fred requested to speak to the seller of a 
vehicle he was buying on the phone but was given excuses, and feels this contributed to 
him being defrauded.  
 
Fred: "So the first initial thing that I would give as advice to anybody is uhm, err, firstly, most 
important is to talk to someone on the phone.  If you can talk to someone on the phone then you 
can actually find out if they are a real person or not."  (P5, lines 225-228) 
 
 
However, Henry, who was defrauded over the phone, reported not wanting to deal with 
anyone on the phone since the scam.  
 
Henry: "People often ring out of the blue for various reasons and I don't do any of it. So I don't 
do any dealings with people on the phone now.  I say if you want to deal with me you've got to 
write to me."  (P10, lines 467-469) 
    
Observing patterns of behaviour in individuals that find themselves in a scam 
situation and do not succumb is vital for fraud prevention.  Greg, who found himself 
under pressure to make a quick decision when booking a holiday tour, recognised it 
was a scam due to a strategy that he now routinely implements when in doubt:  
 
Greg: "Luckily for us, before we book the trip, we always go quickly check it on the 
Internet, just to make sure.  My excuse is always 'oh just need to go get some money'. [...] 
So we went to get the money, but really we were going to the Internet café.  […] And when 
we went on there, we found out that he’s a scam artist, everything he promises he doesn’t 
deliver."  (P2, lines 54-69) 
 
Greg also explained that he routinely uses the excuse of not having the money to 
purchase something because he is uncomfortable saying no.  
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Greg: “For me it is polite and it is not because you’re lying but I don’t like being rude in the 
shop and saying I don’t want it. So I think it’s always been a strategy in England as well but I 
used it a lot more in South America.”   
 
Interviewer: “So this is a strategy to get out of an uncomfortable situation where you’re not sure 
about your decision?”  
 
Greg: “Yeah.”  (P6, lines 258-266) 
 
3.3.3.3 Resolution and justice 
The psychological discomfort that victims of fraud experience is exacerbated by the 
perceived lack of response from the authorities.  None of the participants who reported 
being scammed to the authorities reported having their case followed up, despite some 
being extremely persistent and even tracking down the scammer’s whereabouts.  
 
3.3.3.3.1 Dealing with the authorities 
When a victim attempts to report fraud to The Police, they are directed to Action Fraud, 
an agency that records details of the fraud and passes them on to the police.  Participants 
that reported to Action Fraud had believed the crime would be investigated or followed 
up, but discovered this was not the case.  The excerpts below illustrate the type of 
reaction the lack of clear personal outcomes can engender.  Fred was encouraged by 
Action Fraud's social media representative to call and report the fraud.  When he did, he 
was told during the call that nothing will be done about it, despite him paying by bank 
transfer, through which the scammers details would be easily available to the police.  
This led him to erroneously believe that Action Fraud received funding per report they 
record.  
 
Interviewer: "Could I ask you about Action Fraud?  You mentioned that they get paid by the 
police for each case that they raise." 
 
Fred: "Yeah." 
 
Interviewer: "How did you find that out?" 
 
Fred: "I don’t know that. I’m assuming that. The reason why I’m assuming that, because they  
made it very easy for me to raise the case and they made it very easy and pushed me raising the 
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case but yet as soon as the case is raised, uhm, they didn’t wanna hear anything about it." 
(P6, lines 284-294) 
 
Rob reported similar negative views of dealing with the organisation:  
 
Rob: [...] "the state hasn’t lost money and the banks haven’t lost money, so they need to put in 
place a system that makes it look like ordinary people have protection against fraud.  Uhm, 
whereas, in fact they’re prepared to do nothing at all about it.  The purpose of Action Fraud, 
uhm, is to create a barrier between police and ordinary people trying to report fraud.  So they 
can, police can give plausible deniability that they are there to fight against fraud but actually 
they put this obstruction in the way."  (P5, lines 242-248) 
 
Both experiences reflect that a lack of interest from the authorities generates a very 
cynical response in the victim, perpetuating negative feelings after the incident and 
leading to broad assumptions or conspiracy theories about the operation of the 
organisation.  In many ways, the lack of perceived interest from the authorities and their 
inability or unwillingness to investigate and prosecute fraud crimes redoubles the 
offence for the victims, who find themselves unable to let go and give the experience 
closure. (Rob's reporting path is outlined in Appendix 1.3, Table 1.4) 
 
Participants who did not report fraud to the authorities, reported being too 
embarrassed to report it or chose not to report it because they expected nothing 
would be done about it.  
 
Peter: "I just didn’t feel that I wanted to get involved with the police in that way and really, 
are they gonna do anything about it?  They're just gonna write it in the book or give me a 
number, that’s it.  They’re not gonna be able to find the person or, they’re not gonna be 
interested in that kinda thing.  That’s their job, that’s what they should do uhm, but I think 
this is termed low level crime and it’s not really, not worth investigating.  So really, is it 
worth my time to even report it?"  (P4, 172-181) 
 
3.3.3.3.2 Need for resolution  
The need for support and a resolution of some kind was mentioned by all participants 
that reported the fraud to the authorities.  The need for resolution and achievement of 
closure was important, even when no loss had occurred.  Greg, who was fortunate 
enough to have avoided the scam, encountered the scammer again by coincidence and 
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helped stop potential victims from being scammed by him.  He explains, below, that 
this gave him a sense of justice.  
 
Greg: "Because you can tell people about what happened and they go; oh that’s really bad but to 
see him again, for me, meant everything.  I got closure from that.  Because I got to let everything 
out that has been building up and it was only, how many weeks since we’ve seen him?  Maybe 
two weeks maybe three weeks, I’m not too sure, maybe two weeks since we’ve seen him but to 
get it all out was good for me and I think it helped a lot. [...] And I know I keep going on about it 
but it was, for me, just perfect.  It was like you can’t get away with things like that, it’s not fair.  
And I think that’s the thing, it’s not fair what he tried to do to us. I would never do that to 
somebody else. And I don’t understand how anyone could do that to somebody."  
 
Interviewer: "Would you say you got, like a sense of justice from it?"  
 
Greg: "Yeah, definitely. Completely, hundred per cent justice.  It was like; You aren’t doing this, 
I know he’s gonna do it to other people but, you’re not doing it to these people."   
(P11, lines 496-530) 
 
Greg’s words display the importance of having a second chance to engage with the 
perpetrator.  In his case it was through a chance meeting, but for other interviewees a 
successful prosecution would achieve a similar sense of justice.  The experience reveals 
many features that were common to participants, such as the reiterative nature of the 
thoughts about the scam, the acute sense of injustice attributed to exploiting people’s 
trust, and the desire to prevent fraud from happening again.  
 
3.3.3.4 Loss of trust 
One of the most important repercussions of fraud victimisation reported by participants 
was the loss of trust that went beyond its immediate circumstances. This concerns the 
kind of ‘systemic’ trust enabling social actors to carry out their everyday business 
(Luhmann, 1979, 2000).  From this perspective, trust is granted to fellow citizens as 
well as to authorities, and contributes to the sense of personal safety and order in the 
world. It is this breach of systemic trust that may explain the depth and duration of 
negative emotions experienced by scam victims, directed both outwards and inwards. 
Participants in the study reported a variety of enduring changes in their attitudes, from 
increased cynicism in evaluating other people’s claims, to avoiding using certain 
commercial facilities and a heightened sense of threat and lack of protection. 
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Peter: "It’s quite sad, it’s sad because there are genuine people out there that do need help, even 
if it’s just a bit of advice.  Even if somebody approaches me and says do you know this road and 
how to get there, uhm, nine times out of ten yes do know but I’ll even say to them sorry I’m very 
busy, I need to go.  Don’t even bother to stop and talk."  (P7, lines 299-303) 
 
 
Nina: "Uhm, it has stopped me ordering from small, unknown companies because I just don't 
trust them anymore. [...] It’s a shame, you know. There could be some amazing small company 
out there that does an incredible product and I would never ever order off the Internet off them 
now."  (P6, lines 246-253) 
   
Peter’s and Nina’s accounts points to a sense of estrangement and indifference to others 
resulting from his experience with a scammer; Rob similarly mentions both a change of 
attitude towards others and the authorities:  
 
Rob: "I learnt some things about human nature and I’ve had my suspicions about the government 
reinforced.  Uhm, there is no protection, you’re on your own, if you send money somewhere by 
accident, you’ll never get it back." (P13, lines 593-595) 
 
Rob’s words, and especially the phrase ”you’re on your own” encapsulated the feelings 
of several interviewees upon discovering that the blanket of legal protection we assume 
extending over us is a lot smaller than they had previously imagined.  
 
 
3.4 Interview study Discussion: Study 1 
 
The study reported in this chapter set out to illuminate the full process of fraudulent 
action, in order to gain a new perspective and deeper understanding of the 
circumstances that influence the initiation, cooperation, and consequences of fraud 
victimisation.  Exploring scam events through narrative accounts has helped identify the 
different elements required for a scam to be successful across its different stages. Three 
stages of the scam process, from the victim’s perspective, were identified; 
circumstances leading to engagement with fraudulent offers, factors implicated in 
continuous engagement and the aftermath of fraud, in which different elements 
operated, alone or in combination.  The findings supported previous research outlining 
factors that may influence compliance with fraudulent offers, such as trusting 
individuals that appear credible, friendly or familiar, feeling excited at the prospect of 
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attaining the scam offer or trusting legitimate looking scam communication 
(Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001; Lea et al., 2009; Whitty, 2013).  
 
Several types of scams are based on casting a ‘net’ out, via an offer that looks 
presentable enough for a number of people to be persuaded of its value.  These often 
entail limited engagement due to time or the scarcity of goods; they can be online or 
face-to-face but transactions are typically characterised by relatively few exchanges.  In 
many cases the credible presentation of offer material, a scammer's presentable 
demeanour and the strategies they use to avoid arousing suspicion, generate trust that 
things are what they look like.  This type of trust promotes cooperation given its 
foundation in everyday life.  For example, each time we purchase goods online, we trust 
that a vendor will fulfil their end of the bargain and deliver the purchase (Luhman, 
2000; Misztal, 2013).  Crucially, participants who were victims of scams related to 
purchasing services or goods, reported that it may have helped them personally to be 
more aware of the reality of potential deception.  
 
Trusting intermediaries, either because they were part of an existing social network or 
because they were able to present themselves as similar to the victim was key, as it 
made people dismiss their doubts sufficiently to let the potential positive outcomes of 
the opportunity exert their attraction.  A strong pull factor for some victims was the 
promise of getting richer and the imagined positive scenarios this creates, especially 
when the current circumstances of the person were problematic.  For others, the 
experience simulated ordinary situations, such as making purchases online, often 
without visceral triggers present.  
 
The level of emotional distress and anger experienced in the aftermath of a fraud is not 
always connected to the amount lost; rather, it seems related to the fact of the deception 
itself and the level of trust that the person had accorded to the scammer.  This suggests 
that fraud may be extremely harmful to some victims, even when the amount is low or 
no funds are lost.  Finding a resolution and experiencing a feeling of justice following 
fraud victimisation seems to be an important part of the healing process (Button et al., 
2015), alleviating the recurrent feelings of anger and self-blame experienced by many 
victims.  However, reporting the fraud can, within current mechanisms, add to the hurt 
and frustration victims feel, prolonging the psychological distress after victimization.  
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3.4.1 Individual risk factors in fraud vulnerability 
The aim of the present study was to identify the main personal attributes that may be 
contributing to scam compliance.  Looking at the interview data through the lens of the 
human response to events was important, in order to generate questionnaire items for a 
measure developed in Study 2 (Chapter 4).  The present study explored reflections on 
the experience, identifying factors that may protect one from fraud victimisation.  
Whilst the interviews have identified several commonalities in the events and 
techniques used in scams in accordance with previous research, evaluation of these 
commonalities has tried to go beyond these basic features to examine the human 
attributes that may be connected in the interpretation of these events.  Being in a hurry 
or not having the time to consider all the information led to rushed decisions or 
decisions based on insufficient information, while being excited at the prospect of a 
scam offer reduced motivation to scrutinise finer details.  Encountering someone who 
appeared likeable and friendly elicited trust and compliance, as did investments and 
schemes that had a backing of those from the same peer group.  Certain personal 
circumstances that affected the emotional state of the participant, (e.g. being unhappy in 
a current job), influenced the dismissal of the warning signs and led to decisions, which 
were out of character and later regretted.  A desire to attain goods or services that 
appeared to be scarce, or their availability was limited, lead to riskier choices and less 
caution and being pressured to make a decision quickly led to compliance.   Personal 
attributes that emerged from the findings were organised around the themes, in order to 
inform the questionnaire items.   These included; trusting those that appeared similar or 
those that are liked, inability to say no when under pressure to comply, rushing 
decisions when confronted with lack of time to consider information, making risky 
choices when confronted with difficult personal circumstances etc.   
 
The data collected and analysed in the present study informed the development of 
questionnaire items used in the construction of the Susceptibility to Fraud Scale, a 
measure used in the consequent studies in this programme of research.  For example, 
themes identified in the present study were used to develop questions pertaining to 
liking and similarity, urgency, compliance, vigilance, rushing decisions or impulsivity.  
Questionnaire item development is not discussed at length in this chapter, as it forms a 
part of the consequent study, Study 2.  Further information on how the data from Study 
1 informed the questionnaire development in Study 2 can be found in the following 
chapter, Chapter 4, with examples presented in Table 4.1.  
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3.4.2 Reflexivity 
Reflexivity refers to the influence that the researcher may have on the participant as 
well as data collection (e.g. prior knowledge of the participant).  It also applies to 
analysis (Burman, 1994).  For example, it may affect which quotes are chosen when 
presenting results.   Therefore it is important to consider the position of the 
researcher/author when reading the findings of a qualitative study.   
 
The author is a middle aged, Caucasian woman of Eastern European ancestry (Croatia) 
and is a long term UK resident.  With a background in psychology, she has never 
worked with victims of fraud or as a fraud prevention professional and participants were 
made aware of this.  As a result of this, participants may have felt more comfortable 
discussing shortcomings of the UK based fraud prevention and reporting organisations, 
as several participants reported dissatisfaction with reporting fraud to the authorities.  
However, as someone who has never been defrauded and without the experience of 
dealing with fraud prevention and fraud reporting organisations, the author is likely to 
view the issue of fraud victimisation from an outsider’s perspective.  This perspective 
may have reduced the bias connected to reporting of the results, as it affords a position 
of neutrality, especially with regards to fraud victims that expressed dissatisfaction with 
fraud reporting agencies, but is also worthy of consideration.  As someone who has 
never experienced fraud victimisation and the psychological effects this may cause, the 
author may have unintentionally misrepresented the experiences of the participants in 
this study or omitted the data that a victim of fraud may deem significant.  
 
Additionally, in terms of data collection for the present study, there are several 
considerations to note:   
(i) One of the participants was known to the researcher prior to the interview and 
volunteered to participate when the matter of the research was discussed in a 
casual conversation.   
 
(ii) One of the participants, who volunteered to participate in the study, 
discussed the study with his friends, following participation.   This resulted in a 
friend who was defrauded with him to contact the researcher and volunteer to 
participate.  The same person also told another friend, who, as a result contacted 
the researcher and volunteered to participate in the study.  Although 
participation was voluntary and the participants contacted the researcher asking 
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to participate, there is a chance that the first participant encouraged his friends to 
take part.   
 
(iii) One interview was emotionally difficult to conduct for the researcher, due to 
the fact that the victim was greatly affected by the scam and was distressed at 
one point during the interview, asking for a pause, which was provided.  It was 
clear, upon return that the participant cried while away from the interview.  At 
the end of the interview, the participant was encouraged to discuss if anything 
could be improved to minimise hurt, if the researcher could have been more 
sensitive or could have done anything differently but reported that there was 
nothing that could have been improved. It is possible that the emotional 
response evoked by this interview affected the researcher’s motives for selection 
of material presented in this study.  
 
 
3.5 Future considerations and implications 
 
The findings of the present study indicated that there may be differences in how 
different people process and experience fraudulent offers, as well as other individual 
vulnerabilities, such as personal circumstances that may make a scam offer more 
attractive.  Given a certain amount of credibility, many participants decided to go along 
with the scam, despite not having gathered enough information or feeling uneasy about 
it, where others might have exerted more caution and investigated further.  By 
interviewing two participants that were engaged in the same pyramid scheme, two 
different perspectives on the same fraud were observed.  Participants had different 
recollections on what information was relayed to them at the time and what they 
thought this information meant.  They also reported different reasons for complying 
with the scam when asked, illustrating the fact that motivations to engage with the scam 
as well as factors that prove influential for successful persuasions are not the same for 
all people.  These cases illustrated that despite detecting something wrong, individuals 
can go along with the scam for personal reasons that have little to do with the scam (i.e. 
to be part of the group that is also engaging with the scam).   Future studies may want to 
look into differences in the interpretations of the same fraudulent information.   
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One of the limitations of this study is the self-selection bias.  Apart from the exclusions 
based on the recruitment criteria, all the participants that responded to the study and 
wanted to participate and were interviewed until the data saturation was reached.  The 
study did not use any intermediaries for recruitment (e.g. organisations that work with 
fraud victims), therefore only those participants that contacted the researcher directly 
and wanted to talk about their experience were selected.  This may mean that other, 
more reticent fraud victims were not represented in this study.  Another limitation was 
the inability to recruit more participants that came close to losing funds to fraud but 
perhaps realised on time, in order to examine techniques and strategies used by such 
individuals.   
 
Although the interviews with victims of fraud yielded quality data, it would have been 
of value to interview more participants that came close to being defrauded but realised it 
was a scam before being defrauded, as the interview with one participant fitting this 
description provided an insight that some people may be aware of specific weaknesses 
that may make them more susceptible to fraud and how they compensate for it.  As soon 
as this was noted, recruitment concentrated on finding participants who came close to 
being defrauded but realised before losing funds, however, it proved very hard to recruit 
participants fitting this description.  One reason for this may be that victims of fraud felt 
they were not taken seriously by the authorities or they were too ashamed to talk to 
people they know about their experience, and were therefore more motivated to share 
their experience than those who avoided fraud victimisation and were not affected by it 
as much.  For example, Schiebe et al. (2014) found a positive association between 
falling for the scam they simulated in their study, and a willingness to complete a follow 
up survey.  However, these findings may be a key to developing new strategies for fraud 
prevention, specifically making people aware of their own areas of vulnerability and 
designing specific measures or advice to address these vulnerabilities.  Future studies 
may want to focus on interviewing participants that came close to being defrauded but 
realised in time, in order to examine if this was down to specific awareness of 
individual characteristics they possess that would make them more vulnerable in certain 
fraudulent situations.   
 
Fraud victimisation leads to a loss of confidence and trust in authorities, which may 
result in a lack of fraud reporting and cooperation with authorities in the future.  In 
addition, loss of trust may alter people's attitudes towards others, therefore creating 
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longer-term consequences of fraud victimisation in society, which could be potentially 
devastating and have a serious impact on the victims' interpersonal relationships.  The 
sheer amount of fraud perpetrated nowadays means that the financial burden on the 
authorities to investigate every fraud reported is immense and unrealistic.  However, an 
honest and more sympathetic way of addressing victims of fraud is needed and may be 
achievable by being more transparent about how complaints are processed.  Even a 
small token of empathy may be extremely therapeutic for victims of fraud.  
 
Finally, the majority of participants reported they 'learned their lesson' and modified 
their behaviour following the scam, but sometimes these modifications or coping 
mechanisms only addressed the way scam was delivered (e.g. avoiding the internet or 
the phone), and may still leave them open to future fraud victimisation via other 
delivery methods.  Therefore, organisations may benefit from developing individually 
tailored analysis of users' weak points, in order to design more applicable prevention 
advice, as it is clear that once defrauded, most people try to prevent future victimisation.  
 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
The present study explored, through the narratives of fraud victims, processes that 
underlie fraud victimisation, in order to reveal individual attributes implicated in 
vulnerability to fraud.  The study identified three distinct stages of the scam process 
from the perspective of the victim; precursors to the scam, which may enhance the 
attractiveness of the scam offer, commitment stage, in which different factors combine 
to enhance compliance and the aftermath, incorporating processes that often follow 
fraud victimisation.  These include; reporting fraud and trying to attain a resolution, 
dealing with psychological or financial consequences and incorporating behavioural 
changes in order to avoid future victimisation.  
 
Several individual attributes that appeared to contribute to fraud victimisation were 
identified; rushing decisions when under pressure to make a decision or when time is of 
the essence, complying with requests due to social norms, taking risks to attain desired 
products or services etc.  The present study identified individual attributes and adapted 
behaviours that may help protect from future victimisation.  These included forming 
strategies to compensate for individual fraud vulnerabilities, such as delaying decisions, 
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careful information processing or even lying to get out of potentially harmful situations.  
The present study also found that while most people develop these strategies after they 
are defrauded, some people are aware of their personality attributes irrespective of 
victimisation, which predisposition them to being defrauded in certain situations, and 
try to compensate for them.  
  
The personal reasons and motivation for engaging with fraudulent offers, differ between 
people that find themselves in the same fraudulent situation.  Fraud techniques, social 
mechanisms and other situational factors or life events, as well as individual attributes, 
may contribute, in various degrees, to fraud victimisation, making the process unique to 
each individual.   As scammers frequently adapt their techniques and scam narratives, 
concentrating on warnings that address specific individual vulnerabilities with regards 
to fraudulent offers and situations, may be a better way of forewarning and educating 
about dangers of fraud.  
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Chapter 4 
Predicting individual differences in vulnerability to fraud: the 
development of a Susceptibility to Fraud scale 
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4.1 Introduction  
 
This study builds on research conducted in Study 1, interviews with victims of fraud 
(see Chapter 3).  It is also informed by research conducted by Lea et al. (2009) and 
Modic and Lea (2012, 2013), which explored susceptibility to persuasion and errors in 
judgments. Models of Gullible and Foolish Action by Greenspan (2008, 2009) and a 
Model of Scamming Vulnerability by Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) were taken into 
consideration and informed the development of the initial questionnaire items.  The 
same is true for studies addressing trust and vigilance (e.g. Markóczy, 2003).  
 
The first stage of the scam experience identified certain components, or precursors, that 
make responding to the scam more likely, while the second stage identified factors 
pertaining to the scammer (e.g. different techniques used) and those pertaining to the 
victim (e.g. emotional reactions to fraud offers).  These findings informed the 
development of the initial item pool used in the construction of the Susceptibility to 
Fraud Scale, and specifically, questions pertaining to liking and similarity, urgency, 
insufficient information processing, social norms that govern compliance and trusting 
legitimate and credible looking scam offers.  Urgency, imposed by the time constraints 
(external event), related to rushing decisions or insufficient information processing, 
while urgency (imposed by the scammer) related to compliance.  Liking and similarity 
related to compliance with requests by those that appeared likeable or similar in some 
way.  The examples of how the data from Study 1 informed the questionnaire 
development, are presented in Table 4.1.  
 
 In addition, emotional states and visceral reactions that the fraud offers evoked in some 
participants.  Participants’ reflections on the experience and what they would do 
differently if they were in the same situation, informed the construction of items 
concerning the time allowed for decision-making as well as items pertaining to 
vigilance.  Many participants were surprised at the lack of interest from the authorities, 
following the scam, and these findings informed the construction of items that pertain to 
belief in justice and protection from crime.  This may be explained in the context of just 
world hypothesis (Learner 1965).  Just world hypothesis states that: “people have a need 
to believe that their environment is a just and orderly place where people usually get 
what they deserve” (Lerner & Miller, 1978, p.1030).  
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Table 4.1  
Examples of questionnaire item development using the data from Study 1 
 
Unit of meaning 
 
Theme/ 
Subtheme  
Questionnaire item(s) 
 
“Friendly and genuine, uhm, that’s pretty 
much it, non-threatening. [...] I guess it made 
me think of someone I can relate to...”  
 
 
 
Similarity, 
familiarity and 
likeability 
 
 
I find it hard to say no to people 
I like.  
 
“So, there must’ve been something that wasn’t 
quite right and I think it was the pressure, coz 
he was really really putting pressure on us to 
book it straight away.”  
Urgency I am always suspicious of 
people who ask me to make 
quick decisions. 
 
 
“Uhm, and I, yeah just do my research and buy 
from reputable uhm you know, websites and 
companies. And ask my friends have they 
bought from there as well.” 
 
 
Credibility and 
legitimacy 
 
I am always careful to check out 
people and companies if I 
haven't bought from them 
before. 
 
“I: So why do you think you didn’t read terms 
and conditions?   
R: Just a really really busy time at work. 
Doing 12 hour days.”  
Time constraints  
 
 
I prefer to take my time to think 
things through.  
 
 
 
“You see, unfortunately, the way I was feeling 
on Monday, have I seen it I probably would 
have still gone ahead with it, coz sometimes 
you're feeling desperate, d'you understand 
what I mean, you don't think to think so 
clearly.” 
 
Dissatisfaction 
with one’s present 
circumstances 
When I find myself in a difficult 
situation I often make decisions 
I later regret. 
“For me it’s all about being polite. [...] For me 
it’s really rude to just say no to someone.” 
 
Social norms  I find it hard to say no to people 
without seeming rude. 
 
 
Giving an illusion that one can control one’s environment, belief in just world is an 
important adaptive function, without which the pursuit of long-term goals and 
behaviour regulation may be hindered (Lerner & Miller, 1978).  Belief in just world 
may also be beneficial to mental health, by maintaining self-esteem and general 
wellbeing and contributing to life satisfaction (Dalbert, 1998, 1999).   
 
Lea et al. (2009) suggests that scam victims have a general vulnerability to persuasion 
and not a specific weakness towards the type of scam offer they responded to.  Research 
looking at individual factors that may govern scam compliance has demonstrated that 
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the development of purpose made measures may be essential in pinpointing individual 
vulnerability to fraudulent offers (Fischer et al., 2013; Modic & Lea, 2012, 2013).  
 
4.1.1 Errors in judgments   
Lea et al. (2009) conducted a series of large-scale studies, including victims of fraud as 
well as their family members, examining considerable amount of scam correspondence, 
gathering information on attitudes and behaviours via questionnaires as well as  
simulating a scam offer in order to capture individual’s responses at the time the scam 
offer is evaluated.  Based on their findings, Lea et al. (2009) identified motivational and 
cognitive factors involved in errors of judgment connected to scams.  A summary of 
these factors can be found in Table 2.3 in Chapter 2. 
 
Motivational factors include visceral influence, reduced motivation for information 
processing, preference for confirmation, lack of self-control, liking and similarity, 
sensation seeking, reciprocation, mood regulation and commitment and consistency.  
Cognitive factors included reduced cognitive abilities, positive illusions, background 
knowledge and overconfidence, norm activation, false consensus, authority, altercasting 
and social proof.  There was an overlap between the findings from the previous study, 
Study 1 (Chapter 3), and cognitive and motivational factors identified by Lea et al. 
(2009), such as liking and similarity, reduced motivation for information processing, 
social proof, norm activation, mood regulation and authority, suggesting that 
questionnaire items referring to these factors would be appropriate for the scale.  
 
4.1.2 Gullible and foolish action  
Models of Foolish action and Gullible action were proposed by Greenspan (2008, 2009) 
in order to explain how different factors may influence behaviour that is not in one’s 
best interest and which often happens in the presence of manipulation by others, 
however, they have not, as yet been validated by experimental evidence.   The models 
are explained in detail in Chapter 2 and can be found in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 in 
Chapter 2.   There was an overlap between the findings of the previous study (Study 1) 
and the Model of Gullible Action (Greenspan, 2008).  For example, making decisions 
under the strong influence of emotion (state) was reported by some participants; 
employing lazy thinking and not checking the facts despite being aware it is advisable 
to (cognition), or being in a presence of a skilled and charismatic scammer or facing 
time pressures (situation).  Additionally, being agreeable and trusting (personality).   
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Some participants reported modifying their behaviour following the victimisation such 
as postponing decisions, which according to Greenspan (2008) may help avoid gullible 
acts.  These findings informed the development of questions referring to making 
decisions under the influence of excitement or strong desire, questions referring to 
information processing, making rushed or forced decisions and complying with requests 
of others.  
 
4.1.3 Trust and vigilance  
Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) suggested that gullibility and a trusting nature separate 
fraud victims from non-victims.   For example, research by Workman (2008) consisted 
of long-term observations in a professional organisation.  Questionnaires and 
psychometric measures as well as different simulated phishing attacks were sent to 
employees, in order to observe employees’ vulnerability to phishing attacks.  Workman 
(2008) found that trusting individuals were more likely to succumb to social 
engineering attacks, such as phishing emails or phone calls.  Fischer et al. (2013) found 
that previous fraud victimisation was associated with the trust in the scammer. 
 
Trust often involves accepting vulnerability, as it depends on the intentions and 
behaviours of others.  In other words, when we extend our trust, there is a risk that 
others may not fulfil their responsibilities towards us (Luhman, 2000; Rousseau et al., 
1998).  The amount of trust extended depends on the assessment of this risk.   For 
example, a decision-making experiment by Evans and Revelle (2008), found that when 
participants were asked to send and receive money with an unknown partner, they were 
more likely to reciprocate when told the partner has invested the same or larger amount 
of money than when told they did not invest as much.  Therefore, trust may be 
instrumental in predicting others’ behaviour and incidentally, be connected to 
vulnerability to fraudulent practices and one would presume that more trusting 
individuals would be more vulnerable to scams.  However, research by Yamagishi and 
Kakiuchi (2000) used the prisoner’s dilemma game to examine if trusting individuals 
would be able to predict the behaviour of the opponent.  They found that participants 
higher on a trust measure were better at predicting the behaviour of their opponent than 
participants that were less trusting, and argued that this shows that being trusting does 
not necessarily mean one is gullible.  
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In the study by Markóczy (2003), participants were given trust and vigilance scales and 
asked to predict the behaviour of others, related to current events (e.g. electricity 
shortages).  She found that people high on trust differ in the amount of vigilance they 
possess and that prudent trusters (high in trust and high in vigilance) were better at 
correctly predicting others’ behaviour.  Vigilance may, therefore, be important factor 
implicated in accurate predictions of others’ behaviour, something that might be 
beneficial in spotting fraudulent offers.   
The research shows that there may be a connection with fraud victimisation and trust  
(Fischer et al., 2013; Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001; Workman, 2008) but that this may 
be moderated by the amount of vigilance one possesses (Markóczy, 2003).  However, 
vigilance has not been empirically considered with regards to vulnerability to fraud yet 
the findings from the previous study, interviews with victims of fraud (Chapter 3), 
pointed to the fact that fraud victims become more vigilant following the victimisation.  
This manifested itself in being generally more aware of what others may do and what 
their intentions may be.  Therefore, questions pertaining to trusting nature as well as 
questioning the motives of others were included in the questionnaire development.  
 
4.1.4 Model of scamming vulnerability 
Langenderfer and Shimp's (2001) theoretical Model of Scamming Vulnerability 
explains how the attention is directed under high and low visceral influence.  Visceral 
influence takes our attention away from the usual information processing (i.e. when 
hungry and in presence of food, people find it hard to concentrate on anything else).  
Scammers often exploit visceral influences such as greed (high-return investments, fake 
lotteries) or sexual desires (romance scams), therefore better understanding of the 
factors that moderate visceral influence is vital for fraud prevention.  The model is 
found in Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2.  
 
Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) suggest that the attention people pay to the fraudulent 
messages can be considered in the context of Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of 
persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  ELM identifies two routes of information 
processing; peripheral and central.  The peripheral route utilizes little elaboration and 
relies on persuasive cues while central route concentrates on the message arguments.   
The model can be found in Figure 2.7 in Chapter 2. 
Scammers frequently evoke visceral influence in order to bypass the central route of 
processing and instead, get the potential victim to focus on scam reward instead of the 
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scam information, which may alert to potential danger.   Langenderfer and Shimp 
(2001) suggest that there are certain factors that moderate, as well as influence scam 
vulnerability under the low and high visceral influence.  Self-control is identified as the 
only factor able to prevent scamming vulnerability under high visceral influence.   Even 
under the low visceral influence, there are certain factors that increase scam 
vulnerability, such as cognitive impairment, social isolation, consumer susceptibility to 
interpersonal influence and gullibility, while scepticism and scam knowledge act as 
moderators.  
 
Langenderfer and Shimp’s (2001) Model of Scamming Vulnerability is yet to be tested 
and validated.   The Model of Scamming Vulnerability was based on the data from the 
research conducted by the American Association of Retired People and by interviewing 
professionals from Better Business Bureau, an organisation promoting ethical conduct 
for elderly people.  This means that the data used to construct the theoretical model of 
scamming vulnerability may not be as applicable to wider populations (e.g. elderly 
people frequently suffer cognitive decline, whereas this is not common in younger 
people).  However, it is a starting point in trying to identify components responsible for 
scam compliance, therefore, the moderators of scamming vulnerability were taken into 
consideration when designing the STFS questionnaire items.   
 
4.1.5 Susceptibility to persuasion   
Modic and Lea (2012, 2013) conducted a series of studies looking into susceptibility to 
persuasion and scam compliance.  In one of the studies they found that individuals who 
are more extroverted, better at predicting scam outcomes and less agreeable are also less 
likely to respond to scam offers (Modic & Lea, 2012).   In the consequent studies, 
Modic and Lea (2013) constructed Susceptibility to Persuasion (StP) scale, which 
yielded four reliable factors of scam compliance; low self-control (e.g. difficulty 
controlling impulses), authority (e.g. trust in authority figures), consistency (e.g. strong 
need for consistency and structure) and social influence (e.g. peer or social circle 
influence).  Although Modic and Lea (2013) developed a valid scale that pinpoints 
susceptibility to persuasion, their study design had some limitations, such as a small 
number of people reporting they have lost money to the scenarios presented to them.  
Due to this, scam compliance was measured in terms of responding to the scam offer 
rather than losing money to the offer.  However, some scenarios, such as a classified 
advert or an auction scam do not differ from genuine adverts until the communication 
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with the seller is established, therefore people may respond initially but withhold funds 
once there are warning signs.  As such, responding to some fraudulent offers may not be 
a good indication of scam compliance.  Additionally, scam compliance was not 
measured in the given moment but rather by asking participants if they responded to 
fraudulent offers similar to hypothetical scenarios in the past three years (also Modic & 
Lea, 2012).  Nevertheless, Modic and Lea (2012, 2013) studies offer a new way of 
looking at compliance with fraudulent offers, by concentrating on individual attributes, 
which may increase the likelihood of falling for a scam.  The present study aimed to 
address the limitations of Modic and Lea (2012, 2013) studies by giving participants 
examples of genuine and phishing email correspondence from the same company and 
asking them to decide if the correspondence is real or fake, measuring scam compliance 
in the given moment.  
 
There was an overlap between the findings from Modic and Lea’s (2012, 2013) studies 
and the interview study with fraud victims (Chapter 3), with regards to trusting 
authority figures, social influence and low self-control.  Given this fact and since 
Susceptibility to Persuasion scale is the only measure that has been successfully used to 
measure responding to scams, it was deemed to be an appropriate measure of concurrent 
validity for the measure being developed in the present study.  
 
 
4.1.6 Research aims and rationale 
The aim of the present study is to build on research by Modic and Lea (2013), in order 
to develop a measure of susceptibility to fraud.   
 
The broad aims of this study are: 
• To generate a pool of questionnaire items consulting the data from Study 1 
(Chapter 3) and the available fraud research, models and theories relating to 
vulnerability to fraud  
• To distribute preliminary questionnaire items to fraud experts, researchers in the 
field, fraud victims and non-victims, for consideration, in order to establish 
content validity (pilot study) 
•  To evaluate the newly developed measure against the examples of phishing and 
genuine email correspondence and hypothetical scam scenarios 
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• To assess the concurrent validity of the newly developed measure by comparing 
it against Modic and Lea's (2013) Susceptibility to Persuasion scale, measuring 
similar constructs  
 
Once the initial pool of questionnaire items has been generated, they will need to be 
assessed for how accurate they represent vulnerability to fraudulent offers.  Since the 
proposed measure of susceptibility to fraud needs to measure what it claims to measure, 
the initial pool of questionnaire items will be evaluated and rated by fraud experts (e.g. 
fraud police detectives and other professionals working with fraud victims) and 
researchers in the field, as well as previous fraud victims and non-victims.  These 
ratings on a concept will inform the improvement of the final questionnaire items.   
Measuring scam compliance in a given moment has proved to be challenging without 
serious ethical implications.  The present study aims to measure scam compliance by 
presenting examples of genuine and phishing correspondence to participants and asking 
them to decide (in the moment) if the correspondence is genuine or fake, addressing 
some of the limitations encountered by previous studies (e.g. Modic & Lea, 2012, 2013; 
Scheibe, 2015).  At the same time, participants will be given the newly developed 
measure of fraud susceptibility, in order to explore individual attributes that may be 
connected to fraud vulnerability.   
 
 
4.2 Pilot study 
 
4.2.1 Questionnaire item development  
An initial item pool of 56 statements was generated from available theories of gullible 
action and scamming vulnerability (Greenspan, 2009; Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001) 
and past research on the subject of vulnerability to fraud and persuasion (Lea et al., 
2009; Modic & Lea, 2013), as well as the lived experiences of previous victims of fraud 
interviewed in the first study (Chapter 3).  Table 4.2 shows the preliminary item 
categories used to formulate questions, question examples for each category and the key 
research that informed the development of the questionnaire items in that category.  
 
Several items measuring beliefs about the justice system and the authorities were added 
in order to examine if people’s perception of justice (i.e. that the perpetrator would be 
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caught and their funds would be recovered) would make them more vulnerable to scams 
by making them less careful.  
 
Table 4.2  
Examples of questionnaire items, relevant categories and the research informing item development  
 
Item category                Example of the questionnaire item Relevant research  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Social norms  I find it hard to say no to people without  
seeming rude. 
 
*   *   
Liking and  
similarity  
 
I tend to believe people I feel I connect with. *   *   
Social influence  
 
I usually find it easy to agree with others in  
a group. 
 
*   *   
Trust  
 
I find it hard to tell if someone can be trusted. * *   *  
Urgency  
 
I normally give in when people pressure me  
to make a decision. 
 
*   *   
Information 
processing  
I never bother double-checking terms and  
conditions. 
 
* * * *   
Vigilance  
 
I often double-check what other people  
tell me. 
 
*  *  *  
Decision making 
  
I don't like to rush my decisions. * *     
Impulsivity and 
self-control  
I feel compelled to act immediately when  
I see a bargain. 
 
*  * *   
State/ affect 
 
I find it hard to contain my excitement when  
lucky things happen to me. 
 
* * * *   
Dealing with 
mistakes 
I try hard to understand the reasons for any  
mistake I make. 
 
*      
Trust in Authorities 
and justice 
The Authorities, overall are effective at  
protecting us from crime. 
 
*   *   
Views of fraud 
victims 
 
Only gullible people fall for scams. 
 
*     * 
Notes.  
1 = Study 1 (present thesis) 
2 = Model of Gullible Action (Greenspan, 2009) 
3 = Model of Scamming Vulnerability (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001) 
4 = Factors implicated in scam compliance (Lea et al., 2009; Modic & Lea, 2012, 2013) 
5 = Trust and vigilance (Markóczy, 2003) 
6 = Discourse around fraud victimisation (Cross, 2013, 2015) 
 
 
The present research with scam victims reported in this thesis (Chapter 3) found that 
fraud victims believed that if they were defrauded, perpetrators would be caught and 
they may recoup their funds and this is supported by research by Lea et al. (2009), who 
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suggests that this gives an illusion of control over the situation.  Additionally, two 
questionnaire items were generated according to research on discourse surrounding 
victims of fraud (Cross, 2013, 2015), specifically that victims of fraud are gullible and 
deserving of what happened to them.  As fraud is widespread and often sophisticated, it 
was thought that it would be important to show if these attitudes would make one more 
vulnerable to scam offers (e.g. many people erroneously believe they could not be 
defrauded).  
 
At the time the questionnaire was being designed, the news contained a story of a UK 
police commissioner discussing the issue of financial institutions automatically 
reimbursing victims of fraud for their losses in the news, asserting that this encourages 
lax security behaviour and that victims should, instead, be incentivised to protect 
themselves from fraud (Evans, 2016; Grierson, 2016).  As this was an important topic 
related to fraud victimisation at the time, and given the fact that many participants in the 
previous study admitted not being as careful as they have been since the experience, this 
topic may be an indication of how safe people feel with regards to fraud and whether 
that would indicate less caution.  
 
4.2.2 Participants  
A total of 47 evaluators were recruited to provide feedback on the initial item pool 
including 21 fraud prevention experts and academics, 16 previous victims of fraud and 
10 individuals who had never been defrauded.  Participants from the interview study 
(Study1, Chapter 3) were also invited to participate.  The non-victims were included in 
order to examine if the questionnaire items would make sense to those that have never 
been defrauded.  The fraud prevention experts were drawn from a range of professions 
including forensic accountants, City of London Police detectives, cyber security 
advisors, Trading Standards officers, HRMC Fraud investigators as well as academics 
and researchers working in the field.  
 
4.2.3 Materials and Procedure 
A total of 56 questionnaire items were distributed using online survey software to all 
evaluators.  The evaluators who were independent from the researcher, were told that 
the study aims to develop a measure of individual’s vulnerability to fraud, and asked to 
rate the perceived applicability of each item as being an important factor in someone's 
individual vulnerability to fraud.  In order to reduce the acquiescence bias, a Semantic 
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Differential scale was used, with importance ratings ranging from 0 = Not important to 
10 = Very important, (Robson, 2011). 
 
The content validity of each statement was assessed by considering not only the ratings 
given to each statement but also the open text feedback provided by the evaluators.  
Any questions with mean applicability ratings below 6.0 out of 10 were automatically 
eliminated, with further items being discounted based on feedback received.  Two items 
were also reworded based on feedback received.  A total of 45 items were carried 
forward for inclusion in the main survey.  Mean item applicability ratings for the initial 
56 -item questionnaire items and relevant feedback received are shown in Appendix 1.4 
of this thesis.  
 
 
4.3 Main study 
 
4.3.1 Materials and Procedure 
A total of 45 questionnaire items were distributed in the form of an online survey 
(Qualtrics), alongside the 12-item Susceptibility to Persuasion scale by Modic and Lea 
(2013), which was used to assess concurrent validity.  Responses to each statement on 
both scales were made using a standard 5-point Likert scale (Strongly disagree to 
Strongly agree).   
In addition, 7 (out of the 9) scam scenarios used by Modic and Lea (2012, 2013) were 
given to participants to consider.  Participants were then asked to indicate, for each 
scenario, how likely is it that a scenario is a scam and how likely it is that people would 
react favourably to it. The responses were made using a 5-point scale (Extremely 
unlikely, Unlikely, Neither likely nor unlikely, Likely, Extremely likely).  Participants 
were also asked if they had found themselves in a similar situation to that described in 
the last 3 years, and if so, whether they had responded to it or lost money as a result 
(Yes or No).  
Two examples of email correspondence from the same company (Apple), one a 
phishing attempt and one a genuine email were used as test stimuli to represent potential 
scam scenarios that participants were asked to judge.  The examples of email 
correspondence can be found in Figure 4.1.  For each email correspondence scenario, 
again participants were asked to rate how likely it was that it was a scam and how likely 
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is it that people would respond favourably to it.  Participants were additionally asked to 
decide whether they felt each email example was real or fake and to provide confidence 
ratings regarding their judgment certainty.  
The study was approved by the university’s Science Faculty Ethics Committee. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Examples of email correspondence stimuli  
 
 
4.3.2 Participants  
Participants were recruited via advertisements placed on open social media and via an 
internal participant pool scheme at the university.  A total of 536 respondents completed 
the survey, of which 255 were university students.  All participants completed the 
survey voluntarily and no payment was awarded for its completion.  First year 
university students received course credits for taking part.   
Responses with missing data, as well as participants taking less than 5 or more than 60 
minutes to complete the survey were excluded.  Participants were expected to take, on 
average, between 10 to 25 minutes to complete the survey in question, therefore taking 
too little or too much time may indicate that the participant was not taking the task 
seriously.  Therefore, their data may not be suitable for analysis.  
Further responses were excluded on the basis of unusual response patterns (response 
acquiescence or extreme data values on individual items where >Z ± 3).  This yielded a 
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final sample of 536 participants, aged 18 and 82 years, of whom 362 were female (M= 
26.55 years, SD=12.18) and 174 were male (M= 33.27 years, SD= 16.98). 
A total of 114 participants reported being defrauded once or more in the past and 422 
reported they have never been defrauded.  
 
4.3.3 Results  
4.3.3.1 Results of the factor and reliability analyses  
To evaluate the item structure of the 45-item questionnaire, an exploratory factor 
analysis using principal components extraction was conducted.  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling adequacy, 0.86 and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ² (990) = 6572.1, 
p< .001) indicated that the data were suitable for factor analysis.  A parallel analysis 
using Monte Carlo PCA indicated that only factors with a minimum Eigenvalue of 
above 1.59 should be retained, and inspection of the scree plot analysis suggested a 
point of inflection to occur in eigenvalues following the extraction of five factors, 
indicating a five-factor solution to be the most appropriate for these data (Pallant, 
2013).  Oblique rotation was used to determine factor composition.  Initial item 
loadings for each of the five factors are shown in Table 4.3.  
 
To strengthen the composition of each factor, 14 questions with item loadings below .45 
were removed and the analysis was repeated again on the remaining 31 items. A further 
4 questions with item loadings below .50 and 1 question with no clear parent factor 
weighting were removed leaving a final 26-item, 5 factor scale.  The final version of the 
Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS) can be found in Appendix 1.6 
 
The first factor extracted which accounted for 16.41% of the variance in participant 
responses primarily related to the extent to which the respondent was inclined to go 
along with the wishes of others.  This factor loaded most heavily on questionnaire items 
relating to finding it difficult to say no to people, not wishing to appear rude or agreeing 
to things they did not really want to.  This factor was, therefore named ‘Compliance'  
and consisted of 9 items (Cronbach's α = .87).  Positive loadings on this factor may 
indicate a person whose thoughts or actions are more likely to accede to the will of 
others. 
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Table 4.3   
Factor analysis using principal components extraction of the 45-item questionnaire 
 
Question 
 
                      Component 
   1  
            
   2     3             4    5           
1. I find it hard to say no to people without seeming rude.  .760 
 
 .008 
 
-.084 
 
-.026 
 
 .075 
 
2. I find it hard to say no to people I like.  .748 
 
-.083 
 
-.016 
 
-.005 
 
 .010 
 
3. I often find myself agreeing to things I don't really want  
    to do. 
 .740 
 
-.088 
 
-.079 
 
-.035 
 
-.004 
 
4. I normally give in when people pressure me to make a 
    decision. 
 .709 
 
-.007 
 
 .037 
 
 .100 
 
-.044 
 
5. People tell me I am easy to persuade. 
 
 .680 
 
 .013 
 
 .029 
 
 .014 
 
-.087 
 
6. I feel others often take advantage of me.  .670 
 
-.024 
 
 .063 
 
-.132 
 
 .072 
 
7. I often worry about disappointing people. 
 
 .613 
 
 .126 
 
 .126 
 
-.036 
 
 .040 
 
8. I would prefer to be impolite rather than agree to  
    something I don't want to do. 
-.591 
 
-.021 
 
 .136 
 
 .022 
 
 .242 
 
9. When I find myself in a difficult situation I often make 
    decisions I later regret.    
 .550 
 
-.228 
 
 .011 
 
-.017 
 
 .138 
 
10. I always do what I think is best, even when I am in the 
      minority.  
-.483 
 
 .004 
 
 .159 
 
 .115 
 
 .325 
 
11. I tend to believe people I feel I connect with. 
 
 .458 
 
 .016 
 
 .133 
 
 .189 
 
-.059 
 
12. I find it hard to tell if someone can be trusted. 
 
 .444 
 
 .008 
 
 .077 
 
-.152 
 
 .044 
 
13. I have been talked into buying something I didn’t  
      really want. 
 .440 
 
-.051 
 
 .216 
 
-.121 
 
-.044 
 
14. I usually find it easy to agree with others in a group. 
 
 .385 
 
 .208 
 
 .174 
 
 .250 
 
-.098 
 
15. Forceful people make me feel uneasy. 
 
 .373 
 
 .235 
 
 .153 
 
-.029 
 
 .201 
 
16. I usually give others the benefit of the doubt. 
 
 .366 
 
 .001 
 
 .005 
 
 .250 
 
-.026 
 
17. I don't like to rush my decisions. 
 
 .032 
 
 .705 
 
-.125 
 
 .123 
 
 .050 
 
18. I prefer to take my time to think things through. 
 
 .023 
 
 .645 
 
 .044 
 
 .075 
 
 .114 
 
19. I prefer to get decisions over with quickly. 
 
 .214 
 
-.502 
 
 .182 
 
 .216 
 
 .181 
 
20. People tell me I sometimes make rash decisions. 
 
 .189 
 
-.486 
 
 .371 
 
-.088 
 
 .257 
 
21. I prefer to read contracts for myself rather than believe  
      what others tell me is in them. 
 
-.154 
 
 .485 
 
-.011 
 
-.061 
 
 .241 
 
22. I always check the small print. 
 
-.126 
 
 .454 
 
-.096 
 
-.005 
 
 .336 
 
23. I often seek advice from friends and family before  
      making financial decisions. 
 .114 
 
 .406 
 
 .162 
 
-.014 
 
 .003 
 
24. I never bother double-checking terms and conditions. 
 
 .105 
 
-.335 
 
 .316 
 
 .150 
 
-.163 
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Question 
 
                      Component 
   1  
            
   2     3             4    5           
25. It's not important to read all of the details before  
      making important decisions. 
-.006 
 
-.312 
 
 .195 
 
 .251 
 
 .031 
 
26. If I like something, I have to have it straight away. 
 
-.064 
 
-.070 
 
 .739 
 
 .022 
 
 .058 
 
27. I get a buzz from buying new things. 
 
-.001 
 
 .089 
 
 .706 
 
 .057 
 
-.056 
 
28. I am prepared to take a risk when buying something I 
      really want.  
 .013 
 
-.013 
 
 .674 
 
 .036 
 
-.053 
 
29. I feel compelled to act immediately when I see a  
      bargain. 
 .206 
 
 .066 
 
 .549 
 
 .185 
 
-.018 
 
30. I am always careful to think about things I buy. 
 
 .169 
 
 .268 
 
-.513 
 
 .145 
 
 .197 
 
31. I have made mistakes when trusting people in the past. 
 
 .262 
 
 .010 
 
 .345 
 
-.285 
 
 .113 
 
32. The Authorities, overall are effective at protecting us 
      from crime. 
 .033 
 
 .077 
 
  .051 
 
 .592 
 
-.161 
 
33. I feel safe from becoming a victim of crime. 
 
-.085 
 
-.092 
 
-.157 
 
 .558 
 
 .069 
 
34. Scammers and fraudsters normally will get caught in 
      the end. 
-.001 
 
 .110 
 
 .199 
 
 .540 
 
-.045 
 
35. Only gullible people fall for scams. 
 
-.092 
 
-.121 
 
  .038 
 
 .488 
 
 .181 
 
36. I am always careful to check out people and companies 
      if I haven't bought from them before. 
-.079 
 
.056 
 
-.070 
 
.036 
 
.624 
 
37. I am always careful to check that emails and websites 
      are real. 
-.053 
 
.039 
 
-.195 
 
.185 
 
.582 
 
38. I am always suspicious of people who ask me to make 
      quick decisions. 
-.128 
 
.138 
 
.070 
 
-.197 
 
.538 
 
39. When something seems too good to be true, it usually 
      is. 
.003 
 
-.160 
 
-.273 
 
-.112 
 
.492 
 
40. I often double-check what other people tell me. 
 
-.066 
 
.189 
 
.013 
 
-.075 
 
.451 
 
41. I avoid making decisions if someone is pressing me to 
      choose. 
-.162 
 
.222 
 
.068 
 
-.116 
 
.431 
 
42. I tend to only buy from companies and brands that I  
      know. 
.182 
 
.017 
 
.042 
 
.277 
 
.417 
 
43. I normally avoid making decisions when I am feeling 
      anxious. 
.201 
 
.152 
 
.036 
 
.012 
 
.364 
 
44. You can never be sure if emails and websites are real. 
 
.186 
 
-.104 
 
.127 
 
-.213 
 
.282 
 
45. I am responsible for deciding what happens to me in  
      every situation. 
-.164 
 
-.117 
 
-.060 
 
.181 
 
.263 
 
 
Eigenvalues 
 
3.55 
 
2.48 
 
1.92 
 
1.67 
 
7.39 
 
Percentage of variance 
 
16.41 
 
7.88 
 
5.50 
 
4.27 
 
3.72 
Note.   
Primary factor loadings with the parent factor are shown in bold 
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The second factor extracted accounted for 7.88 % of the variance in participants' 
responses and related to the extent to which the respondent took the time to process 
information before making decisions. This factor loaded most heavily on questionnaire 
items relating to not rushing decisions and preferring to think things through and was 
therefore named ‘Decision time’.  It consisted of 4 items (Cronbach's α = .65).  Positive 
loadings on this factor indicated a preference for careful consideration before making 
decisions while negative loadings on this factor may indicate a tendency to make 
decisions quickly.  
 
The third factor extracted accounted for 5.50 % of the variance in participants' 
responses and related to lack of restraint or risky behaviour when it comes to making 
purchases.  This factor loaded most heavily on questionnaire items relating to not being 
able to resist a bargain, taking risks or an impulse to act immediately when buying 
something that is desired.  This factor was named ‘Impulsivity’ and consisted of 4 items 
(Cronbach's α = .73).  Positive loadings on this factor indicated greater impulsivity and 
a disregard for risk.  
 
The fourth factor accounted for 4.27 % of the variance in participant responses and 
related to the perception of justice.  This factor loaded most heavily on questionnaire 
items relating to feeling safe from becoming a victim of a crime, whether criminals get 
caught and the authorities being affective in protecting people from harm.  This factor 
was named ‘Belief in justice’ and consisted of 4 items (Cronbach's α = .48), with 
positive loadings indicating that a person is more likely to believe that justice prevails 
and people get what they deserve. 
 
The fifth and final factor accounted for 3.72 % of the variance in participant responses 
and related to awareness of people’s motives and being cautious.  This factor loaded 
most heavily on questionnaire items relating to verifying information, people or 
websites and being aware of people’s motives in certain situations.  This factor was 
therefore, named ‘Vigilance’ and consisted of 5 items (Cronbach's α = .65).  Positive 
loadings on this factor indicated increased suspicion of others' motives and readiness to 
cross check information given.  The final version of the Susceptibility to Fraud Scale 
(STFS) can be found in Appendix 7.6. 
Positive loadings on this factor may indicate awareness of others' motives and readiness 
to cross check information given. 
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Whilst principal components analysis considers variance and exploratory factor analysis 
considers covariance, both can be used for reducing the number of variables and 
observing the emerging patterns (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p.635).  Additionally, 
some researchers argue that there are often no differences between the two 
methodologies (Schonemann, 1990; Thompson, 2004) and principal components 
analysis has been used in scale development in the past (Gudjonsson, 1887; Sapp & 
Harrod, 1993).  However, some researchers argue against the use of principal 
components analysis, suggesting that factor analysis is more suitable (Bentler & Kano, 
1990; Costello & Osborne, 2005; Ford, MacCallum & Tait, 1986).   
Due to this, and in order to examine whether factor structure would remain the same, 
exploratory factor analysis, using principal axis factoring extraction was also conducted.   
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, 0.86 and Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity (χ² (990) = 6382.7, p< .001) indicated that the data were suitable for factor 
analysis.  Oblique rotation was used to determine factor composition.  Initial item 
loadings for each of the five factors are shown in Appendix 1.7, Table 1.10.  
 
The factor structure remained stable with both techniques, with all 26 items selected for 
the final version of the newly developed STFS, remaining the strongest contributors to 
their parent factor.  One minor difference was observed with regards to item ‘ I never 
bother double-checking terms and conditions.’  This question was associated with 
Decision Time factor using the principal components analysis but associated with 
Impulsivity using principal axis factoring.  However, correlations for this item were not 
very strong to either factor.   
 
 
4.3.3.2 Reliability considerations  
The overall reliability of the newly developed STFS was α = .63, under the value of   
α =.7 recommended by DeVellis (2012) or α = .8 recommended by Field and Hole 
(2003).  However, the overall reliability is not expected to be high in multifactorial 
measures.  Reliability test results and means for STFS subscales are shown in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.4 
Reliability values and means for subscales of the Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (N= 536) 
 
Factor  Number of 
items 
Cronbach α        M      SD 
Compliance  9 .87 2.82 0.81 
Decision Time  4 .65 3.66 0.68 
Impulsivity 4 .73 3.05 0.85 
Belief in Justice  4 .48 2.76 0.67 
Vigilance 5 .65 3.85 0.65 
  
The scale yielded two scales (Compliance and Impulsivity) with reliability over .7 and 
two factors (Decision Time and Vigilance) just under this value.  The final factor, Belief 
in Justice showed poor internal consistency.  The lower reliability of some of the 
subscales may in part be explained by the fact that some subscales had fewer questions.  
For example, Pallant (2013) suggests that with scales with fewer than ten items, it is 
common to find lower values of alpha, with some as low as .5 (also Tavakol & 
Dennick, 2011).  Sapp and Harrod (1993) accepted a range .5 to .7 as an indication of 
moderate reliability (Nunnally, 1967, 1978) for their brief Locus of Control scale, due 
to the fact that each factor had only three items.   
 
The low reliability of the Belief in Justice Scale suggests that participants were not 
responding consistently to the four questions in the scale, even though this remained a 
consistent component of the factor analysis solution at each iteration of the analyses 
conducted.  The scale items may therefore correlate weakly, even though they group 
together under a single factor.  One item is measuring people’s attitudes to victims of 
fraud.  Research has found that often victims of fraud are seen as responsible for the 
victimisation and even victims of fraud expressed this attitude (Cross, 2013), however 
most of the participants disagreed with this statement.   
One reason for low inter-item correlations within the subscale could be due to a lack of 
variability in participant responses on some items.  Examination of the distribution of 
responses to each item however suggested this was not the case: 
• 62% of participants disagreed that Only gullible people fall for scams  
• 52% disagreed that Scammers and fraudsters normally will get caught in the end 
•  47% disagreed that The Authorities, overall are effective at protecting us from crime 
•  55% agreed that they feel safe from becoming a victim of crime   
 
Participants' responses to all subscale items were therefore well distributed across the 
possible response range.  For short scales with lower reliability coefficients, Pallant 
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(2013) recommends examining the correlations between scale items, with inter-item 
correlations of between .2 and .4 recommended (Briggs & Cheek, 1986).   Therefore, 
inter-item correlations were examined for all the subscales and are reported in Table 
4.5.  
 
Table 4.5 
Mean inter-item correlations for the subscales of the Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (N=536) 
 
Subscales/ Questions Mean 
Subscale 
inter-item  
correlation 
α  if item 
deleted 
Belief in Justice  
1. I feel safe from becoming a victim of crime. .17 .44 
2. Scammers and fraudsters normally will get caught in the end. .14 .39 
3. The Authorities, overall are effective at protecting us from crime. .22 .36 
4. Only gullible people fall for scams. .17 .45 
 
Compliance 
1.I find it hard to say no to people without seeming rude. .45 .85 
2. I normally give in when people pressure me to make a decision. .44 .85 
3. I often find myself agreeing to things I don't really want to do. .45 .85 
4. I find it hard to say no to people I like. .46 .84 
5. People tell me I am easy to persuade. .43 .85 
6. I often worry about disappointing people. .39 .85 
7. When I find myself in a difficult situation I often make decisions I  
    later regret. 
.33 .86 
8. I would prefer to be impolite rather than agree to something I don't  
    want to do. * 
.35 .86 
9. I feel others often take advantage of me.  .43 .85 
 
Vigilance 
1. I am always suspicious of people who ask me to make quick decisions. .24 .63 
2. I often double-check what other people tell me. .24 .62 
3. I am always careful to check that emails and websites are real. .32 .56 
4. I am always careful to check out people and companies if I haven't 
bought from them before. 
.32 .56 
5. When something seems too good to be true, it usually is. .31 .62 
 
Impulsivity 
1. I feel compelled to act immediately when I see a bargain.   .38 .68 
2. I get a buzz from buying new things. .41 .66 
3. I am prepared to take a risk when buying something I really want. .40 .67 
4. If I like something, I have to have it straight away. .41 .65 
 
Decision time 
1. I prefer to take my time to think things through. .28 .62 
2. I prefer to get decisions over with quickly. * .29 .61 
3. People tell me I sometimes make rash decisions. * .33 .56 
4. I don't like to rush my decisions. 
 
.39 .51 
Note.  
* Reverse item 
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This analysis indicated that overall, the mean inter-item correlation for each question 
with other items on the Belief in Justice scale were low when compared to mean-item 
correlations for other subscales which accounts for the low observed alpha value.  
Removal of further items from the scale however did not lead to an increase in the alpha 
value (Table 4.5).  
 
The correlation between question items 2 and 3 on the Belief in Justice subscale was 
within recommended range (r =.36), as was the correlation between question items 1 
and 4 (r =.24), while all other correlations were below .2.  This may suggest stronger 
links exist between pairs of questions, rather than between all of the items in this 
subscale.  Given that these questions link to popular misconceptions about scam victims 
and authorities found in Study 1, they may have value in their own right, which is why 
they were retained.  The factor was therefore included in subsequent analyses.   
 
4.3.3.3 Concurrent validity  
Concurrent validity was assessed by examining the relationship between scores of the 
newly developed Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS) with the Susceptibility to 
Persuasion Scale, developed by Modic and Lea (2013), which can be found in 
Appendix 1.5.1).  The Susceptibility to Persuasion Scale measures related constructs 
and it was expected that there would be a positive relationship between several factors 
of STFS and Susceptibility to persuasion scale (Table 4.6). 
A strong positive correlation (r =.60) was found between the STFS Compliance scale 
and Modic and Lea's (2013) Social Influence subscale, designed to indicate those that 
are likely to be influenced by their peers.  Likewise, a strong positive correlation  
(r =.66) was found between the STFS Impulsivity scale and Modic and Lea's (2013) 
Self-control subscale, designed to reflect a lack of self-control.  A moderate correlation 
(r =.32) was also observed between the STFS Belief in Justice scale with Modic and 
Lea's (2013) Trust in Authority measure, although their Need for Consistency scale was 
only weakly related to the STFS subscales.  Taken together, the pattern of results 
observed supported the presence of relationships between different components of the 
two questionnaires, which should be theoretically related but that several STFS 
subscales may provide a more nuanced interpretation of need for consistency. 
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Table 4.6   
Relationship between STFS and Modic and Lea (2013) Susceptibility to Persuasion scale, (N =536) 
 
                           
                     Susceptibility to Persuasion Scale  
 
Susceptibility to Fraud scale 
Trust in 
authority 
Social 
influence 
Self-control 
(lack of) 
Need for 
consistency 
Compliance                        .10 .60* .34* .16* 
Vigilance -.19* -.30* -.20* -.14* 
Impulsivity .17* .31* .66* .17* 
Decision Time .01 -.17* -.33* -.25* 
Belief in Justice .32* .02 .04 .02 
Note. 
* p<.001 (2-tailed). The minimum accepted p value used in this analysis for determining statistical 
significance (using Bonferroni adjustment for Type I error, 0.05 ÷ 20) was p=.0025.  
 
 
 
4.3.3.4 Relationship between STFS subscales and age 
The relationships between the five subscales of the STFS with age were investigated 
using Pearson product-moment correlations (Table 4.7).  Some relationships were found 
between the questionnaire subscales.  Compliance was negatively associated with 
Vigilance and Decision Time, suggesting compliant individuals tend to be less vigilant 
and invest less time in information processing.  Compliance was also positively 
associated with Impulsivity, suggesting that impulsive individuals also tended to show 
greater compliance. Conversely, a significant positive correlation between Vigilance 
and Decision Time suggests that vigilant individuals tend to invest more time in 
processing information and making decisions.  
 
Table 4.7   
Relationship between Susceptibility to Fraud subscales and age 
 
  Compliance Vigilance      Impulsivity Decision 
Time 
Belief in 
Justice 
Age    -.29**    .38**    -.33**     .20* *   -.14* 
Compliance     -.22**     .35**    -.23* *   -.06 
Vigilance            -.17**     .21**   -.08 
Impulsivity             -.31**    .09* 
Decision Time          -.06 
Belief in Justice       
Note. 
* Minimum accepted p value for statistical significance (using Bonferroni adjustment for Type I error, 
0.05 ÷ 15 = .0033.   
** p<.001 (2-tailed).  
 
 
Significant positive correlations were found between age and Vigilance (r =.38); and 
age and Decision Time (r = .20), indicating that older individuals may be more vigilant 
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and invest more time in information processing.  Significant negative correlations were 
observed between age and Compliance (r = -.38); and between age and Impulsivity  
(r = -.33) suggesting younger respondents tended to be more impulsive and comply with 
others more readily.  A weak negative relationship (r = -.14) was also found between 
age and Belief in Justice, and a weak positive relationship (r =.09) was found between 
Impulsivity and the Belief in Justice, suggesting respondents that believe in justice 
tended to be younger and more impulsive. 
 
4.3.3.5 Susceptibility to fraud and previous fraud victimisation  
Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare those who have never been 
fraud victims and those that reported being defrauded in the past.  Based on this initial 
analysis, only one significant difference was found after using Holm-Bonferroni 
adjustment for Type I error (Holm, 1979), with previous victims of fraud scoring lower 
than non-victims on the Belief in Justice scale, suggesting that fraud victimisation 
influences one's perceived view of justice (Table 4.8).  
 
 
Table 4.8  
Comparison of groups ‘Non-victim’ (N=422) and “Previous fraud victim’ (N=114) and the subscales of 
Susceptibility to Fraud Scale using independent samples t-tests (534 df)  
 
Subscale 
 
Non-Victim Previous Fraud Victim t p Cohen's d 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Compliance 2.80 0.82 2.88 0.73  -1.01   .32 ns   0.10 
Vigilance 3.85 0.65 3.85 0.66  -0.01   .99 ns       0.00 
Impulsivity 3.02 0.86 3.20 0.84  -1.49   .14 ns   0.21 
Decision Time 3.68 0.68 3.58 0.70  1.37    .17 ns   0.14  
Belief in Justice 2.80 0.67 2.61 0.64  2.72    .007*   0.29   
Note. 
* Minimum accepted p value for statistical significance reached (using Holm-Bonferroni adjustment for 
Type I error)  
 
 
Given that prior exposure to risk will not be the same for younger and older participants, 
and the fact that non-victims (M = 27.75, SD = 13.90) were found to be significantly 
younger than previous victims of fraud (M = 32.37, SD = 15.00); t(534) = -3.10, p 
=.002), the comparison of STFS subscales between victims and non-victims was 
repeated whilst controlling for participants’ ages.  Independent groups analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) was used to compare the two groups, with age as a covariate 
(Table 4.9).  
 
 
 121 
Table 4.9  
Comparison of groups ‘Never scammed’ (N=422) and “Scammed once or more’ (N=114) and the 
subscales of Susceptibility to Fraud Scale using one-way ANCOVA with age as a covariate (1,533 df) 
  
Subscale 
 
Non-Victim Previous Fraud Victim F p Partial 
eta-
square 
 
Adjusted 
Mean 
95% CI 
Lower   Upper 
Adjusted 
Mean 
95% CI 
Lower   Upper 
Compliance 2.78 2.71       2.86 2.94 2.80       3.09 3.95 .047 .007 
Vigilance 3.86 3.80       3.92 3.78 3.67       3.89 1.54  .215ns .003 
Impulsivity 3.00 2.93       3.08 3.23 3.08       3.38 7.22  .007 .013 
Decision Time 3.69 3.63       3.76 3.55 3.42       3.67 4.19 .041 .008 
Belief in Justice 2.79 2.73       2.86 2.63 2.51       2.75 5.46 .020 .010 
Note. 
Bonferroni corrected p values shown  
 
After adjusting for age, significant differences were found between victims and non-
victims with respect to Compliance, Impulsivity, Decision Time and Belief in Justice, 
but not Vigilance with previous victims of fraud being more compliant, impulsive and 
investing less time in decision making than non-victims.   
 
4.3.3.6 Authenticity of email correspondence; 'genuine email' vs 'phishing email'  
To evaluate participants' ability to correctly identify genuine email correspondence from 
a phishing email attempt, two email examples from a well-known technology company 
were used as test stimuli.  For the genuine email, 339 participants (63%) were able to 
recognise this as genuine correspondence and 197 participants (37%) incorrectly 
identified this as a fake message.  For the phishing email, 132 participants (25%) 
incorrectly identified this as a genuine correspondence and 404 participants (75%) 
correctly identified this as a phishing attempt.   
 
The only significant finding regarding the genuine email correspondence was connected 
to impulsivity.  People who thought the genuine email was fake scored lower on 
impulsivity than those who correctly identified it as genuine (Table 4.10).  
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Table 4.10  
Mean STFS subscale scores for participants identifying a Genuine email as 'real' (N = 339) or 'fake'  
(N =197)  
  
Subscale 
 
Email correctly 
identified as Real  
Email incorrectly 
identified as Fake 
(false positive) 
     t    p Cohen's d 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Compliance 2.85 0.80 2.76 0.82 1.32  .189ns   0.11 
Vigilance 3.80 0.63 3.91 0.68 -1.83  .068ns  -0.17 
Impulsivity 3.14 0.83 2.91 0.87 2.99  .003*   0.27 
Decision time 3.63 0.67 3.72 0.70   -1.60  .110ns  -0.13 
Belief in justice 2.77 0.67 2.74 0.66  0.53  .594ns   0.05 
Note. 
* Minimum accepted p value for statistical significance reached (using Holm-Bonferroni adjustment for 
Type I error)  
 
However, the newly developed Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS) was able to 
discriminate between people who could correctly identify the fake email as fake and 
those that could not (Table 4.11).  
 
Table 4.11 
Mean STFS subscale scores for participants identifying a Fake email as 'real' (N = 132) or 'fake'  
(N= 404)  
  
Subscale 
 
Email incorrectly 
identified as Real (false 
negative)  
Email correctly 
identified as Fake 
    t    p Cohen's d 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Compliance 3.00 0.77 2.76 0.81 2.98   .003*  0.30 
Vigilance 3.65 0.66 3.90 0.64 -3.92 <.001* -0.38 
Impulsivity 3.39 0.80 2.94 0.84 5.34 <.001*  0.55 
Decision time 3.52 0.64 3.71 0.69 -2.81   .005* -0.29 
Belief in justice 2.86 0.65 2.72 0.67 2.00     .046*  0.21 
Note. 
* Minimum accepted p value for statistical significance reached (using Holm-Bonferroni adjustment for 
Type I error)  
 
The findings indicate that vigilant individuals and those that invest more time in making 
decisions were better at recognising a phishing attempt, whilst those with higher scores 
in compliance, impulsivity and belief in justice were less able to do so.  
 
Individuals that were more compliant and more impulsive were more likely to identify 
fake email as genuine.  These results suggest the newly developed Susceptibility to 
Fraud Scale has good discriminant validity when it comes to phishing correspondence 
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4.3.3.7 Confidence ratings in classifying email correspondence  
As well as being asked to decide if an email example they were presented with is a 
genuine email or a phishing email, participants were asked to rate how confident they 
were about their decision on a scale of 1 (not at all confident) to 10 (extremely 
confident).  Using a 2x2 mixed ANOVA, differences in confidence between those that 
have never been defrauded and those that reported they were defrauded in the past were 
tested. 
 
The main effect for type of correspondence (fake or genuine) was significant (F(1, 534) = 
7.91, p =.005, η2p =.015 ).  However, the main effect for scam group was not significant 
(F(1, 534) = 2.93, p =.087, η2p =.005) and there was no interaction between scam group 
and type of email (F(1, 534) = .130, p =.719, η2p =.000).  
 
These results suggest there are no differences between those that have never been 
defrauded and those that have, when it comes to how confident people are that they 
predicted the authenticity of email correspondence correctly.  However, participants 
were less confident in their answer when rating the genuine email than when they were 
rating the fake email (Figure 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Confidence ratings reported by fraud victims (N=422) and non-victims (N=144) 
when evaluating genuine and phishing email correspondence 
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There were no differences in confidence between participants who correctly identified 
the genuine email as real and participants who incorrectly identified it as fake.  
However, participants that incorrectly identified the phishing email as real were less 
confident in their answer than those that made a correct identification (Table 4.12). 
 
Table 4.12 
Participants’ mean confidence ratings when rating authenticity of email correspondence (534 df) 
 
Confidence  
Ratings  
Email correctly    
identified 
Email incorrectly 
identified 
(false positive) 
t p Cohen's d 
N Mean SD N Mean SD  
Genuine email  339 7.09 1.75 197 7.42 2.23 -1.90 .058 -0.16 
Fake email  404 7.91 2.00 132 6.32 1.96 -7.99 <.001 -.0.80 
 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations of confidence ratings to examine relationships 
between subscales of the STFS and victim group (non-victim and previous fraud 
victim).  Results are presented in Table 4.13.  
 
Table 4.13 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations showing the relationships between the STFS subscales and 
confidence when rating authenticity of email correspondence (rated from 1, Not at all confident to 10, 
Extremely confident) for previous fraud victims (N=422) and non-victims (N=114).   
 
Subscale 
 
                Non-Victim Previous Fraud Victim 
Confidence 
ratings for 
genuine email 
Confidence 
ratings for 
fake email 
Confidence 
ratings for 
genuine email 
Confidence 
ratings for 
fake email 
Compliance         -.02     -.20* -.04      -.19 
Vigilance          .18*       .28* .14        .26 
Impulsivity          .04     -.16* -.02       -.27 
Decision Time         -.01       .10           .02        .28 
Belief in Justice          .08      -.05  .01       -.08 
Notes. 
The minimum accepted p value used in this analysis for determining statistical significance (using 
Bonferroni adjustment for Type I error, 0.05 ÷ 20) was p=.0025.  
* p< .001 (2-tailed).  
 
 
A significant positive correlation was found between Vigilance (r =.18) with confidence 
ratings for the genuine email, and Vigilance (r =.28) with confidence ratings for the 
fake email.  This suggests that more vigilant individuals had higher confidence in their 
answers when classifying email correspondence, both genuine and fake.  
Significant negative correlations were found between Compliance (r = -.20) with 
confidence ratings for the fake email; and Impulsivity (r = -.16) with confidence ratings 
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for the fake email, suggesting that more compliant and more impulsive individuals had 
lower confidence in their answer when classifying fake email correspondence. 
 
4.3.3.8 Scam scenarios  
Participants were also given 7 (out of the 9) scenarios used by Modic and Lea (2012) as 
measures of susceptibility to scams, in order to see if there was a relationship between 
the subscales of the newly developed STFS subscales and scam scenarios. The scenarios 
can be found in Appendix 1.5.2.  The store credit card scenario was not a scam but was 
included as a control to evaluate whether participants could tell which situations 
scammers might exploit.  A detailed breakdown for each scenario is provided in Table 
4.14. 
 
Table 4.14 
Scam scenarios mean ratings and percentage of participants that ‘received’, ‘responded to’ and ‘lost 
money’ to such an offer (N = 536) 
 
Scam Scenario Mean Rating (out of 5) and 95% CIs Number of Respondents 
 
Likelihood of 
event being a 
scam  
Likelihood of 
general public 
responding 
favourably to it 
Previously 
received 
such an 
offer (%) 
Previously 
responded 
to such an 
offer (%) 
Previously 
lost funds 
to such an 
offer (%) 
 
Bank phishing 
email 
 
3.81  [3.70, 3.91] 
 
3.60  [3.51, 3.69] 
 
 
   36.9  
 
   5.8  
 
   1.9  
Nigerian scam 
 
4.73  [4.66, 4.80] 2.16  [2.07, 2.26]    32.6     0.7     0.4  
Auction scam 
 
4.35  [4.28, 4.42] 3.27  [3.17, 3.36]      7.1    3.0    1.3 
Investment scam 
 
3.85  [3.77, 3.93] 3.10  [3.01, 3.19]      4.1    0.4    0.2 
Classified ads scam 
 
3.36  [3.26, 3.46] 3.52  [3.45, 3.60]      4.1    1.7    0.4 
Pyramid scheme 
 
3.85  [3.77, 3.94] 3.14  [3.05, 3.23]      9.9    0.9    0.4 
Store credit card/ 
(Non-scam control) 
1.85  [1.77, 1.92] 3.95  [3.87, 4.03]    49.3   15.3    1.3 
 
 
Modic and Lea (2012) reported that 30% of participants had experienced at least one the 
scenarios used, 13% had responded to at least one scenario, but only around 1% of their 
participants had lost money to such scenarios in the past three years.  The present study 
found that 55% of participants reported finding themselves in at least one of the 
situations used, 9% reported responding and 3% reported losing money to at least one 
scam scenario.  
 Using repeated measures ANOVA, differences in likelihood of each scam scenario 
being a scam were tested.   Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity 
had been violated (χ2(2)=110.99, p < .001, W=.81), therefore the degrees of freedom 
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates.  
 
A significant difference was observed in the likelihood ratings of each scenario being a 
scam (F(5.61, 2999.62) = 606.87, p < .001, η2p = .53), with the Nigerian scam and auction 
scam scenarios being rated as the most likely to be a scam.  The store credit card was 
rated as the least likely to be a scam and was therefore excluded.   
Repeated measures ANOVA was also used to test for differences in the likelihood that 
the general public would respond favourably to the scam scenarios.   Mauchly’s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(2)=142.29, p < .001, 
W=.77), therefore the degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimates.  
 
A significant difference was observed for the likelihood of the general public 
responding favourably to the scam scenarios (F(5.49, 2935.23) = 211.90, p < .001,  
η2p = .28).  The Nigerian scam scenario was rated as being the least likely to result in a 
favourable response, while the in-store credit card was rated as the most likely to result 
in a favourable response by the general public, followed by a bank phishing email.  
 
Cochran’s Q tests were used to examine which fraudulent scenarios were the most 
commonly encountered or recognised by participants and which were the most 
commonly responded to.  The store credit card scenario was excluded from these 
analyses, as it was not a scam.  The analyses showed there was a statistically significant 
difference in frequencies between scenarios when it came to encountering different 
scam offers (Q(5, n=536) = 499.06, p < .001).  Bank phishing emails and Nigerian 
scams were the most commonly encountered scams by participants, while investment 
and classified adverts (fake cheque) were the least common.  
 
There was also a statistically significant difference in frequencies between scenarios 
when it came to responding to scams, (Q(5, n=536) = 62.18, p < .001).  Participants 
reported having responded most frequently to a bank phishing email and auction scams 
and least frequently to an investment scam. 
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4.3.3.9 Relationship between the STFS and scam scenarios 
The relationships between the subscales of the STFS and different scam scenarios are 
shown in Table 4.15.  The STFS Impulsivity subscale scores correlated negatively with 
all 6 true scam scenarios, whilst the STFS Compliance scale scores were negatively 
correlated with all but one scenario (Nigerian scam).  This suggests that those who 
scored higher for compliance and impulsivity seemed to be less able to recognise that 
the presented scenarios could potentially be fraudulent offers.  In contrast, positive 
correlations were found for age and for the STFS Vigilance subscale with the 6 true 
scam scenarios, suggesting that older and more vigilant individuals were more likely to 
recognise that the scenarios could potentially be used to defraud.  The STFS Decision 
Time scale correlated positively but only weakly with the scam likelihood ratings for 3 
of the 6 true scam scenarios, and no significant correlations were found between Belief 
in Justice and participants evaluations of the different scenarios.  
 
 
Table 4.15 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations showing the relationships between the STFS subscales, age and 
subjective likelihood ratings that the scenario may be a scam (rated from 0, Extremely Unlikely to 5, 
Extremely Likely) (N=536).   
 
Scam Scenario     Age Compliance Vigilance Impulsivity Decision 
Time 
Belief in 
Justice 
Bank phishing      .40**    -.20**    .33**    -.19**   .20**   -.13 
 
Nigerian scam 
 
   
    .16** 
    
   -.05 
    
   .14* 
    
   -.14* 
    
   .06 
   
  -.06 
Auction scam 
 
    .27**    -.15**    .28**    -.18**    .15**   -.13 
Investment scam 
 
    .42**    -.13    .25**    -.22**    .13   -.11 
Classified ads scam 
 
    .54**    -.26**    .34**    -.29**    .17**   -.11 
Pyramid scheme 
 
    .41**    -.18**    .25**    -.22**    .10   -.07 
Store credit card/ 
(Non-scam control) 
    .12    -.10     .07     -.09    .08   -.02 
Notes. 
* p< .0012 (2 -tailed) Minimum accepted p value for statistical significance (using Bonferroni adjustment 
for Type I error, 0.05 ÷ 42). 
** p< .001 (2-tailed).  
 
 
The number (out of 6) of the true scam offers that participants reported having 
previously received, responded to, or lost money over were totalled for each participant. 
In order to examine participants past experience and behavioural responses to the 6 
different true fraudulent offers in relation to the STFS subscales, point-biserial 
correlations were calculated (Table 4.16).  
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Table 4.16 
Point-Biserial Correlations between STFS subscales and age with previous experience of receiving or 
responding to one or more scams (0=No; 1=Yes) (N=536).  
 
 Previously 
received such 
an offer 
Previously 
responded to 
such an offer 
Previously  
lost money to 
such an offer 
Age .33**         -.11         -.08 
Compliance       -.08  .08 .08 
Vigilance .23** -.10         -.11 
Impulsivity       -.04    .16**   .15** 
Decision Time       -.002  -.13*         -.10 
Belief in Justice       -.07  .03         -.04 
Notes. 
* p< .003 (2 -tailed) Minimum accepted p value for statistical significance  
(using Bonferroni adjustment for Type I error, 0.05 ÷ 18). 
** p< .001 (2-tailed).  
 
 
A significant positive correlation was observed between STFS Vigilance scores and 
those reporting that they had found themselves in one or more situation similar to 
scenarios they evaluated in the past 3 years.  This may indicate that vigilant individuals 
might be better at recognising fraudulent situations when they encounter them.  A 
similar pattern was also observed for age.  The STFS Impulsivity and Decision Time 
subscales both correlated significantly with responding to fraudulent offers in the past, 
suggesting that impulsive individuals were more likely to respond to and lose money to 
potential fraudulent offers, whilst individuals that take more time to make decisions 
were less likely to respond to fraudulent offers.  
 
 
 
4.4 Scale Development Study Discussion: Study 2  
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 identified the need for more individual approach to 
studying susceptibility to fraud.  Individual characteristics have been found to predict 
the likelihood of responding to fraudulent offers as well as attitudes towards privacy 
and security (Egelman & Peer, 2015; Modic & Lea, 2012, 2013).  However, there are, 
at present, no widely available measures with regards to fraud susceptibility.  Modic and 
Lea’s (2013) Susceptibility to Persuasion scale is the only available scale measuring 
concepts related to fraud vulnerability (developed further by Modic & Anderson, 
2014a) and the present study builds on this research.   
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The development of the 26-item Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS) took into account 
extensive research on fraud and fraud victimisation as well as available theories of 
constructs that may be related to susceptibility to fraud.  The scale yielded five factors 
that may contribute to individual’s vulnerability to fraud; Compliance, Vigilance, 
Impulsivity, Decision Time and Belief in Justice and was able to discriminate between 
people who could correctly identify phishing email correspondence as fake and those 
that could not.  Vigilant individuals and those that invest more time in making decisions 
were better at recognising a phishing attempt while compliant and impulsive individuals 
as well as individuals who believe in justice more readily were less able to do so.    
 
STFS was also able to discriminate between previous fraud victims and non-victims.  
Previous fraud victims were found to be more compliant, impulsive and seem to invest 
less time in decision making than non-victims.  Although previous fraud victims did not 
differ from non-victims in the amount of vigilance they possess, this may be down to 
the fact that most fraud victims become more vigilant as a result of fraud victimisation.  
Additionally, although participants that have previously been defrauded did not feel any 
more confident judging email correspondence than non-victims, more vigilant 
individuals had higher confidence in their answers for both, genuine and fake email 
correspondence.    
 
When participants were given real life scenarios, that could potentially be fraudulent, to 
consider, vigilant individuals were more able to recognise that the presented scenarios 
could potentially be fraudulent situations.  In contrast, compliant and impulsive 
individuals were less able to recognise the scenarios could be fraudulent situations.  
They also felt less confident in their answer when classifying phishing email 
correspondence.  This suggests that vigilance may be a protective factor when it comes 
to fraud vulnerability.  
 
4.4.1 Factors of the Susceptibility to Fraud Scale 
Compliance proved to be the most internally consistent factor.  Individuals with high 
scores on this factor would be more likely to comply with others due to activation of 
social norms or other factors, such as time pressures, despite awareness of the 
vulnerability.  Questionnaire items for this factor relate to factors found to increase 
vulnerability to fraudulent offers, such as liking and similarity and evoking social norms 
(Lea et al., 2009).  Compliance predicted individuals that incorrectly identified phishing 
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correspondence as genuine as well as those that reported being defrauded in the past. 
Therefore, this subscale may be a good measure of general compliance with fraudulent 
offers.  
 
Impulsivity was the second most reliable factor.  Individuals with high scores on this 
factor may exhibit lack of restraint and disregard to risk with regards to making 
purchases.  Impulsivity predicted those that incorrectly identified phishing 
correspondence as genuine.   This suggests that Impulsivity subscale may be a good 
measure of lack of restraint when it comes to purchases, which could be exploited by 
scammers, but could also be applied to other types of fraud.  Impulsivity also predicted 
previous fraud victimisation.  
 
Impulsivity was also positively related to lack of self-control, a subscale of Modic and 
Lea’s (2013) Susceptibility to Persuasion scale, which was found to predict responding 
to fraudulent offers.  In an earlier study, Modic and Lea (2012) found that 
premeditation, a facet of an impulsivity measure, also predicted responding to 
fraudulent offers.  Current findings confirm this.  Using Modic and Lea (2013) scam 
scenarios, the present study found that more impulsive individuals were more likely to 
respond and lose money to fraudulent situations similar to the scam scenarios they were 
assessing.  
 
Vigilance was related to awareness of others’ motives and readiness to check the 
information.  Questionnaire items measuring vigilance are related to research on trust 
and vigilance (Greenspan, 2009; Markóczy, 2003) as well as research identifying 
scepticism as a moderator of scamming vulnerability (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001).  It 
also refers to the motivation to process information (Lea et al., 2009).  
Research on trust and vigilance found that vigilance was found to be implicated in 
predicting the behaviour of others (Markóczy, 2003), with trusting but vigilant 
individuals better at predicting how others would behave.  Although this factor had 
lower reliability than the previous two factors, Vigilance predicted correct identification 
of phishing correspondence and previous fraud victimisation.   
 
This subscale may be a good indication of individual’s willingness to be cautious and 
check the information provided, which would help protect one from fraudulent offers.  
Vigilant participants reported they found themselves to be in receipt of a greater number 
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of scam offers of the type described in the scenarios used in the present study (Modic & 
Lea, 2013).  This may be down to their heightened awareness of fraud in everyday 
situations.  Grabosky and Duffield (2001) suggested that fraud victimisation is easier 
when one's vigilance is relaxed and that the key lies in the effective education and fraud 
prevention systems that would swiftly detect fraud, where committed.  It could therefore 
be argued that individuals with higher levels of vigilance and awareness with regards to 
fraud would be more protected from fraud victimisation.  
 
Decision Time indicates a preference to take more time to carefully consider 
information when making decisions.  It was also found to have lower reliability than 
Compliance and Impulsivity, however, questionnaire items for this factor relate to the 
data from the first study in this programme of research (Chapter 3), interviews with 
victims of fraud, where majority of the participants reported they regret rushing their 
decisions.  Questionnaire items for this factor also relate to the literature on gullible 
action (Greenspan, 2009).  Decision Time successfully predicted correct identification 
of phishing correspondence and previous victimisation; therefore, this subscale may be 
a good measure of vulnerability to fraud.  Additionally, those that reported taking 
greater time when making decisions were less likely to have previously responded to 
fraudulent offers.  This supports the assertion by Greenspan (2009) that delaying 
decisions, in certain situations, offers protection from gullible action.  
 
Positive relationships were found between Vigilance and Decision Time.  Participants 
who exhibited greater vigilance were also found to invest more time in making 
decisions. Since both characteristics were found to be good predictors of correct scam 
identification, when it came to recognising the phishing correspondence example used 
in the present study, it may be assumed that Vigilance and Decision Time are protective 
factors that help lower the risk of fraud victimisation.  
 
The Belief in Justice subscale was intended to capture people's attitudes towards fraud 
victims as well as fraud agencies and processes that can be applied once fraud 
victimisation takes place.  The items on this factor relate to data from the interview 
study in Chapter 3, on people’s reactions to justice, following the victimisation (also 
Lea et al., 2009) and discourse regarding fraud victims (Cross, 2013, 2015).  For 
example, many participants in the first study reported that they believed that if they 
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were defrauded, the case would be investigated and the perpetrator caught.  Lea et al. 
(2009) suggested this notion relates to the illusion of control.  
 
Individuals that expressed a greater belief in justice tended to be younger and were less 
likely to have been a previous victim of fraud.  The finding that previous victimisation 
appears to lower one's belief in justice could in part be down to the experience of 
participants when reporting fraud to relevant agencies and not getting the desired 
response.  Previous research has found that fraud victims have a strong desire for justice 
following fraud victimisation but often even the basic advice or help is unavailable 
(Button, et al., 2013; Button et al., 2015).  However, since this factor had much lower 
reliability than recommended, these findings should be taken with caution as this factor 
warrants further testing in order to ascertain its reliability and validity.  
 
The newly developed Susceptibility to Fraud Scale is one of the first specifically 
developed scales to measure vulnerability to fraud.  However, reliability of the whole 
scale and some of the factors was lower than the alpha value recommended by DeVellis 
(2012).  Although the scale demonstrated content, concurrent and predictive validity, 
the reliability of some of the scales lets it down, therefore the scale would benefit from 
further testing.   
 
4.4.2 Age and fraud vulnerability  
Age was found to be an influential factor in contributing to fraud vulnerability.  
Younger participants self-reported that they exhibited more compliant and impulsive 
behaviour, which in turn were connected to lower detection of potential fraudulent 
situations, as measured by participants’ responses to the example scam scenarios used in 
the present study.  In addition, compliance and impulsivity were connected to reduced 
time invested in making decisions and processing information with participants that 
reported being victims of at least one or more scams being more likely to exhibit these 
characteristics.  Older participants self-reported being more vigilant and taking more 
time when making decisions.  They were also more likely to report finding themselves 
in receipt of fraudulent offers in the past 3 years.  As this was also true of vigilant 
individuals, it could mean that with age, people become more vigilant and better at 
recognising fraudulent offers when they encounter them.  Although older participants in 
the present study seemed to exhibit characteristics that may help protect against 
experiencing fraud victimisation, it cannot be argued that age reduces vulnerability. 
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Elderly people are known to be aggressively preyed upon by scammers and so remain 
one of the most vulnerable groups when it comes to fraud through an increased 
exposure to risk (Harries et al., 2013; Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001).  In addition, only 
4% of the current sample was aged 60 years or over, when some authors have argued 
that cognitive decline may lead to an assumed increased in vulnerability (Langenderfer 
& Shimp, 2001; Lea et al., 2009; Schiebe, 2015).    
 
 
4.5 Future considerations  
 
The present study found that the newly developed ‘Susceptibility to Fraud’ measure was 
good at predicting attributes that contribute to responding to phishing correspondence.  
There are different kinds of phishing correspondence, some of which rely on quick 
decision making, usually purporting to refer to customers’ compromised account that 
needs attention, and this is the kind we presented to participants in the present study.  
Testing the scale on different kinds of phishing correspondence, such as Nigerian scam 
correspondence, where more deliberation is required on the part of the potential victim, 
or other online scams (i.e. lottery scams, sweepstakes, miracle cures etc.) would be 
beneficial.  For example, the phishing example of email correspondence presented to 
participants in this study contained a warning about a compromised account, which is 
likely to evoke panic or fear.  As different types of scams rely on different motivational 
and cognitive factors, the scale may yield different results with scams that evoke 
positive emotions (e.g. lottery win or a prize) or rely on different scam cues (e.g. 
authority or scarcity).  It would therefore, be valuable to examine if the newly 
developed STFS could be used as a valid general measure of vulnerability to fraud 
across different types of scams and what factors explain vulnerability to different types 
of scams best.  This would also allow for the scale to be used in fraud prevention.  For 
example, if we knew that compliance and impulsivity best predict certain types of 
scams and lack of vigilance other types of scams, individuals could be educated about 
scams that they may be more vulnerable to, according to their scores on STFS, in order 
to avoid future victimisation.  
 
Although STFS was able to discriminate between people who could correctly identify 
phishing email correspondence as fake and those that could not, it must be noted that 
measuring fraud compliance by asking participants to decide if an email is real or fake 
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raises certain considerations.  Deciding whether email is a phishing example or a real 
email in an online survey does not accurately represent a real-life situation.  If an 
individual received an email, such as a warning about a potential closure or compromise 
of their bank account, they would most likely be experiencing strong emotions (e.g. fear 
or panic), which are likely to have an impact on their decisions about what to do about 
it.  Since this is lacking in a survey, where participants are being asked to evaluate 
emails rationally and are not active recipients of such emails, their decisions are less 
likely to be governed by visceral influence or strong emotions.  However, given the fact 
that the STFS still predicted those who incorrectly identified phishing correspondence 
as genuine, it is likely that it may also be a good predictor of vulnerability to phishing 
correspondence in real-life contexts and in the presence of additional vulnerability 
factors.  
 
The present study used the same sample to develop the STFS and test its reliability and 
validity.  Whilst this is not ideal, Study 3 (Chapter 5) was seen as an opportunity to 
replicate the reliability tests, as well as test the validity of the newly developed STFS on 
an independent sample.  The results are reported in section 5.3.1 in Chapter 5.  
 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
In the present study, a measure of susceptibility to fraud was developed and tested.  The 
newly developed Susceptibility to Fraud Scale was able to discriminate between 
previous fraud victims and non-victims as well as participants who could correctly 
identify phishing email correspondence and those who could not.  Additionally, STFS 
was also able to discriminate between participants that were able to recognise that 
certain real-life situations (e.g. online auctions or classified adverts) could potentially be 
scams.  Compliance and Impulsivity, as well as Belief in Justice, were associated with 
increased fraud vulnerability, whilst Vigilance and Decision Time seem to moderate it.  
The results, therefore, suggest that Susceptibility to Fraud Scale may be used as an 
indicator of individual vulnerability to phishing correspondence, and could potentially 
also apply to other types of fraud.  
 
The research in the present study provides an important contribution to understanding 
factors that underlie vulnerability to fraudulent offers, especially with regards to 
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protective factors, that may moderate susceptibility to fraud, such as increased vigilance 
and a preference to delay decisions and consider the available information.  In addition, 
this research confirms the findings of existing research (Langerderfer & Shimp, 2001; 
Lea et al., 2009; Modic & Lea, 2012, 2013) on lack of self-control and impulsivity as 
factors that increase vulnerability to scams.  These findings may also provide the basis 
for more individual and victim orientated approach to fraud prevention.  
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Chapter 5 
The Barnum effect as a measure of susceptibility to fraud 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of the study described in this chapter is to build on the results obtained in the 
previous, scale development study, Study 2.  Having developed the Susceptibility to 
Fraud Scale (STFS) and assessed its reliability and validity against Modic and Lea 
(2013) Susceptibility to Persuasion scale, the STFS was tested on the examples of email 
correspondence, in order to examine if it could predict correct identification of a 
phishing correspondence.  The study found that vigilant individuals, as well as 
individuals that prefer taking the time to make their decisions were better at recognising 
a phishing attempt than individuals that were more impulsive and compliant.  
 
The next step would be to test the newly developed STFS scale in a real-life scam 
situation.  However, there are moral and ethical considerations in doing so (Jagatic et 
al., 2007).  Therefore, a proxy scam situation that mimics what people may experience 
in a real-life scam situation was used for Study 3.  
 
5.1.1 Gullibility in relation to fraud 
Gullibility is frequently associated with being too trusting, however, some studies have 
argued otherwise (Markóczy, 2003; Yamagishi, Kokuchi & Kosugi, 1999; Yamagishi & 
Kakiuchi, 2000).  Rotter (1980) argued that trusting someone in the absence of warning 
signs is not the same as trusting someone in the presence of warning signs or evidence 
that the person is not trustworthy, and that only the latter is connected to gullibility. 
Markóczy (2003) found that trusting individuals that are also vigilant were better at 
predicting behaviour of others than naïve trusters.   Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) 
argued that gullibility may enhance scam vulnerability under certain conditions.  For 
example, Greenspan (2008) suggests that induced foolish action happens in the presence 
of manipulation by person(s), usually on the basis of false information against one’s 
best interests, manifesting itself as “gullibility”.  Gullibility and foolish action may, 
therefore, in some situations, be connected to fraud vulnerability, especially where there 
is a direct contact with the scammer and his or her actions need to be evaluated.  
 
5.1.2 The Barnum effect as a measure of gullibility 
The Forer effect, also known as the Barnum effect, is a personal validation fallacy, 
referring to the acceptance of vague and widely applicable feedback as highly accurate 
of oneself, when presented as bona-fide personality feedback.  In his study, Forer 
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(1949) gave participants a psychometric measure, after which he supplied them with 
personality feedback.  Participants were told they were receiving personality feedback 
based on the scores of the measures they completed (i.e. their personalised feedback), 
however the feedback they received was the same for all participants and was derived 
from daily horoscopes.  The feedback was purposely vague or neutral and could apply 
to anyone.  Participants were then asked to rate the feedback for how accurate it was as 
a description of their personality.  The study found that participants rated this highly 
generalised feedback as being a 'good' or 'perfect' fit to their own personality.  
Moreover, when participants are given their actual true personality feedback, as well as 
the Barnum feedback, due to its broad applicability, the Barnum feedback was seen as 
more accurate (O'Dell, 1972).   
 
Several studies researching the Barnum effect have made a connection between the 
acceptance of bogus personality feedback and gullibility (Dana & Graham, 1976; Forer, 
1949; MacDonald & Standing, 2002; Piper-Terry & Downey, 1998).  However, Layne 
(1979) argues that accepting vague feedback as a description of one's personality does 
not equate to gullibility, as such feedback is purposely designed to apply to the majority 
of people, and as such, the acceptance of the feedback may be rational and not gullible.  
Personality test feedback is seen as more credible, when coming from a credible source 
(e.g. a psychologist), therefore it would be irrational not to accept it as accurate 
feedback.  Personality feedback also may be regarded as more accurate when it is 
presented as overall feedback instead of individual statements (Layne, 1978).  This may 
be problematic as it could lead to an inaccurate measurement of the effect.  
 
5.1.2.1 The Barnum effect manipulations  
Some studies have found that when the same, vague personality feedback is given to 
participants but they are asked to rate how accurate it is of people in general, the 
accuracy ratings for people in general tend to be lower (Snyder & Larson, 1972).  For 
example, in the study by Johnson, Cain, Falke, Hayman and Perillo (1985), one group 
of participants was asked to rate the personality feedback presented to them for how 
accurate it is of them, and the other group was asked to how accurate it may be of their 
acquaintance.  They did not complete any psychometric measures prior to assessing the 
personality feedback, which is usually the case with the Barnum effect studies.  The 
study found that participants rated the statements as more accurate of them, despite the 
fact that they were not made to believe that the feedback was based on personal 
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information.  Johnson et al. (1985) suggested that the reason for this may be down to the 
fact that individuals have a greater availability of knowledge about ‘the self’ as opposed 
to other people. 
 
Other manipulations included adding positive and negative statements to the bogus 
personality feedback, in order to see if this influences the perceived accuracy ratings.  
Layne (1978) replicated Forer's (1949) original experiment but gave each participant 
favourable (positive) or unfavourable (negative) personality feedback and asked them to 
rate it for accuracy.  The positive and negative statements were specific (i.e. not highly 
applicable), rather than neutral or vague.  The study found that participants accepted 
favourable or positive items more readily than negative.  Dana and Fouke (1979) 
similarly found that positive statements were rated as more accurate as were neutral 
statements, and suggested that this may be down to the fact that neutral and mildly 
positive statements may have a higher base validity (i.e. have a higher occurrence in 
general population) than negative items in the general population.    
 
Several other research studies have also used positive and negative feedback, finding 
that people tend to rate positive items higher and negative items lower, when asked to 
evaluate the feedback for how accurate it is of them (Dana & Fouke, 1979; Davies, 
1997; Furnham & Varian, 1988; Layne, 1978; MacDonald & Standing, 2002).  When 
asked to rate the same feedback for ‘people in general', the pattern is reversed.  
 
In the studies by Furnham and Varian (1988), participants completed psychometric 
measures, after which they were given 9 positive and 9 negative personality statements 
to rate for accuracy on a 9-point scale.  The study found that participants rated positive 
items as more accurate than negative.  Furnham and Varian (1988) then replicated the 
study and used slightly different types of personality feedback, in order to overcome the 
confounding of the base rate validity of statements.  The personality statements given to 
participants included; general and positive, which have a high base rate occurrence in 
the general population (e.g. ‘Security is one of your major goals in life’), general and 
negative (e.g. ‘You have a great deal of unused capacity which you have not turned to 
your advantage.’).  They also included specific statements; specific positive (e.g. ‘ You 
are often described by others as the most popular person they know.’) and specific 
negative (e.g. ‘ You can be very patronizing to those you see inferior to yourself.’).  
They found that general statements were rated as more accurate than specific, with 
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positive general statements rated as more accurate than negative general statements, 
which suggested that the acceptance of personality feedback is due to generality rather 
than favourability of the items.  
 
The Barnum effect is also influenced by the perceived status of the person administering 
the feedback and is also known as prestige effect (Halperin, Snyder, Shenkel & 
Houston, 1976; Rosen, 1975; Snyder & Newburg, 1981).  In the study by Rosen (1975), 
participants were given psychometric measures to complete, after which they were 
asked to provide their own and their parents' date of birth.  Participants were then given 
the same personality feedback; however, one group was told the feedback was provided 
by an astrologer on the basis of the dates of birth provided while the other group was 
told the feedback was provided by a psychologist, based on the psychometric measures 
they completed.  The study found that the same personality feedback was rated higher 
when it was provided by a psychologist than when it was provided by an astrologer.  
 
Snyder and Newburg (1981) manipulated the prestige of the test administrator in a 
group setting. The group of participants were taken to an office of 'Dr. Smith' where 
they were greeted with a test administrator who was dressed in a professional manner.  
Participants took part in a discussion led by Dr. Smith, in which they introduced 
themselves to one another and were encouraged to share details about themselves.  
Participants were then asked to describe another member of the group based on the 
discussion they engaged in.  They were also told they would receive personality 
feedback by Dr. Smith, based on the discussion.  Finally, participants were also asked to 
rate how qualified they thought Dr. Smith was to provide the personality feedback and 
how qualified another group member is to provide personality feedback based on the 
discussion.  Participants were then provided with bogus personality feedback, with 
some participants receiving positive statements and some receiving negative statements.  
Half of participants were told Dr. Smith provided their personality feedback and half 
were told another group member provided the feedback.  The study found that 
personality feedback which was provided by Dr. Smith was rated as being more 
accurate than feedback provided by another group member, even when negative 
feedback was given (also Halperin et al., 1976).   Additionally, Snyder and Shenkel 
(1976) tested if personality feedback would be rated differently when provided in oral 
rather than written form, but found no differences.  
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5.1.3 The Barnum effect as a proxy scam measure  
Vague feedback often appears to the individual receiving it, as highly accurate feedback 
of his or her own personality.  People do not recognise the fact that this is due to the 
high base rate of such feedback (i.e. high occurrence in the general population), 
therefore it could be equally accurate of others as it is of them.  This difference in the 
degree to which vague and highly applicable personality feedback is true of oneself 
versus true of others may indicate a cognitive bias, which can be exploited for 
fraudulent gains.  For example, this type of feedback is often part of clairvoyant or 
psychic scams or other cold readings, such as astrology predictions or palm readings.  In 
fact, in the original study by Forer (1949), the statements were compiled from daily 
horoscopes.  The inability to recognise the broad applicability of such feedback may 
indicate an individual’s vulnerability to this type of fraud.  As such, the Barnum type 
feedback may provide a suitable proxy scam measure for frauds that utilise this type of 
feedback.   
 
The Barnum effect might also help to explain participants' responses in other potential 
fraudulent situations.  Stajano and Wilson (2011) found that online auction scams are 
perpetrated by inflating the seller’s customer feedback with fake testimonials, which are 
seen as trustworthy sources.  Therefore, feedback that appears to be coming from 
trustworthy sources, such as a psychologist in the case of the Barnum effect studies, 
may be more likely to be accepted as true without consideration for its authenticity.  
 
Many scams rely on authority cues, due to the fact that people tend to trust and obey 
those in authority (Lea et al., 2009; Modic & Lea, 2013; Whitty & Buchanan, 2012a, 
2012b; Whitty, 2013; Workman, 2008).  Therefore, fraudulent offers frequently purport 
to be from authority figures or someone who can facilitate the offer (Lea et al., 2009).  
Similarly, in the Barnum effect studies, personality feedback is based on previously 
scored psychometric measures and tends to be delivered by a psychologist (i.e. a person 
that is qualified to administer psychometric tests), therefore the accuracy assigned to the 
received feedback may be down to the perceived authority of the person preparing it.  
For example, some studies looking into the Barnum effect found that 'prestige' or status 
of the person that is administering and delivering personality feedback influences 
accuracy scores (Halperin et al., 1976; Rosen, 1975; Snyder & Newburg, 1981).  
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In most scam situations, there is usually some information that is processed by the 
potential victim, whether that is a website or email content or some other information 
provided by the scammer in face-to-face situations.  The decision of whether to trust 
such information depends on different factors, many of which are manipulated by 
scammers, such as adding cues of authenticity or purporting to be from authority 
sources or even creating false endorsements to influence the victim and detract from 
careful information processing.  Therefore, the Barnum effect paradigm may be a good 
way of examining acceptance of information that is not authentic when it comes from 
what appears to be a qualified source, especially when specific positive and specific 
negative feedback is used.  
 
5.1.4 The Barnum effect and personality attributes 
The Barnum effect has been linked to certain personality characteristics.  
Cuperman, Robinson and Ickes (2014) conducted an online survey, in which 
participants completed various psychometric measures one of which was the Sense of 
Self Scale (SOSS), after which participants were told they were to receive personality 
feedback based on the measures administered, which they were asked to rate for 
accuracy, statement by statement and overall.  Participants were then given the vague 
statements used in the study by Forer (1949).  The study found a positive relationship 
between the acceptance of neutral or generic Barnum effect statements and several 
personality predictors; self-reported self-monitoring, inner directedness, emotional 
contagion and a weak sense-of-self.  Additionally, they found a negative relationship 
between the acceptance of generic personality statements and self-esteem, self-concept 
clarity and social desirability.  Furthermore, sense of self was also identified as a 
predictor of the Barnum effect acceptance scores, and Cuperman et al. (2014) concluded 
that the Barnum effect paradigm is a good way to explore malleability of self-image in 
individuals with a weak sense-of-self.  
 
The Barnum effect has also been linked to an individual's need for social approval 
(Mosher 1965; Orpen & Jamotte, 1975).   In their study, Orpen and Jamote (1975) gave 
their participants a scale measuring the need for group approval, after which participants 
received identical personality feedback.  The study found a positive relationship 
between social approval and acceptance of bogus personality feedback.   
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More recently, research by Mason and Budge (2011) found a relationship between the 
Barnum effect and referential thinking or a tendency to experience events as referring to 
one’s self.  In their study, participants completed different measures and were given 
different personality feedback to evaluate, some consisting of feedback based on one of 
the scales used, some horoscope derived items and positive and negative Barnum type 
statements developed by the authors.  The study found no differences in the extent of 
agreement between the different types of feedback.  
 
Acceptance of false personality feedback has also been linked to having an external 
locus of control (Cupperman et al., 2014; Snyder & Larson, 1972).  Rotter (1966) 
describes locus of control as: “the degree to which the individual perceives that the 
reward follows from, or is contingent upon, his own behaviour or attributes versus the 
degree to which he feels the reward is controlled by forces outside of himself and may 
occur independently of his own actions” (Rotter, 1966, p 8).  
 
External locus of control refers to the attribution of events to luck or chance or 
something that is beyond one’s control.  This also includes attributing events to the 
behaviour of powerful others.  Internal locus of control, refers to attribution of life as 
being contingent upon one’s own behaviour, effort or characteristics.  
 
Contrary to previous research, studies looking into personality factors in relation to the 
Barnum effect by Furnham (1989), found that those with an internal locus of control 
accept positive and reject negative feedback more readily than those with the external 
locus of control.  Furnham (1989) also found a positive relationship between factors 
associated with extraversion and positive personality feedback and factors associated 
with neuroticism with negative personality feedback.  
 
5.1.5 Research aims and rationale  
The present study aimed to explore whether the Barnum effect may be used as a 
successful proxy scam measure in order to test the utility of the newly developed 
Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS).  More specifically, can STFS predict the 
acceptance of positive, negative and neutral Barnum type personality feedback? 
 
As some studies found that personality feedback is accepted more readily when the 
status of the experimenter appears to be higher, administering the Barnum effect 
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experiments online may mean that potential confounding effects would be avoided as 
there is no authority figure present to reinforce the feedback.  However, not many 
Barnum effect studies have been administered online.  Although their study did not use 
the Barnum effect, Fletcher, Taylor and Glansfield (1996) explored the acceptance of 
personality feedback generated by different sources.  Some participants were told an 
expert interpreted their personality feedback and others were told it was computer 
generated.  They found no differences in ratings for feedback that was computer 
generated as opposed to interpreted by an expert.  More recent studies have been 
conducted using online survey methods (e.g. Cuperman et al., 2014), which seems to be 
a convenient method, as the data on both, psychometric measures and the feedback 
ratings can be collected at the same time, minimising attrition.  
 
Personality feedback in the Barnum effect studies tends to attract higher ratings when 
presented as a whole as opposed to individual items (Layne 1978), therefore, in the 
present study, participants will be given their personality feedback sentence by sentence 
and asked to rate each statement for accuracy in order to avoid this.   
 
The present study uses three types of personality feedback; neutral or vague feedback 
used in Forer's (1949) study, and the specific positive and negative feedback used by 
Furnham and Varian (1988).  Specific rather than neutral positive and negative feedback 
statements were used in order to examine if there is a link between fraud susceptibility 
and acceptance of positive and negative feedback.  Neutral positive and negative 
personality feedback may be more readily accepted by participants and may therefore 
not be suitable as a measure of susceptibility to fraud.  For example, research found that 
victims of certain frauds may be more prone to flattery (Lea et al. 2009; Witty, 2013), 
therefore high ratings of specific positive items may provide an indicator of propensity 
for flattery.  
 
In the previous study (Chapter 4) ‘Compliance’, a factor of Susceptibility to Fraud 
Scale, was found to have the largest part of the variance in fraud susceptibility.  
Therefore, the present study also utilised Gudjonsson’s (1989) Compliance Scale (GCS) 
as an additional measure of concurrent validity for the STFS. 
 
Since there is evidence that locus of control may be implicated in the acceptance of 
bogus personality feedback (Furnham, 1989; Snyder & Larson, 1972), the present study 
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included Sapp and Harrod’s (1993) brief Locus of Control (LOC) measure in order to 
explore possible relationships with the STFS.   Participants were also given their scores 
on the LOC measure after debriefing, to make reparation for deception.    
 
 
Study 3 Research questions:  
1. What is the nature of the relationship between susceptibility to fraud, compliance and 
locus of control?  Are individuals who are more susceptible to fraud more compliant or 
more likely to assume external factors beyond their control as determining what 
happens in their lives? 
 
2. Is susceptibility to fraud related to greater self-bias in responses to the Barnum type 
personality feedback?  Are individuals who are more susceptible to fraud more likely to 
rate themselves higher than they rate others on neutral and positive items and lower on 
negative items).  
 
3. Does the Barnum effect predict fraud victimisation?  Do previous fraud victims show 
greater self- bias in relation to the Barnum effect? 
 
 
5.2 Method  
 
5.2.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited by advertising the study on social media and participation 
was voluntary.  No incentive was offered for participation apart from personality 
feedback, which was supplied at the end of the survey.  The study was also advertised 
among first year undergraduate psychology students at the University of Portsmouth, 
who received a course credit for their participation, but who belonged to a different 
cohort to that recruited during Study 2.  As the Barnum Effect paradigm relies on 
deception, participants were told that the purpose of this study was to help develop a 
new personality questionnaire, and allow the researcher to examine how people 
perceive the accuracy of feedback they receive about their personality characteristics 
from the test being developed.  
 
Out of 531participants that started the survey, a total of 430 participants completed all 
parts of the survey, giving an attrition rate of 19%.  Following debriefing, participants 
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were able to leave comments about the study.  One participant requested for their data 
to be removed without an explanation and was removed from the data set.  A further 4 
participants were removed after leaving a comment saying that they suspected the 
feedback received had nothing to do with the measures they completed and one 
participant was removed due to scoring all the questions with the same score throughout 
the survey.  The final sample of 424 participants consisted of 94 male and 330 female 
participants, 18 – 70 years of age (M =31.46, SD =12.91) out of which, 261were 
university students.  
A total of 120 participants reported being defrauded in the past and 304 reported they 
have never been defrauded. Out of the 120 participants that have been defrauded, 47 
stated that they reported the fraud to the authorities and 73 stated they did not report it.  
The percentage of participants in the sample that reported they had been defrauded in 
the past varied across different age groups, the 18-25 years age group were the least 
likely to report being defrauded in the past (14%), compared to participants between the 
ages of 26 and 50 years (39%) or those between the ages of 51-70 years (49%).  
 
5.2.2 Materials  
The present study used Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS), developed in the previous 
study (Chapter 4 and Appendix 1.6).  The study also used the 9-item Brief Locus of 
Control (LOC) scale by Sapp and Harrod (1993), measuring internal locus of control, 
belief in chance and belief in powerful others, in order to measure the degree to which 
people feel they can control what happens to them.  The inclusion of the Locus of 
Control scale in addition to being used to provide participants with some genuine 
personality feedback at the end of the study, also allowed the relationship between an 
individual's locus of control and fraud susceptibility to be examined.  External locus of 
control may be characterised by feeling unable to control what happens which may 
indicate vulnerability to fraudulent offers, whilst a belief in powerful others may 
indicate those who succumb to authority cues in fraudulent communication.  The Brief 
Locus of Control scale items can be found in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1  
Sapp and Harrod (1993) Brief Locus of Control scale  
 
Internal control  α  = .58 Chance  α  = .65 Powerful others  α  = .72 
 
1. My life is determined by my 
own actions. 
 
1. To a great extent, my life is 
controlled by accidental 
happenings. 
 
 
1. People like myself have very 
little chance of protecting our 
personal interests where they 
conflict with those of strong 
pressure groups.  
 
2. I am usually able to protect 
my personal interests. 
2. Often there is no chance of 
protecting my personal interests 
from bad luck happenings. 
 
2. My life is chiefly controlled 
by powerful others.  
 
3. I can pretty much determine 
what will happen in my life. 
3. When I get what I want, it is 
usually because I’m lucky. 
3. I feel like what happens in my 
life is mostly determined by 
powerful people.  
 
 
Since compliance was found to have the largest part of the variance in fraud 
susceptibility in the previous study, 20-item Gudjonsson (1989) Compliance Scale was 
included as a measure of concurrent validity for STFS.  Gudjonson (1989) Compliance 
Scale items can be found in Table 5.2.   
 
Table 5.2 
Gudjonson (1989) Compliance Scale  
 
Compliance Scale  α  = .71 
 
1. I give easily to people when I am pressured. 
2. I find it very difficult to tell people when I disagree with them.  
3. People in authority make me feel uncomfortable and uneasy.  
4. I tend to give in to people who insist that they are right. 
5. I tend to become easily alarmed and frightened when I am in the company of people in authority. 
6. I try very hard not to offend people in authority.  
7. I would describe myself as a very obedient person 
8. I tend to go along with what people tell me even when I know that they are wrong.  
9. I believe in avoiding rather than facing demanding and frightening situations. 
10. I try to please others. 
11. Disagreeing with people often takes more time that it is worth.  
12. I generally believe in doing what I am told.  
13. When I am uncertain about things I tend to accept what people tell me.  
14. I generally try to avoid confrontations with people.  
15. As a child I always did what my parents told me.  
16. I try hard to do what is expected of me. 
17. I am not too concerned about what people think of me.* 
18. I strongly resist being pressured to do things I don't want to do.* 
19. I would never go along with what people tell me in order to please them.*  
20. When I was a child I sometimes took the blame for things I had not done.  
Note.  
* Reverse item 
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Participants completed the STFS first, followed by the LOC scale and the Compliance 
Scale.  To standardise the responses and make the questions appear as if they were part 
of the same measure, responses to all the scales were measured on a 5-point Likert scale 
by asking participants to indicate to what degree they agree with each statement  
(1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree).  The range of scores for each subscale of 
the Sapp and Harrod (1993) LOC scale was therefore, 3 to 15.  Higher scores indicate 
more internal locus of control, higher belief in chance and higher belief in powerful 
others.   
 
The range of scores for the Gudjonson (1989) Compliance scale ranged from 20 to 100, 
with lower scores indicating lower compliance.  The range of scores for the STFS total 
was from 26 to 130, with lower scores indicating lower susceptibility to fraud.  Means, 
standard deviation and range of the scale scores found with the present sample are 
shown in Table 5.3.  
 
 
Table 5.3 
Means, standard deviation and range of the scale scores for the measures used in the  
experiment, N = 424 
 
Measure  
 
Minimum Maximum M SD Skewness 
STFS 1.15 4.35 2.86 0.45 -.31 
LOC internal  4.00 15.00 10.84 2.13 -.31 
LOC chance  3.00 15.00 8.00 2.32 .12 
LOC powerful others  3.00 15.00 7.40 2.68 .35 
Compliance scale  26.00 92.00 57.49 12.76 -.17 
 
 
 
5.2.3 Procedure  
Participants were invited to participate in the study by advertising on different social 
media platforms and the university participant pool.  
The invitation to participate gave the following information about the study: 
“You are invited to take part in a research study looking into perceptions of accuracy of 
personality test feedback.  The survey takes approximately 20-30 minutes and anyone 
over 18 is welcome to participate.  You will first be asked to answer questions about 
your attitudes and daily activities, after which you will be presented with your 
personality feedback.  Since we are trying to assess if the personality perception 
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questionnaire is accurate in delivering personality feedback, you will be asked to rate 
this feedback sentence by sentence on a 1-10 accuracy scale. “ 
 
The study was conducted using the online survey hosting software, Qualtrics. 
Participants were asked to complete the three psychometric questionnaires in the same 
order (STFS, LOC and Compliance), rating all questions on a 5- point Likert scale.  
After this, participants were told that they would be presented with their own 
personality feedback based on the psychometric measures they completed and that the 
feedback would be presented sentence by sentence in order to rate the quality of each 
feedback element. 
 
They were asked to rate each statement for how accurate it is of them and also how 
accurate it was of people in general, using a 10-point semantic differential scale (with 
end descriptors of 1-not very accurate to 10- very accurate).  After providing accuracy 
evaluations for each of the 21 personality statements, participants were asked if they 
experienced being defrauded in the past, if they reported it and how satisfied they were 
with any response from the authorities.  As part of the debriefing process, participants 
were presented with the opportunity to share their views on the nature of the study and 
feelings regarding the deception used as well as being provided with details of further 
sources of support and information about fraud.  Participants were also reminded of 
their right to request their data to be withdrawn from the study at this point.  To make 
good on the study details given at the start of the questionnaire that participants would 
receive personality feedback after taking part in the study, all participants were 
automatically provided with their true personal score on the Locus of control scale 
together with an explanation what scores on this scale indicate, at the end of the survey. 
 
5.2.4 Personality feedback  
All participants received the same Barnum type personality feedback consisting of 7 
positive, 7 negative and 7 neutral feedback statements (Collins, Dmitruk & Ranney, 
1977; Forer, 1949; Furnham & Varian, 1988) but were told they were receiving their 
own personalised feedback to rate for accuracy (Table 5.4).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 150 
Table 5.4  
Positive, negative and neutral Barnum type personality feedback  
 
Positive Feedback  
 
Negative Feedback  Neutral Feedback  
 
1. You are often described by 
others as the most popular 
person they know. 
 
 
 
1. In confrontation situations 
you tend to display extreme 
stubbornness and will not back 
down even when the evidence  
is stacked against you. 
 
 
1. Security is one of your major 
goals in life. 
 
 
2. Often you display the self-
confidence and self-awareness 
that other people can only aspire 
to. 
 
2. You have tendency to make 
unfavourable generalizations 
about people/situations of which 
you know nothing about. 
 
2. While you have some personality 
weaknesses, you are generally  
able to compensate for them. 
3. You have such a broad 
spectrum of abilities that you 
could do almost anything in life. 
 
3. You can be very patronizing 
to those you see as inferior to 
yourself. 
 
 
3. At times you have serious doubts  
as to whether you have made the 
right decision or done the right 
thing. 
 
4. You are very socially skilled 
and as such can cope with the 
most difficult situations with 
apparent ease. 
 
 
4. When bored, you may often 
goad others into an argument 
just to “spice things up”.  
 
4. You prefer a certain amount of 
change and variety and become 
dissatisfied when hemmed in by 
restrictions and limitations.  
5. You enjoy helping those who 
need it.  
 
5. You are seldom constructively 
critical of your own actions. 
 
 
 
5. At times you are extroverted, 
affable, sociable while at other 
times you are introverted, wary, 
reserved. 
 
6. You inspire admiration and 
respect in all those you meet. 
6. You do not suffer criticism in 
any form with good grace. 
 
6. You have a great deal of 
unused capacity, which you have 
not turned to your advantage. 
7. You have aesthetic interests 
and appreciate the really 
beautiful aspects of life. 
 
7. You tend to overact or panic 
when in a stressful or potentially 
stressful situations. 
 
7. Some of your aspirations tend  
to be pretty unrealistic.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Results  
 
The primary objective of the analysis was to evaluate the ability of the newly developed 
STFS, to predict behavioural responses in a situation where participants received 
generalised personality feedback about themselves.   
 
First, factor and reliability analyses of the newly developed STFS are presented, 
followed by the relationship between STFS and chosen psychometric measures, after 
which the results of the analyses on the acceptance of Barnum type feedback in relation 
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to STFS and previous fraud victimisation are presented.   Finally, factors implicated in 
fraud reporting are considered. 
 
5.3.1 Results of the factor and reliability analyses  
Since the same sample was used to develop and test the reliability and validity of the 
STFS in Study 2 (Chapter 4), reliability analysis was repeated using the data from the 
present study.  The factor with the highest reliability was Compliance (α=.87), followed 
by Decision Time (α=.70), Impulsivity (α=.60) and Vigilance (α=.57).  Belief in Justice 
had the lowest reliability (α=.52), which is consistent with the results of the previous 
study, Study 2.  Overall, the reliability of the STFS subscales was the same for 
Compliance, slightly higher for Decision Time and Belief in Justice and slightly lower 
for Impulsivity and Vigilance, when compared to results of the reliability analyses in 
Study 2 (Table 4.4).   
 
To evaluate the item structure of the 26-item questionnaire, an exploratory factor 
analysis using principal axis factoring was conducted.  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy, 0.85 and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ² (325) = 2850.9, p< .001) 
indicated that the data were suitable for factor analysis.  A parallel analysis using Monte 
Carlo PCA indicated that only factors with a minimum Eigenvalue of above 1.48 should 
be retained, and inspection of the scree plot analysis suggested a point of inflection to 
occur in eigenvalues following the extraction of four factors (Pallant, 2013).  Oblique 
rotation was used to determine factor composition.  Initial item loadings for each of the 
five factors are shown in Appendix 1.7, Table 1.11.  An exploratory factor analysis 
using principal components extraction, retaining Eigenvalues 1.48 and above, yielded 
similar results (Appendix 1.7, Table 1.12).  
 
On the independent sample used in the present study, the factor structure of 4 out the 5 
subscales was confirmed from Study 2.  All questions were retained in their original 
parent factors for Compliance, Vigilance, Impulsivity and Belief in Justice, suggesting 
these factors are robust.  However the stability of the Decision Time subscale could not 
be established from this sample, as it could not be distinguished from the Impulsivity 
subscale.  This is something that further studies may want to evaluate.  
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5.3.2 Relationship between Susceptibility to Fraud scale (STFS), Gudjonson's 
(1989) Compliance scale, Sapp and Harrod's (1993) Locus of Control scale and age  
In order to examine the relationships between the STFS scale with existing measures of 
psychology compliance and locus of control, Pearson correlations were calculated 
(Table 5.5).  The STFS total score was positively correlated with Gudjonson's (1989) 
compliance scale, indicating that individuals who are more compliant may also be more 
susceptible to fraudulent messages.  There was also a strong significant positive 
correlation between the STFS Compliance subscale and Gudjonson's Compliance scale, 
a measure of concurrent validity for this study.  In addition, there was a significant 
positive correlation between the STFS Impulsivity subscale and a significant negative 
correlation between the STFS Vigilance subscale and Gudjonson's Compliance scale.  
This suggests that people who are more compliant are also more impulsive and less 
vigilant.  
 
 
Table 5.5  
 
Correlations between Susceptibility to Fraud scale (STFS), Gudjonson (1989) Compliance scale, Sapp 
and Harrod (1993) Locus of control scale (LOC) and age, N =424 
 
 Gudjonson 
Compliance  
    LOC  
   Internal 
  LOC 
  Chance 
  LOC 
  Powerful      
  others 
    Age 
 
STFS  
Compliance  
 
 
.75** 
 
-.30** 
 
.42** 
 
.43** 
 
 
-.32** 
STFS  
Vigilance 
 
-.16* 
 
.02 
 
-.03 
 
.05 
 
.20** 
STFS  
Impulsivity  
 
.28** 
 
-.09 
 
.24** 
 
.21** 
 
-.25** 
STFS  
Decision time  
 
-.13 
 
.12 
 
-.22** -.08 
 
.15* 
STFS 
Belief in justice  
 
.02 
 
.26** 
 
-.01 
 
-.11 
 
-.10 
STFS Total .61** -.19** .38** .30** -.38** 
Notes. 
* p< .0016 (2 -tailed) Minimum accepted p value for statistical significance (using Bonferroni adjustment for  
Type I error, 0.05 ÷ 30). 
** p< .001 (2-tailed). 
 
Significant relationships were found between the STFS total and the three components 
of Sapp and Harrod's (1993) Locus of Control scale.  Individuals who were more 
susceptible to fraud were also more likely to have external locus of control and showed 
greater belief in chance and the influence of powerful others.  This may suggest that 
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individuals who may be more susceptible to fraud are more likely to believe that their 
life events are out of their control.  They may also be more influenced by fraudulent 
communication, such as those pertaining to be from authority figures.  
 
The STFS belief in justice also correlated positively with an Internal Locus of Control, 
indicating that people who believe in justice with regards to fraud, are more likely to 
believe they have autonomy and personal control over events in their life.   
 
Significant relationships were also found between the STFS subscales and age 
suggesting that older participants reported a lower susceptibility to fraud, and seem to 
be less impulsive and less compliant.  Older participants were also more vigilant and 
spent more time making decisions.  
 
 
5.3.3 Susceptibility to fraud scale (STFS) and the acceptance of Barnum feedback 
as accurate of 'oneself' and 'other' 
Overall, participants gave higher ratings to positive (N=424, M = 6.08, SD = 1.56) and 
neutral (N=424, M = 6.77, SD = 1.22), than negative items (N=424, M = 4.63, SD = 
1.56), when asked to rate the items for how accurate they are of them.  However, 
accuracy ratings differed for the same items when participants were asked to rate the 
items for people in general.  Whilst the mean ratings were not that different for neutral 
items (N=424, M = 6.25, SD = .98), the accuracy ratings for positive items were lower 
(N=424, M = 5.60, SD = 1.06) and negative items were higher (N=424, M = 5.52, SD = 
1.25) for people in general than when rating for 'oneself'.  A comparison of mean 
accuracy ratings for each statement comparing self-assessments with people in general 
is shown in Table 5.6.  
 
Personality feedback has been found to be regarded as more accurate when presented as 
overall feedback instead of individual statements (Layne, 1978).   Presenting feedback 
sentence by sentence allows for deeper understanding on what statements may appear 
problematic for participants and enables more accurate analysis.  For example statement 
1 in Table 5.6 seems to be an anomaly as it seems to be rated as more accurate of others 
than oneself, which is not typically found for positive statements.  Therefore, this 
particular statement may be more extreme than others: You are often described by 
others as the most popular person they know. 
As such, it may be different to other positive statements.  
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Table 5.6  
 Mean accuracy ratings for positive, negative and neutral statements for ‘oneself’ and ‘other’,  
 N = 424, df = 423 
 
Feedback 
Statement 
     Self ratings     Other ratings     Mean    
    difference 
   
   t 
   
  p M SD M SD 
 
Positive 
       
1. 3.91 2.43 4.65 1.79 -0.75  -6.77 <.001 
2. 5.68 2.50 5.55 1.68 0.13   1.10  .274 
3. 5.73 2.51 5.28 1.75 0.45   4.05 <.001 
4. 5.98 2.55 5.70 1.67 0.28   2.30  .022 
5. 8.33 1.68 6.75 1.82 1.58 16.34 <.001 
6. 5.60 2.26 5.28 1.67 0.32   3.64 <.001 
7. 7.32 2.23 5.99 1.70 1.34 11.80 <.001 
Total  
 
 
Negative 
6.08 1.56 5.60 1.06 0.48   7.00 <.001 
1.   5.04 2.70 5.69 1.91 -0.66   -5.59 <.001 
2.  4.33 2.58 6.00 2.12 -1.67 -13.38 <.001 
3.  4.21 2.67 5.36 2.19 -1.16   -9.23 <.001 
4.   3.44 2.73 4.56 1.98 -1.12   -8.95 <.001 
5.   4.88 2.75 5.61 1.89 -0.72   -5.46 <.001 
6.   4.91 2.44 5.53 1.76 -0.62   -5.63 <.001 
7.   5.63 2.96 5.91 1.78 -0.29   -2.15   .032 
Total  
 
 
Neutral 
4.63 1.56 5.52 1.25 -0.89 -12.67 <.001 
1.   6.97 2.35 7.02 1.85 -0.05   -0.46 .649 
2.   6.66 1.96 6.10 1.63 0.56    5.67 <.001 
3.  6.97 2.32 6.08 1.85 0.89    9.03 <.001 
4.  6.94 2.31 6.04 1.65 0.90    8.03 <.001 
5.  7.89 2.41 6.32 1.95 1.57  14.31 <.001 
6.  6.69 2.21 6.33 1.73 0.36    3.81 <.001 
7.  
Total  
5.29 
6.77 
2.80 
1.22 
5.85 
6.25 
2.08 
0.98 
-0.56 
0.52 
 -4.89 
 10.43 
<.001 
<.001 
 
 
Correlations between subscales of the STFS and accuracy ratings for Barnum 
statements when rated for how accurate they are of 'oneself' are presented in Table 5.7.  
Overall, the STFS total score was positively correlated with negative Barnum feedback 
statements, suggesting that individuals who score higher on fraud susceptibility may 
more readily accept negative feedback about themselves.  When examining the STFS 
subscale scores, those who scored higher on compliance and impulsivity were more 
likely to accept negative feedback.  In contrast, individuals who take longer to make 
decisions and process information (STFS Decision Time subscale) assigned lower 
accuracy ratings to negative feedback.  There was a significant negative correlation 
between positive Barnum statements when rated for 'oneself' and STFS Compliance, 
suggesting that more compliant individuals tended to rate positive feedback items as 
being less true of them.  Additionally, there was a weak positive correlation between 
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STFS total and neutral Barnum statements, suggesting that more susceptible individuals 
were more likely to accept neutral or vague feedback as accurate descriptions of 
themselves.  
 
 
Table 5.7  
Correlations between Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS) and type of feedback: positive,  
negative and neutral when rated for 'oneself' 
 
  STFS 
Compliance 
STFS 
Vigilance 
STFS 
Impulsivity 
STFS 
Decision 
time  
STFS 
Belief in 
justice  
STFS 
Total 
 
Positive self 
 
 
 -.18** 
 
  .02 
 
   .06 
 
  -.08 
 
  .14 
 
 -.05 
Negative self 
 
  .21**  -.07    .31**   -.23**   .07   .31** 
Neutral self  .15   .10    .13   -.07   -.07   .10* 
 
Notes. 
* p< .0027 (2 -tailed) Minimum accepted p value for statistical significance (using Bonferroni  
adjustment for Type I error, 0.05 ÷ 18). 
** p< .001 (2-tailed). 
 
 
With regards to the mean accuracy ratings for feedback statements when asked how 
accurate they were for 'people in general', no significant relationships were found 
between any STFS subscales and ratings for positive statements.   
 
 
Table 5.8 
Correlations between Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS) and type of feedback: positive,  
negative and neutral when rated for 'other' 
 
 STFS 
Compliance 
STFS 
Vigilance 
STFS 
Impulsivity 
STFS 
Decision 
time  
STFS 
Belief in 
justice  
STFS 
Total 
Positive other 
 
   -.01   -.05    .11   -.09   .08   .07 
Negative other 
 
    .15*    .05    .20**   -.09   .00   .15* 
Neutral other     .08    .03    .14*   -.05   -.01   .09 
 
Notes. 
* p< .0027 (2 -tailed) Minimum accepted p value for statistical significance (using Bonferroni  
adjustment for Type I error, 0.05 ÷ 18). 
** p< .001 (2-tailed). 
 
There was a significant positive correlation between negative Barnum statements and 
STFS total, with those reporting higher susceptibility ratings being more likely to rate 
negative items as being more accurate of others.  The same pattern was also observed 
for negative feedback with the STFS compliance and impulsivity subscales.  A weak 
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positive correlation was also found between the STFS impulsivity subscale and mean 
accuracy ratings for neutral items when rated for 'people in general'.  
 
Overall, the pattern of results between STFS subscales and the perceived accuracy of 
feedback may suggest some link between susceptibility to fraud and participants' 
interpretation of Barnum statements.  Results suggest impulsivity and compliance were 
related to accepting negative feedback to be more accurate of both 'self' and 'other'. 
Compliant individuals also assigned lower accuracy ratings to positive items when 
applied to 'self' (but not others), suggesting that compliant individuals may be more 
likely to hold negative view of themselves.  
 
 
5.3.4 Agreement frequencies for type of Barnum feedback and STFS 
Whilst the mean accuracy ratings evaluated in the previous section, show the relative 
trend between the perception of feedback and fraud susceptibility, they do not provide 
an indication of the absolute degree to which participants accepted or did not accept 
feedback as true of them.  In order to evaluate how many people accepted the feedback 
as accurate of them for each statement valence type, accuracy ratings of 7 or above (on 
the1-10 scale) were classified as agreement and statements with ratings below 7 as non-
agreement.  This provides an overview of whether the items were accepted as good 
descriptions of individual's personality or rejected (Table 5.9).  
 
Table 5.9  
Number of participants agreeing with positive, negative and neutral Barnum personality feedback 
statements 
 
 
Total number  
of statements 
agreed with 
         Positive           Negative          Neutral  
 
Frequency 
 
Percent 
 
Frequency 
 
Percent 
 
Frequency 
 
Percent 
0 17  4.0  94 22.2  8 1.9 
1 56 13.2 105 24.8 14 3.3 
2 92 21.7  86 20.3 54 12.7 
3 79 18.6  64 15.1 69 16.3 
4 57 13.4  41   9.7 101 23.8 
5 48 11.3  21   5.0  79 18.6 
6 48 11.3   8   1.9  71 16.7 
7 27  6.4   5   1.2   28   6.6 
 
Total 
 
424 
 
100 
 
424 
 
100 
 
424 
 
100 
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Overall, people accepted a greater number of positive and neutral items as accurate 
descriptions of their personality than negative items.  The neutral statements, in 
particular were accepted more readily, possibly due to their assumed high base rate in 
the general population: 66% of the participants agreed with 4 or more neutral 
statements, 42% agreed with 4 or more positive statements, whereas only 18% of the 
participants agreed with 4 or more negative statements.  
 
The correlations between the Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS) and the number of 
positive, negative and neutral Barnum feedback items that participants agreed with 
shown in Table 5.10, showed a similar general pattern of results as those found for 
accuracy ratings for 'self' (Table 5.7).  
 
Table 5.10 
Correlations between Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS) and agreement frequencies for positive, 
negative and neutral Barnum personality feedback  
 
 STFS 
Compliance 
STFS 
Vigilance 
STFS 
Impulsivity 
STFS 
Decision 
time  
STFS 
Belief in 
justice  
 STFS 
 Total 
 
Positive statements  
 
-.14* 
 
 
.05 
 
.05 
 
-.07 
 
.12 
 
   -.05 
Negative statements .18** 
 
-.03 .27** -.20** .04 .25** 
Neutral statements .10 
 
.11 .13 -.04 -.07 .06 
Overall statements .05 .06 .20** -.13 .04 .11 
 
Notes. 
* p< .0020 (2 -tailed) Minimum accepted p value for statistical significance (using Bonferroni adjustment  
for Type I error, 0.05 ÷ 24). 
** p< .001 (2-tailed). 
 
There was a significant positive correlation between the overall fraud susceptibility and 
the number of negative feedback statements that participants agreed with, indicating 
that those who were more likely to be susceptible to fraud were also more likely to 
accept negative statements as a genuine description of their personality.  The same trend 
was also true for compliance and impulsivity, with individuals whom are more 
compliant and impulsive accepting a greater number of negative statements as accurate 
descriptions of their own personality. 
 
A significant negative correlation was found between decision time and agreement with 
negative statements, indicating that those who take time making decisions and 
processing information accepted fewer negative statements as true descriptions of their 
personality.  Additionally, there was a significant negative correlation between 
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compliance and acceptance of positive items, suggesting that compliant individuals 
were less likely to accept positive items as descriptions of their personality. The results 
also indicated a significant relationship between impulsivity and the total number of 
statements agreed with, suggesting more impulsive individuals were more likely to 
accept a greater number of feedback statements, of any valence, as being accurate 
descriptions of their personality.  
 
 
5.3.5 Susceptibility to fraud and accuracy ratings for Barnum personality feedback 
for ‘oneself’ and ‘other’  
In order to examine differences in the pattern of acceptance of positive, negative and 
neutral feedback for people who differed in their level of susceptibility to fraud, high 
and low susceptibility to fraud groups were created using total scores on STFS.  
 
The two groups were created using a median split of STFS total scores (low 
susceptibility group = 1- 2.92 and high susceptibility group = 2.92 - 5).  This gave a 
total of 229 participants in the low susceptibility group and 195 participants in the high 
susceptibility group, whose perception of feedback was then evaluated separately for 
self-ratings of accuracy and accuracy with respect to people in general.      
 
5.3.5.1 Ratings for self 
A 3x2 mixed ANOVA with type of feedback (positive, negative, neutral) when rated for 
‘self’ as a within-subject factor and fraud susceptibility (high, low) as a between-subject 
factor was conducted.  Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated for these data (χ2(2)=35.80, p < .001, W=.92), therefore the degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates.     
A significant main effect for valence of feedback (positive, negative and neutral) was 
observed (F(1.85, 780.39) = 343.72, p < .001, η2p  = .449) as well as for fraud susceptibility 
group (F(1, 422) = 6.37, p = .012, η2p  = .015).  In addition, there was a significant 
interaction between feedback valence and fraud susceptibility on ratings of feedback 
accuracy when evaluated by participants as being true of themselves (F(1.85, 780.39) = 
17.96, p < .001, η2p = .041).  The results indicate that the accuracy ratings for positive, 
negative and neutral Barnum statements differed between people in low and high 
susceptibility groups (Figure 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1 Accuracy ratings for personality feedback as true of 'oneself' for low and high fraud 
susceptibility groups 
 
 
Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment were used to examine differences in 
accuracy ratings between the high and low fraud susceptibility groups for each positive, 
negative and neutral feedback type.  Results indicated a significant difference between 
high and low susceptibility groups with regards to negative feedback (p < .001), with 
participants in the high susceptibility to fraud group being more likely to rate negative 
Barnum feedback as true of themselves (M = 5.06, 95% CI [4.84, 5.27]) than those in 
low susceptibility group (M = 4.27, 95% CI [4.07, 4.47]).   
 
No significant difference was found in mean accuracy ratings for positive feedback 
statements between low (M = 6.12, 95% CI [5.97, 6.37]) and high (M = 5.98, 95% CI 
[5.76, 6.20]) susceptibility groups (p = .215 ns).  Additionally, no significant difference 
was found in mean accuracy ratings for neutral statements between low (M = 6.69, 95% 
CI [6.53, 6.85]) and high (M = 6.87, 95% CI [6.70, 7.04]) susceptibility groups (p = 
.125 ns).   
These results suggest that more susceptible individuals are more accepting of negative 
feedback than less susceptible individuals whilst acceptance of positive and neutral 
feedback seems to not differ between the two groups.  
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5.3.5.2 Ratings for ‘other’ 
A 3x2 mixed ANOVA with type of feedback (positive, negative, neutral) when rated for 
‘other’ as a within-subject factor and fraud susceptibility (high, low) as a between-
subject factor was conducted.  Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated for these data (χ2(2)=70.34, p < .001, W=.85) therefore the 
degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates.      
A significant main effect for type of feedback (positive, negative and neutral) was 
observed (F(1.73, 731.45) = 79.79, p < .001, η2p  = .159).  The same was true for fraud 
susceptibility group (F(1, 422) = 6.88, p = .009, η2p  = .016), suggesting mean accuracy 
ratings when evaluated for 'others in general' differed depending on the type of feedback 
and participant's level of susceptibility to fraud.  However, there was no interaction 
between type of feedback and fraud susceptibility for accuracy ratings for ‘others’ 
(F(1.73, 731.45) = .57, p = .540(ns), η2p  = .001).  
 
Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment were used to examine differences in 
accuracy ratings between the high and low fraud susceptibility groups for each positive, 
negative and neutral feedback type.  
 
Figure 5.2 Accuracy ratings for personality feedback as true of 'other' for low and high fraud 
susceptibility groups 
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Results indicated a significant difference between high and low susceptibility groups 
with regards to negative feedback (p =.019), with participants in the high susceptibility 
to fraud group being more likely to rate negative Barnum feedback as true of others      
(M = 5.68, 95% CI [5.50, 5.85]) than those in low susceptibility group (M = 5.39, 95% 
CI [5.23, 5.55]).   
No significant difference was found in mean accuracy ratings for positive feedback 
statements between low (M = 5.53, 95% CI [5.39, 5.66]) and high (M = 5.69, 95% CI 
[5.54, 5.84]) susceptibility groups (p = .120 ns).  Additionally, no significant difference 
was found in mean accuracy ratings for neutral statements between low (M = 6.17, 95% 
CI [6.04, 6.30]) and high (M = 6.34, 95% CI [6.21, 6.48]) susceptibility groups            
(p = .069 ns).   
These results suggest that more susceptible individuals are more critical of others than 
less susceptible individuals.  The ratings of positive and neutral feedback did not differ 
between the two groups. 
 
5.3.6 Susceptibility to fraud scale (STFS) and self-bias in response to Barnum 
personality feedback  
Previous Barnum effect studies have found that participants assign higher scores to 
themselves on neutral and positive statements than compared to when asked to rate how 
applicable the same statements are to people in general, whilst for negative items, this 
pattern is reversed (Dana & Fouke, 1979; Davis 1997; Furnham &Varian, 1988; Layne, 
1978).  In her interview study with victims of fraud and those who reported receiving 
but not responding to fraudulent offers, Cross (2013) found that fraud victimisation is 
often blamed on the victim’s decision to respond and engage with fraudulent schemes, 
even in situations where there is evidence that the scam was highly sophisticated.  This 
may indicate that those who managed to avoid being defrauded in the past feel they are 
better at recognising fraudulent practices in general.  
 
In order to examine the extent to which participants recognise that the bogus feedback 
provided in this study could also be applicable to other people (i.e. to what extent they 
evaluated feedback accuracy for themselves as being different from others) and whether 
this would be related to fraud susceptibility, difference scores were created.  This was 
done by calculating the difference between the accuracy scores participants attributed to 
 162 
themselves and those they assigned to others for each of the 7 different positive, 
negative and neutral Barnum feedback statements.   
 
A difference value of zero would indicate that the individual feels they are no different 
to others, whereas a positive value indicates they evaluate themselves more highly than 
others and a negative value indicates they evaluate others more highly than themselves 
on the attribute under evaluation.  Mean (self - other) difference scores were then 
calculated for each participant for the 7 statements relating to each feedback valence 
type and compared between high and low fraud susceptibility groups.  
 
A 3x2 mixed ANOVA with type of feedback (positive, negative, neutral) as a within-
subject factor and fraud susceptibility (high, low) as a between-subject factor was 
conducted on the difference scores (self-other).  Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated for these data (χ2(2)=76.37, p < .001, 
W=.83), therefore the degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimates.      
A significant main effect was found for type of feedback (positive, negative and neutral) 
for difference scores (F(1.72, 723.90) = 188.97, p < .001, η2p  = .309).  Mean difference 
scores for each feedback valence type are shown in Figure 5.3.  
Positive (M = .46, 95% CI [.33, .60]) and neutral (M = .52, 95% CI [.43, .62]) statement 
difference scores had positive mean values, indicating people felt these were more 
accurate of themselves than others.  However, negative statements had negative mean 
difference scores (M = -.87, 95% CI [-1.01, -.73]), suggesting participants thought these 
tended to be more accurate of other people as opposed to themselves. 
 
The main effect for fraud susceptibility group (high and low) was not significant  
(F(1, 422) = 0.401, p = .527(ns), η2p  = .001), however a significant interaction was 
observed between fraud susceptibility and type of feedback (F(1.72, 723.90) = 13.93,  
p < .001, η2p  = .032).  Whilst both, low and high fraud susceptibility groups rated 
themselves as similar to others on neutral Barnum statements, the high susceptibility to 
fraud group had lower mean difference scores for positive feedback statements, but 
higher mean difference scores for negative statements than the low susceptibility to 
fraud group (Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.3 Personality feedback accuracy ratings difference (self – other) for low and high fraud 
susceptibility groups 
 
 
This suggests that those in the high susceptibility group were less likely to see 
themselves as superior to others than those in low susceptibility group (i.e. high 
susceptibility individuals reported negative feedback as more true of them, and reported 
themselves as being broadly similar to others with respect to neutral feedback items).  
 
Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment were used to examine difference 
scores between the two fraud susceptibility groups for each type of positive, negative 
and neutral feedback statements. 
 
The results for positive feedback statements suggest there was a significant difference 
between the high and low susceptibility groups (p = .011).  Individuals in the high 
susceptibility group were less likely to view themselves as superior to others (M = .29, 
95% CI [.09, .49]) than those in the low susceptibility group (M = .64, 95% CI [.46, 
.82]).  
 
The results for negative feedback statements suggest there was a significant difference 
between the high and low susceptibility groups (p < .001).  Individuals in the high 
susceptibility group were more likely to view others as superior to them (M = -.62, 95% 
CI [-.82, -.42]), than compared to the low high susceptibility group (M = -1.12, 95% CI 
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[-1.31, -.94]).  Taken together, these findings may suggest that people whom exhibit 
high susceptibility to fraud are less likely to regard themselves as superior to others.  
 
There were no differences between the high susceptibility to fraud group (M = .53, 95% 
CI [.38, -.67]) and low susceptibility to fraud group (M = .52, 95% CI [.39, -.66]), with 
respect to their interpretation of neutral feedback (p = .937), with the confidence 
intervals for both groups suggesting they did not regard themselves as different from 
others.      
 
5.3.7 Fraud victimisation and the acceptance of Barnum personality feedback  
To examine whether responses to Barnum personality feedback statements 
differentiated between those who had or had not previously been a victim of scams, the 
evaluation of self vs other difference scores for the positive, negative and neutral 
Barnum feedback was extended to consider scam victimization.  In the present sample, 
a total of 120 participants reported being defrauded in the past and 304 reported they 
have never been defrauded.  
 
A 3x2 mixed ANOVA with type of feedback (positive, negative, neutral) as a within-
subject factor and fraud victimisation (defrauded, never defrauded) as a between-subject 
factor was conducted on difference scores (self-other).  Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated for these data (χ2(2)=85.51, p < .001, 
W=.82), therefore the degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimates.      
A significant main effect for type of feedback was found (F(1.69, 712.95) = 167.32  p < 
.001, η2p  = .284).  The main effect of fraud victimisation (defrauded, never defrauded) 
was not significant (F(1, 422) = 0.34  p = .563(ns), η2p  =. 001), however a significant 
interaction between type of feedback and scam victimisation was found (F(1.69, 712.95)  = 
4.33, p = .019, η2p  = .010).  Mean difference scores for each fraud victimisation group 
are shown in Figure 5.4, for each type of feedback statement.  
 
Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustment were used to examine difference 
scores for those that had been defrauded in the past and those that have never been 
defrauded, for each type of positive, negative and neutral feedback. 
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Figure 5.4 Personality feedback accuracy ratings difference (self – other) for previous fraud victims and 
non-victims 
 
 
Results suggested there was a significant difference between the scam groups with 
respect to their evaluation of positive feedback (p = .017).  Individuals that reported 
being defrauded in the past were more likely to view themselves more favourably than 
others (M = .74, 95% CI [.49, .99]) compared to those that had never been defrauded  
(M = .38, 95% CI [.22, .53]).   
 
There were no differences between the two groups in their evaluation of negative 
Barnum statements.  Individuals that reported being defrauded in the past (M = -.95, 
95% CI [-1.21, -.69]) did not differ from those whom reported they had never been 
defrauded (M = -.87, 95% CI [-1.03, -.70]).  The same trend was found for neutral 
items. Those that reported being defrauded (M = .44, 95% CI [.26, .63]) did not differ 
from those that have never been defrauded (M = .56, 95% CI [.44, .67]).  
 
Together these results suggest that fraud victims may regard themselves as considering 
positive qualities to be a more accurate description of themselves than others, compared 
to non-victims, but that they do not differ in their interpretation of the accuracy of 
negative or neutral feedback compared to non-victims.   
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5.3.8 Susceptibility to fraud and previous fraud victimisation 
Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare those who have never been 
fraud victims and those that reported being defrauded in the past.  Based on this initial 
analysis, only one significant difference was found with previous victims of fraud 
scoring lower than non-victims on the Belief in Justice scale, suggesting that fraud 
victimisation influences one's perceived view of justice (Table 5.11).  
 
 
Table 5.11  
Comparison of groups ‘Non-victim’ (N=304) and “Previous fraud victim’ (N=120) and the subscales of 
Susceptibility to Fraud Scale using independent samples t-tests (422 df)  
 
Subscale 
 
Non-Victim Previous Fraud Victim t p Cohen's d 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Compliance 3.16 0.80 3.03 0.84 1.53 .13 ns 0.16 
Vigilance 3.64 0.65 3.73 0.63 -1.29 .20 ns     -0.14 
Impulsivity 3.21 0.75 3.26 0.71 -0.72 .47 ns     -0.07 
Decision time 3.54 0.76 3.49 0.75 0.58 .56 ns 0.07 
Belief in justice 2.98 0.63 2.82 0.74 2.19   .029 0.23 
 
 
 
Given that prior exposure to risk will not be the same for younger and older 
participants, and the fact that non-victims (M = 29.00, SD = 12.33) were found to be 
significantly younger than previous victims of fraud (M = 37.68, SD = 12.28); t(422) = 
-6.54, p <.001), the comparison of STFS subscales between victims and non-victims 
was repeated whilst controlling for participants’ ages.  Independent groups analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) was used to compare the two groups, with age as a covariate 
(Table 5.12).  
 
 
Table 5.12  
Comparison of groups ‘Never scammed’ (N=304) and “Scammed once or more’ (N=120) and the 
subscales of Susceptibility to Fraud Scale using one-way ANCOVA with age as a covariate (1,421 df) 
  
Subscale 
 
Non-Victim Previous Fraud Victim F p Partial 
eta-
square 
 
Adjusted 
Mean 
95% CI 
Lower  
Upper 
Adjusted 
Mean 
95% CI 
Lower  
Upper 
Compliance 3.11 3.02       3.20 3.16 3.01       3.30 0.27 .60ns .001 
Vigilance 3.66 3.59       3.74 3.67 3.55       3.78 0.01  .97ns    .000 
Impulsivity 3.17 3.09       3.25 3.37 3.24       3.50 6.34 .012 .015 
Decision time 3.56 3.48       3.65 3.43 3.29       3.57 2.63 .11ns .006 
Belief in justice 2.97 2.89       3.04 2.85 2.72       2.97 2.69 .10ns .006 
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After adjusting for age, a significant difference was found between victims and non-
victims with respect to Impulsivity, with previous victims of fraud being more 
impulsive than non-victims.  However, the effect of the Belief in justice was no longer 
significant. 
 
5.3.9 Factors involved in fraud reporting  
Out of 120 participants that reported being defrauded in the past, 47 stated they have 
reported the crime to the authorities and 73 stated they did not.  In order to explore 
differences in the attributes of those who do and do not report fraud independent 
samples t- tests were conducted comparing the two groups on each of the key dependent 
measures evaluated in the present study (Table 5.13). 
 
Table 5.13   
Personality differences among fraud victims that reported (N=47) and those that did not report (N=73) the 
victimisation (118 df)   
 
 
Measure 
 Reported   Did not report          
      t 
     
    p 
Cohen's  
      d 
 
Mean SD Mean SD 
 
STFS Compliance 
 
2.85 
 
0.83 
 
3.15 
 
0.82 
 
-1.94 
 
.055ns 
 
-0.36 
 
STFS Vigilance 3.78 0.59 3.70 0.65 0.70 .48ns 0.08 
 
STFS Impulsivity 3.12 0.79 3.36 0.64 -1.78 .078ns -0.33 
 
STFS Decision time 3.51 0.78 3.36 0.73 0.22 .83ns 0.20 
 
STFS Belief in Justice 2.66 0.80 2.92 0.68 -1.94 .055ns -0.35 
 
STFS Total 2.68 0.53 2.89 0.46 -2.20 .030 -0.42 
 
 
Gudjonson Compliance 53.68 12.83 59.49 12.09 -2.08 .040 -0.47 
 
LOC Internal 11.26 2.15 11.04 2.03 0.55 .58ns 0.11 
 
LOC Chance 7.47 2.62 8.19 2.31 -1.55 .12ns -0.29 
 
LOC Powerful others 6.57 2.95 8.03 2.37 -2.97 .004 -0.55 
 
 
Barnum positive DT 0.89 1.47 0.64 1.38 0.95 .35ns 0.16 
 
Barnum negative DT -1.20 1.86 -0.79 1.40 -1.38 .17ns -0.25 
 
Barnum neutral DT 0.53 1.41 0.39 1.04 0.62 .54ns 0.11 
   Note. 
   DT = Difference Total  
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There was a significant difference in SFTS total scores between those who did and did 
not report the fraud, with those who had higher susceptibility scores being less likely to 
report the fraud.   
 
A similar trend (to STFS total) was observed for the STFS Compliance and Belief in 
Justice subscales, with those who did not report the fraud being more compliant and 
more likely to believe in justice, than those who did not report the fraud, although these 
effects marginally failed to reach statistical significance (p=.055) 
 
With regards to Locus of control scale, a significant difference was found between those 
who reported and did not report being defrauded, with respect to their belief in powerful 
others.  Individuals who did not report being defrauded were more likely to believe in 
powerful others, than those who did report the fraud.  No other personality differences 
were observed between fraud reporters and non-reporters, and no differences in the 
interpretation of Barnum feedback were found between fraud reporters and non-
reporters. 
 
 
5.4 Barnum Study Discussion: Study 3 
 
The present study sought to establish whether people who are more susceptible to fraud, 
as indicated by their responses to the STFS would be more inclined to exhibit 
stereotypical Barnum effect responses (i.e. being more accepting of positive and neutral 
feedback and rejecting negative feedback) than those who are less susceptible.   
 
The present study was conducted using an online survey, in order to collect the 
responses to psychometric measures and feedback ratings at the same time, minimising 
attrition (also Cupperman et al., 2014).   Studying the Barnum effect typically involves 
deception, which has ethical implications.  Using the survey method ameliorated some 
of the ethical implications, as the participants were given their personal scores on one of 
the measures they completed at the end of the survey, which is something they were 
promised at the beginning of the study.  In the past, studies have tested if personality 
feedback would be rated differently when provided in oral rather than written form 
(Snyder & Shenkel, 1976), computer generated as opposed to interpreted by an expert 
(Fletcher et al., 1996) with no differences reported.  Therefore, studies wishing to utilise 
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the Barnum effect paradigm may find that using an online survey is a good way to 
collect responses at the same time and offer participants bona-fine personality feedback 
they were promised, minimising potential harm.  
 
In the present study, the Barnum effect was able to differentiate between previous fraud 
victims and non-victims as well as low and high susceptibility groups, although not in 
the way the study predicted.  Nevertheless, it is suggested that the Barnum effect may 
be a used as a measure of fraud susceptibility.  
 
Comparing previous fraud victims to non-victims, the present study found that fraud 
victimisation influences one's perceived view of justice, with greater belief in justice 
reported by non-victims.  After controlling for age, the results indicated that previous 
fraud victims tend to be more impulsive, however, the effect of Belief in Justice was no 
longer significant.   
 
5.4.1 Susceptibility to fraud and the Barnum effect 
Overall, the ratings of the Barnum type personality feedback followed the expected 
pattern.  Positive and neutral personality statements were accepted as more accurate of 
oneself and negative items as less accurate, suggesting that the experimental procedure 
used was successful in invoking the Barnum effect.  However, individuals that were 
more susceptible to fraud were more likely to assign higher accuracy ratings to negative 
items when rating the accuracy of feedback for oneself, than those in the low 
susceptibility group.  They also assigned higher accuracy to negative items when rating 
the same feedback for how applicable it is to people in general, than low susceptibility 
group.  These results suggest that individuals that are more susceptible to fraud may be 
more self-deprecating.  Instead of viewing those that exhibit susceptibility to fraud as 
gullible, they may be seen as more self-critical, as they are aware of their flaws.  
 
When it came to difference scores (self-other), calculated in order to measure self-bias 
(i.e. the degree to which participants felt they were better or worse than people in 
general), individuals in the high susceptibility group were less likely to see themselves 
as superior to others than those in low susceptibility group.  These results suggest that 
the hypothesis, that individuals more susceptible to fraud will be more likely to see 
themselves as superior to others, is rejected.   
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The results suggested that there may be a link between the subscales of the STFS and 
the perceived accuracy of the personality statements, with more compliant and 
impulsive individuals rating negative personality feedback as more accurate of both 
'self' and 'other'.  Those that take time to consider their decisions agreed with fewer 
negative statements.  Additionally, individuals who were more impulsive were also 
more likely to accept a greater number of feedback statements as accurate descriptions 
of their personality, irrespective of valence, which may suggest that, in a situation that 
could be a scam, they may be less likely to scrutinise information given to them.  
 
As well as rating the negative feedback as more accurate of themselves and others, 
compliant individuals also assigned lower accuracy ratings to positive items when rating 
the feedback for oneself but not for others.  These results suggest that compliant 
individuals may have a more negative perception of themselves.  This is consistent with 
previous research, which found a positive relationship between compliance and low 
self-esteem, as well as state and trait anxiety, paranoia and suspiciousness (Gudjonsson, 
Sigurdsson, Brynjólfsdóttir & Hreinsdóttir, 2002).  Furthermore, Gudjonsson, et al. 
(2002) posit that compliant individuals may disagree with things they consciously 
decide to go along with and as such, compliance is different to suggestibility.  
Additionally, Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) argue that compliant individuals are aware 
they are being encouraged to respond in a certain way.  Taken together, the results could 
suggest that compliant individuals may be more susceptible to fraud even in cases 
where they are aware the situation they found themselves in is harmful to them and feel 
they have no control.  This realisation may be responsible for feelings of low self-
esteem and the way they view themselves, therefore the acceptance of negative Barnum 
type personality feedback in compliant individuals may be down to low self-esteem.  
Additionally, research by Fischer et al., (2013) found a negative association between 
compliance and feelings of superiority and suggested that this might be down to fraud 
victimisation leading to erosion of self-worth.   This may in part, explain the findings, 
that people who are more susceptible to fraud feel they are inferior to others.   
 
The present data may also help to explain some of the findings in the first study, as 
some participants reported being targeted at times when they were down and their self-
esteem was already suffering.  Compliance may further exacerbate this.  Mosher (1965) 
found that participants with higher scores on Marlowe Crown scale, which measures 
social desirability, were more likely to accept negative feedback.  Therefore, the 
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acceptance of negative items may be a unique feature of individuals that are more 
compliant or eager to please and therefore, more susceptible to persuasion by others.  
  
5.4.2 Previous fraud victimisation and the Barnum effect 
The present study found that participants that reported being defrauded in the past rated 
positive feedback as more accurate of themselves than of others, than non-victims did, 
suggesting they hold a more favourable view of themselves than they do of others.  No 
differences were found for negative and neutral items, therefore the hypothesis that the 
Barnum effect would predict previous fraud victimisation was supported, but only in 
part.  These findings regarding the victims of fraud having an overly positive view of 
self may mean they may be prone to flattery.  For example, previous research found that 
proneness to flattery could be exploited by scammers (Lea et al., 2009; Whitty, 2013).  
Therefore, overly positive view of self may indicate vulnerability to fraud in certain 
fraudulent situations.   
 
These findings were somewhat surprising, as it was expected that susceptible 
individuals would show the same pattern as victims of fraud, be more ‘gullible’ and 
more likely to fall for the Barnum effect (i.e. assigning higher ratings to positive items 
and lower ratings to negative items) than less susceptible individuals.  In contrast, it 
seems that susceptible individuals are more self-deprecating.  One explanation for these 
results may be that those previously defrauded may not be susceptible to fraud.  For 
example, frauds differ in the amount of cooperation they require from the victim from 
none to quite extensive cooperation (Titus and Gover 2001).  Victims of ID fraud often 
have no communication with the scammer; therefore, their victimisation may not be 
down to individual characteristics.  Scammers may steal documents or cards of the 
victim and use them for fraudulent activities (Button et al., 2009a).  Frauds also differ in 
how plausible and credible they appear.  For example, highly sophisticated frauds, such 
as spear phishing attacks can be very convincing due to the amount of effort the 
scammer may put in sourcing specific information about the victim, in order to deceive 
(Parmar, 2012), therefore they may affect individuals that would not otherwise be 
vulnerable to fraud.  Other types of fraud, such as making a purchase online from what 
seems like a legitimate business and not receiving the goods paid for, also may not 
indicate individual's susceptibility to fraud but may end in fraud victimisation.  This was 
evident in the fact that some of those who self-reported being defrauded in the past were 
in the low susceptibility group.  Although participants were asked about prior 
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victimisation, the study failed to enquire about the details of the fraud that took place.  
This information may have provided an insight into why previous fraud victims 
responded differently to the Barnum type feedback than individuals susceptible to fraud. 
Another reason for these results could be that some previous fraud victims changed their 
behaviour or attitudes after being defrauded, making them less susceptible to fraud as a 
result.   
 
It is also possible that individuals in the high susceptibility group may be aware of their 
susceptibility and were able to avoid being defrauded as a result.  As younger 
individuals were more likely to be susceptible to fraud, and given the fact that fraud 
victims in this study tended to be older, previous victimisation may be down to the 
number of fraudulent offers received across one’s lifespan, with younger participants 
less likely to receive as many fraudulent offers as those that are older.  
 
5.4.3 Personality factors in susceptibility to fraud  
Greater fraud susceptibility was positively related to Gudjonson's (1989) Compliance 
(GCS) scale (a measure of concurrent validity), as was Compliance, a subscale of STFS.  
Additionally, compliant individuals were also more impulsive and less vigilant.  The 
results suggest that individuals who are more susceptible to fraud may be more likely to 
accede to the will of others. 
 
Previous studies (Cupperman et al., 2014; Furnham, 1989; Snyder & Larson, 1972) 
have found a link between the acceptance of bogus personality feedback and an external 
locus of control, therefore a Locus of Control measure (Sapp & Harrod, 1993) was used 
in order to examine the relationship between STFS and locus of control.   Individuals 
who were more susceptible to fraud were more likely to have an external locus of 
control (i.e. believe that their life events are out of their control), as did compliant 
individuals.  They were also more likely to believe in powerful others and chance, 
which means that they may be more influenced by authority cues in fraudulent 
communication or more likely to believe that luck in on their side, which could be 
exploited by various scams (e.g. fake lotteries or free prizes).  
 
The results also indicated that individuals, who believe in justice with regards to fraud, 
were more likely to have an internal locus of control.   However, as previous fraud 
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victimisation was found to influence one’s perceived view of justice, these results may 
mean that perceived control over one’s life changes following fraud victimisation.  
 
 
5.5 Future considerations 
 
The present study is the first research study to use the Barnum effect as a measure of 
fraud susceptibility.   Although it was predicted that participants with higher scores on 
the STFS would exhibit the same pattern of Barnum type feedback acceptance as 
previous fraud victims, this was not the case.  Participants that were more susceptible to 
fraud were more likely to accept negative feedback as true descriptions of their own 
personality, and this was especially true of more compliant and impulsive individuals.  
However, the opposite was true for previous fraud victims, who were more likely to 
accept positive statements as true descriptions of their personality.   One possible reason 
for this disparity may be that some fraud victims may not be susceptible to fraud, which 
could be down to becoming more vigilant following fraud victimisation.  Another 
possible reason for these results is that while some people may be more susceptible to 
fraudulent offers, they may be aware of it and are able to compensate for this.  This was 
observed in an interview study, Study 1 in this programme of research, where one of the 
participants reported being aware of his inability to say no, due to which he devised a 
strategy to protect himself from situations that may exploit this.  
 
Due to low participant numbers, the interaction between susceptibility, victimisation 
and the acceptance of differently valenced personality feedback could not be observed, 
therefore future studies may wish to replicate the study addressing this limitation. 
 
Future studies may also wish to ask participants to report details of previous 
victimisation, in order to examine if fraud susceptibility varies across different types of 
frauds and length of communication with the scammer (i.e. identity fraud versus scams 
that require lengthy communication or greater cooperation with the scammer) and how 
this may impact acceptance of Barnum type personality feedback.  Additionally, future 
studies may also want to examine the role of self-esteem and fraud susceptibility, 
especially with regards to compliance and the acceptance of the negative feedback.    
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The present study was seen as an opportunity to test the reliability of the STFS on an 
independent sample.  Results of the reliability analysis indicated reliability of the 
Compliance scale to be exactly the same as in Study 2 (Chapter 4).  However, reliability 
of the Decision Time subscale was higher, while the reliability of Vigilance and 
Impulsivity subscales was lower in the present study.  Although reliability for Belief in 
Justice was higher than in Study 2, its reliability was still relatively low (α=.57) and it 
remained the least reliable factor.  
 
The results of the factor analysis indicated that the factor structure of four out the five 
scales was confirmed from the previous study, Study 2; Compliance, Vigilance, 
Impulsivity and Belief in Justice.  This suggests that those factors may be reasonably 
robust.  However the stability of the Decision Time subscale could not be established 
from this sample due to the fact that it could not be distinguished from the Impulsivity 
subscale.  Therefore, future studies may wish to evaluate the robustness of the STFS 
subscales, especially Belief in Justice, which did not yield any interesting results in the 
present study.  Due to the low reliability of this factor, it would be of value for future 
studies to either develop it further or omit it from the scale.  
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
In the present study, the Barnum effect paradigm was used to explore its potential as a 
measure that could be used to differentiate between victims and non-victims of fraud, in 
order to examine its applicability as a tool for assessing the predictive validity of the 
newly developed STFS scale.  As such, the present study was the first to use the 
Barnum effect as a proxy scam situation.  The Barnum effect predicted previous fraud 
victimisation, with those previously defrauded being more likely to accept positive 
Barnum type feedback items as accurate descriptions of their personality than non-
victims, indicating possible propensity to flattery.  Although the study yielded 
conflicting results; those susceptible to fraud were more likely to rate negative Barnum 
type feedback items as accurate descriptions of their personality than those who were 
less susceptible, whilst previous fraud victims rated positive items as more accurate than 
non-victims, possible explanations for this have been put forward.  Despite this, the 
present study was able to contribute new knowledge to research utilising the Barnum 
effect paradigm, specifically that high susceptibility to fraud, as measured by the 
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Susceptibility to Fraud Scale is connected to the acceptance of the negatively valenced 
Barnum type feedback items.  Additionally, individuals in the high fraud susceptibility 
group were more likely to view others as superior to them than those in the low fraud 
susceptibility group and were less likely to report fraud victimisation to the authorities, 
which may be down to the self-deprecation.  By asking participants to rate each 
feedback statement for accuracy, instead of presenting the feedback as a whole, the 
present study was able to identify that individuals with higher scores on the STFS 
Impulsivity subscale were more likely to agree with any feedback, irrespective of 
valence.  This suggests that asking participants to rate the feedback by evaluating each 
statement instead of an overall feedback may be more effective in measuring agreement 
with Barnum type feedback.  
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6.1 Introduction to general discussion  
 
This chapter presents a discussion of the research findings in this thesis.  First, aims and 
rationale for the research are presented, followed by short summaries of the three 
studies forming the programme of this research.  Summary of the research findings are 
presented and discussed next.  The implications of this research are presented, including 
the recommendations for future research.  Finally, limitations of this research are 
outlined.  
 
6.2 Aims and rationale for the research  
Annual Fraud Indicator figures for recent years suggest that fraud is on the rise (Table 
2.1, Chapter 2).  Current fraud prevention measures are not always effective, however, 
there is an opportunity to learn from the victims of fraud, learn about the complexity of 
fraudulent situations, scam correspondence, persuasion techniques and persuasive lures 
that scammers are good at designing.  But is it enough?  Scam prevention measures are 
frequently ignored because of their abundance, especially online (Egelman et al., 2008; 
Frauenstein & Flowerday, 2016; Furnell & Thompson, 2009).  There is evidence that 
security and privacy attitudes may be down to individual differences and that designing 
security warnings that address users’ individual characteristics may be beneficial 
(Egelman & Peer, 2015).  This may also be the case for other fraud warnings.  While 
scammers are getting increasingly smarter, targeting specific victims, exploiting specific 
human attributes, fraud prevention is yet to start considering individual differences in 
the fight against fraud.  This programme of research set to investigate individual 
characteristics in vulnerability to fraudulent offers and to create a valid and reliable 
psychometric measure that would be able to pinpoint potential areas of vulnerability to 
fraud.  The research expands on the research of Modic and Lea (2012, 2013) exploring 
susceptibility to persuasion and its relation to scam compliance.   
In order to do this, three separate studies were conducted: 
 
(i) Identify factors and personal attributes that may contribute to making judgment 
errors in scam situations by conducting interviews with victims and near victims of 
fraud (Study1, Chapter 3).  
 
(ii) Construct and develop a psychometric questionnaire designed to indicate an area 
of individual susceptibility to fraudulent offers (Study 2, Chapter 4).  
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(iii) Test the utility of the newly developed measure of fraud on a proxy scam 
situation (Study 3, Chapter 5).  
 
 
6.3 Summary of research studies 
  
6.3.1 Interview study: Study 1 
The first study in this programme of research, described in Chapter 3, explored the scam 
process, through the narratives of fraud victims, taking care to also consider the present 
circumstances of each victim.  Through the participants’ stories, three distinct stages of 
a scam process emerged, each with its own themes and subthemes, relevant to 
understanding the nuances of fraud victimisation, fraud reporting and the psychological 
impact on victims.  Interviews have been found to be an effective way of gathering data 
on the topic of fraud, which can be used in variety of ways (Button et al., 2013; Cross, 
2013, 2015; Fischer et al., 2013; Lea et al., 2009; Olivier et al., 2015; Whitty, 2013).  
The analytical approach was based on thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).   
 
6.3.2 Scale development study: Study 2 
Chapter 4 describes the stages involved in the development of the Susceptibility to 
Fraud Scale (STFS).  The first stage was based on the findings of the previous study, 
Study 1, as well as previous research looking into susceptibility to persuasion and errors 
in judgments (Lea et al., 2009; Modic & Lea, 2012, 2013), theoretical models of 
Gullible Action and Foolish Action (Greenspan, 2008, 2009) and the Model of 
Scamming Vulnerability (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001).  In this stage, a pool of 
questionnaire items was generated and tested by asking a range of content experts to 
rate each question for applicability to fraud and provide feedback.  The chosen 
questionnaire items were distributed to participants via an online survey in the second 
stage of the study, along with examples of genuine and phishing email correspondence, 
Modic and Lea’s (2013) Susceptibility to Persuasion scale and hypothetical scam 
scenarios (Modic & Lea, 2012).  An exploratory factor analysis using principal 
component extraction was conducted in order to identify the number of factors in the 
data.  The final scale yielded five subscales of susceptibility to fraud; Compliance, 
Implusvity, Vigilance, Decision time and Belief in justice.  The newly developed 
 179 
measure was tested against examples of genuine and phishing email correspondence and 
hypothetical scam scenarios.  
 
6.3.3 The Barnum effect study: Study 3 
In the final study in this programme of research, the utility of the scale was tested using 
the Barnum effect as a proxy scam situation.  The Barnum effect pertains to the 
acceptance of vague or neutral personality feedback that could apply to anyone as 
accurate description of one’s personality (Forer, 1949).  Manipulations include asking 
participants to rate the same feedback for how applicable it is to people in general 
(Johnson et al., 1985; Snyder & Larson, 1972) as well as including positively and 
negatively valenced feedback (Dana & Fouke, 1979; Furnham & Varian, 1988; Layne, 
1978).  In this study, the newly developed Susceptibility to Fraud Scale was distributed 
to participants along with Gudjonson (1984) Compliance scale and Sapp and Harrod 
(1993) Locus of Control scale.  Participants were made to believe that, following the 
psychometric measures; they would be given their own personality feedback.  Instead, 
all participants received the same, Barnum type personality feedback.  The study 
included a series of analyses including looking into differences between high and low 
fraud susceptibility groups and non-victims and previous victims of fraud, as well as 
relationships between the subscales of the STFS and the agreement with Barnum type 
personality feedback.  
 
 
6.4 Summary of the findings  
 
The primary aim of this thesis was to construct a valid measure of susceptibility to 
fraud, in order to identify and evaluate the key components of fraud vulnerability.  
The initial framework was based on the findings of the interview study with victims of 
fraud and the review of different theoretical models and previous fraud literature.   
The interview study (Chapter 3) identified three stages of scam compliance from the 
perspective of the victim, which are: Precursors (e.g. situational factors), Commitment 
(e.g. factors that may influence scam compliance after the initial engagement) and 
Aftermath (e.g. processes that follow fraud victimisation).  From this study, various 
themes emerged: 
• Time constraints, such as urgency and lack of time to consider information 
• Dissatisfaction with one’s present circumstances 
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• Social influence 
• Factors pertaining to the perpetrator, such as credibility, similarity and 
likeability, or limiting the availability of the offer 
• Factors pertaining to the victim, such as excitement at the prospect of the offer, 
lack of scrutiny of information and social norms 
• Psychological and financial consequences 
• Forming avoidance strategies  
• Seeking resolution and justice  
• Loss of trust 
 
The results demonstrated that there were many themes consistent with previous fraud 
literature, on techniques used by fraudsters, such as: limited availability or requiring an 
urgent response (Cialdini, 2001; Lea et al., 2009; Kramer & Carroll, 2009), and liking 
and similarity (Cialdini, 2011; Lea et al., 2009; Silvia, 2005).  Additionally, individual 
characteristics that may influence compliance with fraudulent offers, such as: lack of 
self-control and impulsivity driven by excitement (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2011; 
Holtfreter et al., 2010; Lea et al., 2009; Modic & Lea, 2012, 2013), low motivation for 
information processing (Blythe et al., 2011; Lea et al., 2009; Kauffman et al., 1999) or 
social influence (Modic & Lea, 2013).  Additionally, new themes emerged, such as 
formation of strategies for fraud avoidance, specifically those addressing vulnerability 
to fraud based on individual attributes and loss of trust and lack of empathy following 
fraud victimisation.  Although previous research identified scam trajectories (Button et 
al., 2013; Whitty, 2013) and stages of the fraud process from the perspective of the 
perpetrator (Shadel & Pak, 2007), the interview study in this research programme was 
possibly the first to identify distinct stages fraud victims go through during the scam 
process, organising the factors that underlie them according to stage, and using the 
results for the construction of a psychometric measure.  Although the final stage of the 
fraud process, the Aftermath, offered limited contribution to the construction of the 
scale (e.g. strategies constructed in order to compensate for vulnerability), it supported 
previous findings on the effects of fraud on victims (Button et al., 2013; Cross et al., 
2014; Titus & Gover, 2001), reaffirming the need for better preventative measures. 
 
The scale development study, Study 2 was based on the findings of the interview study 
with victims of fraud and the review of different theoretical models and previous fraud 
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literature (Lea et al., 2009; Modic & Lea, 2012, 2013).  Findings from this study, 
regarding the subscales of the newly developed measure, supported theoretical models 
of Scamming Vulnerability (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001) and Gullible Action 
(Greenspan, 2009).  The Model of Scamming Vulnerability identified self-control as a 
moderator of scamming vulnerability under the visceral influence (Lanngenderfer & 
Shimp, 2001), which was confirmed by Impulsivity, a subscale of the STFS.  Inability 
to control one’s impulses and lack of self-control have also been mentioned as factors 
influencing scam compliance, as they compromise decision-making (Bayard et al., 
2011; Holtfreter et al., 2010, 2015; Modic & Lea, 2012, 2013; Pratt et al., 2014).  
These findings also support a component of the Gullible Action Model (Greenspan, 
2009), referring to state.  More specifically, decisions made under the influence of 
strong emotions (hot cognition).   
 
The model of Gullible Action also supported the findings referring to a subscale of the 
STFS concerned with delaying decisions, Decision Time, particularly that, when 
encountering misleading situations, delaying decisions may protect from gullible acts 
(Greenspan, 2009).  
 
There were also topics, which arose from the fraud literature, such as liking and 
similarity and social norms (Cialdini, 2001; Lea et al., 2009; Whitty, 2013), such as not 
wanting to disappoint people, complying when pressured to make a decision, which 
ended up being part of the Compliance subscale.  The final two subscales, Vigilance 
and Belief in Justice refer to literature on trust and vigilance in relation to predicting 
behaviour of others (Markóczy, 2003) and attitudes about justice and fraud victims, 
based on the findings of the interview study (Chapter 3), and fraud research (Cross, 
2013; Lea et al., 2009).   Comparing the newly developed STFS to an existing measure 
of Susceptibility to Persuasion (Modic & Lea, 2013), the first scale of its kind to 
measure concepts relating to scam compliance, demonstrated the concurrent validity of 
the STFS.   
To test the utility of the STFS in Study 2, two email examples from a well-known 
technology company were used as test stimuli in order to examine participants' ability to 
correctly identify genuine email correspondence from a phishing email attempt. The 
results indicated that vigilant individuals and those that invest more time in making 
decisions were better at recognising phishing correspondence, whilst those with higher 
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scores on Compliance, Impulsivity and Belief in justice were less able to do so, 
indicating that the scale has a good predictive validity when it comes to phishing scams.  
In Study 3, the Barnum effect was used as a proxy scam situation in order to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the STFS as an indicator of fraud susceptibility.  In order to do this, 
high and low susceptibility groups were created.  Participants in the high susceptibility 
group were less likely to see themselves as superior to others than those in low 
susceptibility group (i.e. high susceptibility individuals reported negative feedback as 
more true of them than those in low susceptibility group), driven primarily by 
Compliance and Impulsivity.  
The study (Study 3) also found that previous fraud victims were more likely to assign 
higher scores to positive items than non-victims, but did not differ in their interpretation 
of the accuracy of negative or neutral feedback compared to non-victims.  These results 
suggest that fraud victims may regard themselves as considering positive qualities to be 
a more accurate description of themselves than others, which may indicate fraud 
vulnerability in certain contexts.  For example, overconfidence has been found to lead to 
judgment errors (Lea et al., 2009).  
As it was expected that susceptible individuals would show the same pattern as victims 
of fraud, these conflicting results were unexpected, however, there may be an 
explanation for these results.  Previous victimisation can in some cases be an indicator 
of future vulnerability, as some fraud victims have demonstrated an attraction to 
fraudulent offers (Lea et al., 2009), or are particularly vulnerable after being defrauded 
that it leads to future victimisation (Buchanan & Whitty, 2014; Whitty & Buchanan, 
2016).  However, it could be argued that not all victims are the same in that respect.  For 
example, fraud affects a great number of people and can be extremely sophisticated in 
the way it is executed.  Fraud can also be perpetrated without cooperation of the victim.  
Therefore, previous victimisation may not be a good indication of fraud vulnerability. 
This was supported by the findings, which indicated that participants who self-reported 
being defrauded previously were split between high and low susceptibility groups.  
Prior fraud victimisation may also result in greater vigilance.  This was supported by the 
findings of the interview study, Study 1, with the majority of participants reporting that 
they have become aware of people’s motives after the scam, which made them more 
diligent in checking information and questioning possible implications.  The act of 
being scammed may therefore change someone's susceptibility to fraud in general. 
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Finally, fraud susceptibility may not always result in fraud victimisation.  For example, 
one can be susceptible to fraud but also aware of this and able to compensate for it.  
This was also supported by the findings from Study 1.  Therefore, previous fraud 
victimisation may not be a good indicator of general susceptibility to fraud.  
6.4.1 Susceptibility to Fraud Scale 
In the following sections, results of the Study 2 (Chapter 4) and Study 3 (Chapter 5) are 
discussed concurrently, in order to discuss the utility of the STFS subscales.  Overview 
of the main research findings is shown in Table 6.1.   
 
Table 6.1 Overview of research findings, with regards to subscales of the STFS 
 
Subscale Study 2, Chapter 4 Study 3, Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
Previous 
victim 
Responded 
to scam 
offers in the 
past? 
Able to 
recognise 
phishing 
attempt? 
Previous 
victim 
Overall 
acceptance 
of Barnum 
feedback 
Acceptance of 
negative 
Barnum 
feedback 
 
Compliance 
 
(+)* 
  
(-) 
   
(+) 
Impulsivity (+)* (+) (-) (+)* (+) (+) 
Vigilance   (+)    
Decision time (-)* (-) (+)   (-) 
Belief in justice      (-)  (-) (-)   
Notes. 
(+) more likely to 
(-) less likely to 
* after controlling for age 
 
 
6.4.1.1 STFS Compliance and Impulsivity as indicators of fraud vulnerability 
Compliance, the subscale of the newly developed STFS scale, was found to be the best 
predictor of susceptibility to fraud.  It was the factor with the strongest internal 
reliability (α=.87) and accounted for the largest proportion of the variance (16.41%) in 
STFS (Study 2, Chapter 4).  Compliance predicted incorrect identification of phishing 
correspondence as genuine and also accounted for variations in previous fraud 
victimisation in Study 2.  
 
In the Barnum Effect study (Study 3), compliant individuals assigned higher ratings for 
negative personality feedback items and lower ratings for positive personality feedback 
items than individuals who are less compliant.  They were also less likely to see 
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themselves as superior to others, suggesting that individuals with higher scores on this 
factor may have a more negative view of self.  Additionally, compliant individuals were 
also more likely to have an external Locus of Control, believe in chance and powerful 
others (Sapp & Harrod, 1993), which could indicate potential fraud vulnerability.  For 
example, authority cues are frequently used in scam correspondence, therefore someone 
who believes in powerful others may be more influenced by communication purporting 
to be from credible authority sources.  Additionally, there was a strong significant 
positive correlation between the STFS Compliance subscale and Gudjonson's (1989) 
Compliance scale, a measure of concurrent validity for Study 3.   
The relationship between Compliance and a negative view of self supports the research 
by Gudjonson et al. (2002), whose findings indicated a positive relationship between 
compliance and low self-esteem as well as Fischer et al. (2013), who found a negative 
association between compliance and feelings of superiority.  However, it is not clear if 
low self-esteem governs compliance or vice versa.   Gudjonson et al. (2002) suggested 
that compliant individuals disagree with things they consciously decide to go along 
with.  This awareness of one's weakness may lead to a negative view of the self.  
Alternatively, low self-esteem may be responsible for greater compliance in some 
situations.  In the first study of this programme of research, some participants reported 
being vulnerable at the time they were defrauded and explicitly connected this 
vulnerability with their consequent compliance with a scam, despite having concerns at 
the time.  One participant remembered feeling so desperate and eager to find a job, that 
even if she had found out about the company being fraudulent prior to paying a fee for a 
training pack, she may have gone ahead just in case it did work out.  This may suggest 
that when people are at a low ebb in their lives and feel vulnerable, they are more likely 
to take risks.  Participants that were defrauded when in difficult circumstances in their 
lives also seem to experience more psychological distress, which may contribute to 
reduced self-esteem, which in turn may make them more vulnerable to fraud.  
 
The Compliance subscale is, therefore, a good indicator of susceptibility to fraud.  It 
may also be a good indicator of one's self-esteem and vice versa.  Compliance, as a 
construct, has not been extensively explored in relation to fraud, therefore, future 
studies may want to consider the relationship between self-esteem and compliance in 
relation to fraud vulnerability.  
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Lack of self-control has been found to be a factor implicated in vulnerability to 
fraudulent offers (Holtfreter et al., 2010, 2015; Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001; Lea et al., 
2009; Modic & Lea, 2013) and this is especially pronounced when the victimisation 
happens online (Pratt et al., 2014).  Additionally, Modic and Lea (2012) found 
premeditation (a facet of an impulsivity scale) to be a good predictor of scam 
compliance, with those who are not able to foresee the consequences more likely to 
engage with fraudulent offers.  Impulsivity has also been found to affect decision-
making process, with those that are more impulsive being more likely to take risks 
(Frederick, 2005) and purchase things from unknown vendors after receiving 
unsolicited email (Holtfreter et al., 2015).  
 
The results of the Study 2 and 3 supported previous research on lack of self-control.  
Impulsivity was the second strongest predictor of susceptibility to fraud (explaining the 
5.50% of the variance in STFS) with satisfactory internal reliability (α=.73).  Scores on 
the Impulsivity scale also predicted the incorrect identification of phishing 
correspondence as genuine in Study 2 and was related to previous fraud victimisation in 
both, Study 2 and Study 3, after controlling for age, suggesting that more impulsive 
individuals may be less able to spot phishing correspondence, making them more likely 
to become fraud victims.  Additionally, a positive relationship was found between 
Modic and Lea (2013) Self-Control subscale of StP scale, measuring lack of self-
control, and STFS Impulsivity subscale, indicating that Impulsivity denotes lack of self-
control with regards to fraudulent offers.   
 
Additionally, in the Barnum Effect study (Study 3), impulsive individuals were more 
likely to assign higher ratings to negative personality feedback statements and were 
more likely to accept a greater number of statements irrespective of valence, suggesting 
they may be less likely to scrutinise information given to them.  They were also more 
likely to believe in powerful others and chance, measured by Sapp and Harrod’s (1993) 
Locus of Control measure.   
 
Some authors have argued that, rather than indicating gullibility, greater acceptance of 
neutral and positive items refers to being rational, as most people tend to describe 
themselves using positive attributes (Layne, 1979).  Therefore, greater acceptance of 
negative items may indicate that compliant and impulsive individuals are more likely to 
agree with people even when they are being told negative things about themselves.  
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Impulsivity and Compliance subscales, therefore, may be used as a reliable indicator of 
susceptibility to fraud.  
 
6.4.1.2 Vigilance and Decision Time as moderators of fraud vulnerability  
Vigilance and Decision time were subscales of the STFS, with slightly lower reliability 
than optimal (α=.65), however, both factors appeared to be good indicators of 
vulnerability to fraud.  In Study 2, Vigilance and Decision Time scales predicted the 
correct identification of phishing correspondence.  Additionally, negative relationships 
were found between these subscales and Impulsivity, as well as Compliance, indicating 
that more impulsive and compliant individuals are also less vigilant and spend less time 
making decisions.  In Study 3, individuals that take time to make decisions accepted 
fewer negative personality statements as true descriptions of their personality and were 
less likely to believe in chance (Sapp & Harrod, 1993) and in Study 2 they were less 
likely to report responding to fraudulent offers based on hypothetical scam scenarios.  
 
The Decision Time subscale explained 7.88% of the variance in STFS and represents a 
participant's preference for taking time to make decisions.  According to Greenspan 
(2009), this attribute may protect from gullible action.  This was also supported by the 
accounts of victims of fraud from Study 1 in this thesis.  Rushing decisions and not 
considering information carefully, or not having the time to consider information, were 
frequently cited as a reason for fraud victimisation.  These results can be explained in 
context of decision-making styles.  For example, Scott and Bruce (1995) identified five 
decision- making styles; a rational style (search and evaluation of alternatives), an 
intuitive style (based on feelings), dependent style (based on advice), avoidant style 
(avoiding decisions) and spontaneous style (based on a desire for immediate decisions).  
In a series of studies exploring why consumers delay decisions, Greenleaf and Lehman 
(1995) found that some consumers delay decisions when they are too busy to devote the 
time to a decision due to other priorities, need the time to gather further information for 
comparison and want to obtain someone else's advice before purchasing.  This suggests 
that preference for delaying decisions until there is time to carefully consider 
information may offer protection from fraud.  Furthermore, making a rule to delay 
decisions may also offer protection from the effects of visceral influence.  Scams often 
evoke visceral influence in order to bypass careful information processing (Cukier et al., 
2007; Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001; Lowestein, 1996; Rusch, 1999), therefore delaying 
decisions would offer protection in situations that evoke visceral influence but would 
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also mean exerting self-control.  However, factor analysis on an independent sample in 
Study 3 (Chapter 5) indicated that it may not be distinguished from Impulsivity.  
Therefore, the Decision Time subscale may be used as a general indication of 
preference for careful consideration, although it may benefit from further evaluation.  
  
Little direct empirical evidence exists to link vigilance with fraud prevention or what 
"being vigilant" means in the context of fraud.  Vigilance, a subscale of STFS was 
found to indicate an awareness of others' motives and preferences to check information 
given.  Vigilance has been implicated in predicting the behaviour of others, with 
trusting individuals who were more vigilant being better at predicting others' behaviour 
than those found to be less vigilant (Markóczy, 2003).  In Study 1, many participants 
reported that, since becoming a victim of a scam, they had grown more aware that 
others may not have honest motives, therefore they are now more careful to check small 
details and think about pros and cons.  In Study 2, as well as correctly identifying 
phishing correspondence, vigilant individuals also reported receiving more fraudulent 
offers similar to the scenarios presented to them for consideration (Modic & Lea, 2013).  
This may indicate that generally, vigilance may be implicated in a greater awareness of 
fraudulent practices.  Vigilant individuals also reported feeling more confident in their 
identification of email correspondence for both, genuine and phishing examples.  
 
Vigilance has been identified as an important factor in the detection of insurance fraud, 
such as paying attention to irregularities in claimants' stories in order to detect deception 
(Morley, Ball, & Ormerod, 2006).   Therefore, the STFS Vigilance subscale may 
provide a good general indicator of how aware one is of fraudulent practices in 
operation.   
 
6.4.1.3 Belief in Justice 
The reliability of some factors of the STFS fell below the recommended value widely 
quoted for indicating acceptable reliability (Cronbach's α, 0.7; DeVellis, 2012), with the 
Belief in Justice factor in particular suggesting a lack of internal consistency (α =.48).  
The questionnaire items that comprised this factor were retained in the item pool for 
couple of reasons.  First was that in the interviews with victims of fraud (Chapter 3), 
where participants had reported the fraud to the authorities, they were often surprised to 
have their case ignored.  They expressed disbelief that the authorities would turn their 
back on the crime that had been committed against them and they reported thinking, 
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prior to the victimisation, that they believed the "police would be all over it" once they 
reported the crime.  This appeared to be a factor common to most victims.  Second, was 
that some of the participants in the first study (Study1, Chapter 3) also reported that 
they were surprised they were defrauded as they considered themselves to be intelligent.  
They felt ashamed of being defrauded and some even openly commented that they felt 
embarrassed going to the police because they felt responsible for the crime.  This 
finding was supported by Cross (2013, 2015), who found negative discourse around 
fraud victimisation, specifically that fraud victims are seen as greedy and therefore, they 
deserved what happened to them.  
 
Holding an erroneous belief that fraud victimisation only happens to people who have 
certain attributes may be an indication of vulnerability, as would a belief that all crimes 
can be solved and prosecuted.  In fact, research by Lea et al. (2009) also found that 
fraud victims believed the fraud, once reported, would be investigated and prosecuted 
and suggested that this may be down to the illusion of control.  As the scale was 
intended to be a protective measure, a way to pinpoint areas of individual vulnerability 
to fraud, it was felt that being under the impression that all crimes would be investigated 
by the authorities or that only certain types of people are vulnerable to fraud, would 
make one less careful.  As such, these beliefs may be an indication of vulnerability to 
fraud; therefore, this factor was put forward despite its low reliability.   
 
The results of the reliability analysis for this factor appeared conflicting in that they 
indicated that removing any further items from the subscale would lower the reliability 
of the subscale, however, the inter-item correlations of the questionnaire items 
suggested that this factor may be measuring different concepts.  Despite this, the factor 
remained as a stable component during each iteration of the factor analysis process in 
Study 2.  Two items on the subscale; 'Only gullible people fall for scams' and 'I feel safe 
from becoming a victim of crime' had a correlation within the recommended range of .2 
and .4 (Briggs & Cheek, 1986), as did the other two items 'Scammers and fraudsters 
normally will get caught in the end' and 'The Authorities, overall are effective at 
protecting us from crime'.  However, all other correlations were below the 
recommended amount.1 
 
                                                
1 'I feel safe from becoming a victim of crime' and 'The Authorities, overall are effective at protecting us 
'Only gullible people fall for scams' and 'Scammers and fraudsters normally will get caught in the end' 
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The fact that participants who responded feeling safe from becoming a victim of a crime 
did not agree that the Authorities are effective at protecting them from crime as much as 
they agreed that only gullible people fall for scams points to the fact that there may be a 
latent variable underlying these items, such as an illusion of control, as mentioned by 
Lea et al. (2009).  For example, feeling safe from becoming a victim of a crime because 
only gullible people fall for scams, could indicate an illusion of control over events that 
one has no control over, such as becoming a victim of a crime.  This is probably more 
prominent with regards to fraud, as fraud is often seen as the victim’s responsibility, 
even by victims themselves (Cross, 2013, 2015).  However, increasing sophistication of 
some types of fraud means that no one is safe from fraud and in some cases, being 
defrauded does not require cooperation.  Therefore, these items may seem to measure an 
illusion of control with regards to fraud victimisation, while the other two items refer to 
the effectiveness of the Authorities to punish perpetrators of fraud and as such, these 
items may be measuring people’s belief in justice.  Nevertheless, Belief in justice 
predicted previous fraud victmisation in both, Study 2 and Study 3.  It was also 
implicated in the incorrect identification of the phishing email correspondence, with 
individuals that believe in justice more likely to identify phishing email as genuine, 
however the result was marginally significant (p=.046).  Whilst it is clear the concepts 
evaluated by the scale are important, the factor may benefit from further development, 
potentially exploring and separating these two concepts. 
 
6.5 The model of Fraud Susceptibility  
 
In the present thesis, three unique studies were designed and executed in hope that they 
would pinpoint individual attributes that may be implicated in vulnerability to fraud.  
An interview study, which explored the scam process, in order to gain a new 
perspective and deeper understanding of the factors that influence compliance with 
fraudulent offers and two experimental studies, designed to test the newly developed 
measure of fraud susceptibility.  This holistic approach allowed for better understanding 
of factors that increase or moderate vulnerability to fraudulent offers.  As a result, the 
Model of Fraud Susceptibility was proposed (Figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1 The Model of Fraud Susceptibility 
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The model outlines different influential components of vulnerability and takes into 
consideration all three studies in this programme of research.  
 
When a fraudulent offer is received, or a product or a service is needed, there are certain 
factors that come into play, which may make the offer more attractive or simply make 
the engaging with the offer more likely.  First, the precursors to the scam, or the 
circumstances the potential victim may find themselves in, such as having no time to 
carefully examine the offer or finding themselves in a situation that could be alleviated 
by the scam offer (e.g. needing a job).  The offer will also appear more attractive if it 
looks like a genuine offer, is somehow limited (e.g. one day only deal) or appears 
scarce, and the source of the offer (e.g. a scammer or a website) appears trustworthy.   
 
Once the potential victim deems the offer appropriate, they may comply with it 
immediately due to certain factors, either because they are more impulsive or because 
they are more likely to go along with things, even when they do not want to.  However, 
they may decide that, although the offer looks legitimate, it may be worth checking 
facts before a decision is made or they may have a preference for taking time to think 
things over.  Additionally, the potential victim may be aware that they are vulnerable to 
fraud and use strategies to avoid it.  For example, although the offer looks attractive, the 
potential victim may be aware that, in the past, impulsive decisions led to undesirable 
outcomes, therefore they have learnt to delay their decisions, which may lead to a 
decreased emotional involvement and allow time for careful information processing.   
 
The decision to go along with the offer may also be influenced by an individual’s belief 
that scams only happen to certain people, inducing false confidence in the decision.  
The scam process may, therefore, be a very complex event, influenced by different 
components that contribute to scam compliance.  
 
 
6.5 Original contribution and implications  
 
The present research offers several contributions to fraud research.  The newly 
developed measure of fraud susceptibility is the first scale constructed using a variety of 
analytical methods that measures facets of vulnerability to fraud.  The scale items were 
specifically generated for this purpose, according to findings from an interview study 
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with victims of fraud, as well as previous fraud research and available models that may 
explain compliance with fraudulent offers.  The present research offered empirical 
evidence to the Model of Scamming Vulnerability (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001) and 
the Model of Gullible Action (Greenspan, 2009).  It also indicated that certain beliefs 
may influence how careful someone is with regards to fraud as well as shown that 
compliance, as well as impulsivity, may be an influential factor in scam compliance.  
Additionally, the concept of vigilance was identified as a moderating factor of 
susceptibility to fraudulent offers as was a preference for careful deliberation prior to 
making decisions.  Based on these findings, the Model of Fraud Susceptibility has been 
proposed.  
 
The utility of the STFS was tested in two separate studies (Study 2 and Study 3), 
yielding results that have implications for future fraud research.  The utility of the scale 
was also supported by evidence that the scale is highly related to similar measures, a 
Susceptibility to Persuasion scale (Modic & Lea, 2013) and Compliance Scale 
(Gudjonson, 1989).  Additionally, the present research was the first to utlise the Barnum 
effect as a proxy scam measure.  
 
The STFS and the Model of Fraud Susceptibility can be useful tools for fraud 
practitioners and be used to ascertain a level or areas of vulnerability.   Additionally, the 
model may provide a basis for better preventative measures and advice to victims and 
potential victims.  
 
6.5.1 Implications for fraud research  
Throughout the present research, the focus has been on developing a measure that could 
be used as a fraud prevention tool, which resulted in a Susceptibility to Fraud Scale, 
measuring different areas of fraud susceptibility.  As well as offering support to 
previous research on self-control and impulsivity (e.g. Modic & Lea, 2012, 2013), the 
present thesis identified other factors involved in susceptibility to fraud.  Compliance 
with the wishes of others was found to indicate susceptibility to fraud as well as 
negative views of self.  This supports previous research (Gudjonson, et al., 2002; 
Fischer et al., 2013) and may suggest a relationship between compliance and self-
esteem, which warrants further research.  Vigilance (Markóczy, 2003; Morley et al., 
2006) and preference to delay making decisions in ambiguous situations (Greenspan, 
2009; Greenleaf & Lehman, 1995) were also found to indicate susceptibility to fraud.  
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The concept of vigilant behaviour with regards to fraud is under researched.  While 
some studies have attempted to look at trust in relation to scam compliance (Fischer et 
al., 2013; Workman, 2008), vigilance may be moderating the effects of trust and it is 
this vigilance that is crucial in determining if a trusting individual is naive or prudent 
(Markóczy, 2003).  This may be crucial in fraudulent situations.  The findings of the 
first and second study in this programme of research, indicated that vigilance and time 
allocated to decision making may be important in understanding why some people tend 
to recognise fraudulent offers when others do not.  For example, Thunholm (2004) 
found a relationship between the intuitive and the spontaneous decision-making styles 
and suggested this may indicate that in some cases, such as where there is time pressure, 
the two styles may merge to create high speed intuitive style. This may be crucial in 
relation to fraudulent offers, especially those that create urgency.   In the presence of 
urgency, when warnings signs are detected, one may choose to concentrate on the 
scammer or the scam offer instead, to justify the decision, as concentrating on risk 
would mean delaying the decision.  In the first study of this programme of research, 
some participants reported having doubts about the situation but the time pressures 
made them concentrate on the positives instead (e.g. such as the attributes of the 
scammer or attaining the desired item).  Thunholm (2004) further suggest that decision-
style involves habit and as such, it may be possible to learn another habit.  In context of 
fraud, this may mean delaying decisions until visceral influence has subsided or 
alternative information can be considered.  These findings could therefore benefit from 
further research.  Specifically, further studies should look into decision-making styles 
and fraud victimisation.  
 
The results of the Barnum study, Study 3, and to some degree Study 1, identified that 
there may be fundamental differences in the attributes of individuals susceptible to 
fraud who progress to become victims and those that do not, which may have 
implications for future fraud research and prevention, and warrants further 
investigation.    
 
6.5.2 Implications for fraud prevention practice 
The present research found that reporting fraud leads to a loss of confidence and trust in 
authorities, which may result in a lack of fraud reporting, as well as cooperation with 
the authorities in the future.  In addition, loss of trust may have long-term societal 
consequences, such as altering people’s attitudes and leading to less empathy and trust 
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extended to others.  Although it is impractical to follow up every case of fraud reported, 
an honest and more sympathetic way of addressing victims of fraud is needed.  This 
could be achieved with more transparency about the likelihood of an investigation and 
prosecution, how complaints are processed and what the reporting data is likely to be 
used for.  For example, if victims of fraud were treated more sympathetically and told 
that, although the investigation of their fraud case is unlikely, reporting fraud is vital for 
fraud prevention and policy making, as it identifies new fraud tactics and leads to 
improvements in fraud policing, they may be less likely to feel let down by the fraud 
justice system.  
It is clear from previous research on security warnings (Egelman et al., 2008; Egelman 
& Peer, 2015; Frauenstein & Flowerday, 2016), that better fraud prevention is needed, 
one which goes beyond just listing and warning about the scams in operation.  Most 
victims try to modify their behaviour following fraud victimisation, however, they do 
not always know how best to do this and may concentrate on scam delivery or content 
only, leaving them open to further victimisation.  The Susceptibility to Fraud Scale may 
be used as an instrument for evaluating areas of vulnerability in order to determine what 
advice would be the most suitable.  Additionally, the scale could be used in conjunction 
with the Model of Fraud Susceptibility, in order to raise awareness of individual 
attributes that contribute to or moderate vulnerability to fraud offers.  
 
6.5.1 Implications for future research 
Future research studies should concentrate on interviewing people that came close to 
being defrauded but realised it was a scam.  Limited findings from Study 1 identified 
that some people are aware of aspects of their personality that make them more 
vulnerable to interpersonal influence in certain situations and have devised strategies 
that compensate for this.  This is a fundamental step for fraud prevention.  A deeper 
understanding of this self-awareness and coping strategies could improve advice given 
to victims and especially repeat victims of fraud.  
Different types of scams rely on different motivational and cognitive factors.  As such, 
the newly developed STFS may benefit from testing on different scam correspondence, 
in order to establish if it could be used as a valid general measure of vulnerability to 
fraud across different types of scams.  This may also benefit future fraud prevention.  
For example, if it was established that compliance and impulsivity best predict certain 
types of scams and lack of vigilance other types of scams, people could be given advice 
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about scams that they may be more vulnerable to, according to their STFS scores.  
Finally, future studies may also want to examine the role of self-esteem and fraud 
susceptibility, especially with regards to compliance and the acceptance of the negative 
feedback.  
 
6.6 Considerations and limitations  
 
Certain considerations and limitations have been noted with regards to studies reported 
in the present thesis.   
 
6.6.1 Difficulty in measuring scam compliance 
In order to ascertain if a measure indeed measures what it is supposed to measure, it has 
to demonstrate predictive validity.  This is extremely difficult when measuring 
susceptibility to fraud.  For example, in the studies conducted by Lea et al. (2009), a 
letter (sent in a plain envelope) with a questionnaire asking for people's opinions about a 
scam correspondence attached to the questionnaire and an explanation about the study, 
attracted fewer responses than a letter pretending to be a scam offer, that had a 
questionnaire attached after the offer is read.  Therefore, measuring scam compliance is 
difficult without deception, as it may make people more cautious.  The context, 
emotions, thoughts and possible consequences need to be 'real'.   
 
Ideally, an experiment would measure individual characteristics connected to fraud 
susceptibility and compliance with the fraudulent offer at the same time; however, in 
order to do that, some type of scam needs to be simulated without the participants 
knowing about it.  This methodology has proven to be extremely effective (e.g. Jagatic 
et al., 2007; Workman, 2008) but often poses serious ethical considerations.  This 
includes causing psychological harm and distress to participants as fraud victimisation 
often elicits feelings of shame and embarrassment.  However, the research by Jagatic et 
al. (2007) also unearthed some important methodological issues, too.  For example, 
whilst most of the participants fell for a targeted phishing attack in their study, after the 
study, the participants only discussed the unethical nature of the research and expressed 
anger, with no one openly admitting to falling victim to a phishing attack used in the 
study.  This may suggest that fraud victimisation, even in experimental contexts, tends 
to elicit secrecy.  The study by Workman (2008), involved looking at fraud 
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vulnerability in a business organisation, in which employees agreed to monitoring 
beforehand.  The study did not mention any negative consequences; however, it may be 
that employees felt they could not express anger at being used as unwitting participants 
in the fraud study due to the monitoring clause in their contract.  
 
Therefore, in Study 2, examples of genuine and phishing email correspondence were 
used.  Although, an incorrect identification of phishing correspondence may predict 
scam compliance in other contexts, it has to be emphasized that measuring fraud 
compliance by asking participants to decide if an email is real or fake may not be a true 
measure of scam compliance.  In a real-life situation, such an email might evoke strong 
emotional reaction, which is likely to influence compliance.  However, given the fact 
that the STFS predicted those who incorrectly identified phishing correspondence as 
genuine, despite the fact that participants were able to rationally think about their 
choices, unaffected by factors that influence errors in judgments, it may also be a good 
predictor of vulnerability to phishing correspondence in real-life contexts.  Additionally, 
this method of testing scam compliance, although not perfect, may be a good way of 
measuring scam compliance in a way that is not harmful to participants.  
 
The Barnum effect may not have been an appropriate proxy scam measure of general 
scam compliance. The results of the Barnum study, Study 3, did not follow the usual 
pattern as predicted (e.g. acceptance of neutral and positive items as more true on 
oneself than negative items).  However, as this is the first time the Barnum effect has 
been used in the context of fraud, using a newly developed measure, it is difficult to say 
how applicable it is as a proxy scam situation, without further testing.  
 
6.6.2 Sampling considerations  
There are certain sampling considerations worth mentioning.  In Study 1, one of the 
participants came close to being defrauded but realized in time.  Furthermore, the same 
participant reported having rules and strategies in place to get out of situations where he 
may be put under pressure to comply, due to the fact that he finds it difficult to say no.  
It would have been advantageous to explore additional accounts of near victims, 
especially if they are aware of areas of their personality that may be vulnerable to 
persuasion or fraudulent communication and to explore the decisive factors that caused 
them to withdraw from the scam.  However, it proved difficult to recruit participants 
that fit these criteria.  The study found that victims of fraud often felt they were ignored 
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by the authorities, and were therefore willing to tell someone their side of the story, but 
this may not be of importance to those that are used to avoiding fraudulent offers that 
come their way.  There is a possibility that, with more participants fitting these criteria, 
different conclusions would have been reached.  
 
Studies 2 and 3 in the present thesis relied heavily on student participants.  Even though 
the studies attracted a great number of participants of all ages, about a third of the 
sample in each of these studies comprised of participants aged between 18 and 22 years 
of age.  Although this is not unusual in psychology research, it often poses certain 
limitations.  Studies have found that students differ in characteristics from general 
population and especially from older adults (Foot & Sanford, 2004; Sears, 1989).  For 
example, Sears (1989) argues that students have less formulated sense-of-self and 
comply with authority more readily, and that age is an influential factor in people’s 
attitudes.   
 
Present research found that younger participants were more susceptible to fraud, were 
more likely to be more compliant and impulsive, however, they were less likely to 
report previous fraud victimisation, which may be due to the amount of exposure to 
fraudulent offers.  Modic and Lea (2012) noted similar findings.  Therefore, it may be 
sensible not to rely on student participants in fraud research.  
 
6.6.3 Other limitations  
In Study 2 and Study 3, participants were asked if they have previously been defrauded.  
However, they were not asked to explain the nature of the fraud experience, such as 
what type of fraud it was or how long the communication, if any, with the scammer 
was.  In hindsight, this question should have been asked, as this information may have 
provided an insight into why previous fraud victims responded differently to the 
Barnum type feedback than individuals susceptible to fraud, as not all frauds require the 
same amount of cooperation from the victim.  Additionally, while some frauds are 
obvious, there are others, which are extremely sophisticated.  Therefore, knowing this 
information would have been helpful in exploring fraud susceptibility with regards to 
previous fraud victims.  
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6.7 Conclusion 
 
The idea that 'one cannot cheat an honest man' is still prevalent today, as the discourse 
around fraud victimisation revolves around greed and blame.  Society, perpetrators and 
the victims themselves assign the blame and the responsibility for the fraud 
victimisation to the victim.  Fraud causes great psychological harm.  The costs of fraud 
victimisation are not only monetary but also societal.  Fraud erodes trust in the fellow 
man as well as trust in the society and the effectiveness of the authorities to provide a 
safe, law-abiding environment for its citizens.  Therefore, fraud victimisation should not 
be dismissed as a lesser crime as it so often is.  Although the costs of fraud 
investigations and prosecutions are high and investigating some types of online fraud is 
an impossible task due to the cross-border element, there is plenty that can be done to 
improve fraud prevention measures.  Taking an individual approach means that, rather 
than overwhelming victims and potential victims with information that is not applicable 
to them, victims could be given more effective advice on how to compensate for their 
vulnerabilities with regards to fraud.  
The present research used a variety of methods in order to construct a measure of fraud 
susceptibility.  Through the narratives of fraud victims in Study 1 (Chapter 3), processes 
that underlie fraud victimisation were identified and successfully used, along with 
previous fraud research and theoretical models, to develop Susceptibility to Fraud Scale 
in Study 2 (Chapter 4).  The newly developed measure is comprised of five subscales: 
Compliance, Impulsivity, Vigilance, Decision Time and Belief in Justice.   
The STFS was able to discriminate between previous fraud victims and non-victims in 
Study 2, with Compliance, Impulsivity and Belief in Justice, associated with increased 
fraud vulnerability.  It was also able to discriminate participants who could correctly 
identify phishing email correspondence and those who could not.  In addition, the 
present research provides an important contribution to understanding factors that 
underlie vulnerability to fraudulent offers, especially with regards to protective factors, 
such as increased vigilance and a preference to delay decisions and consider the 
available information.   
The utility of the STFS was also tested on a proxy scam situation, utilising the Barnum 
effect paradigm in Study 3 (Chapter 5), the first study to use the Barnum effect as a 
measure of susceptibility to fraud.  A connection between high susceptibility to fraud 
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and the acceptance of the negatively valenced feedback was found, with individuals in 
the high fraud susceptibility group more likely to view others as superior to them than 
those in the low fraud susceptibility group, driven mostly by Compliance and 
Impulsivity.  Additionally, impulsive individuals were more likely to agree with any 
statements.  
 
The findings in this thesis indicated that individual characteristics may be important 
indicators of vulnerability to fraud.  The proposed Model of Fraud Susceptibility is 
based on evidence across all three studies in this thesis, and as such, it provides the 
basis for more individual and victim orientated approach to fraud prevention.  
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1.1.2.2 Invitation letter; Study 1 
 
 
                                                                                                   Department of Psychology 
                                                                                                                       King Henry Building  
                                                                                                                       King Henry I St. PO1 2DY 
                                                                                                                              
 
University of Portsmouth is looking for participants for a 
research study looking into scams.  
 
 
Many people become victims of scams. With the Internet becoming a necessity 
for many people, scams have evolved and happen more frequently. This is because 
Internet allows scams to be delivered to people’s homes without much effort and 
scammers are exploiting this in various ways.  The study will consist of one 
interview (face to face or on the phone) and will ask questions regarding the scam, 
any information or details you might have been given by the scammer(s) as well as 
your feelings, thoughts and experiences at the time and after the scam. Information 
gained through these interviews will be used to explore how people process scam 
information and guide us in developing better scam prevention measures in the 
future.  
 
We are looking for people who are 18-60 year old and who have been victims of 
at least one scam (internet or otherwise) where they lost or were persuaded to give 
money to a scammer. We would also like to hear from people who experienced 
communicating with the scammer but decided not to proceed.  
 
Some examples of scams include; 
- purchasing goods that never arrived and not getting your money back  
- financial investments with large returns 
- bogus lotteries or clairvoyant readings 
- scams that promised you money for allowing your account to be used to deposit  
  funds 
- emails asking you to financially help someone in trouble 
 
Participation is completely voluntary and your data will be strictly confidential 
and used only for this study. You may change your mind about participating at any 
point of the process, even at the interview.  
 
If you wish to find out more, you can do so by contacting the researcher via 
email: martina.dove@port.ac.uk and an information pack will be sent for your 
consideration.  
 
Finally, thank you for taking the time to read this letter.  
Please do not hesitate to get in touch with any questions you may have. 
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1.1.2.3 Information sheet; Study 1 
 
 
                                                                                                                         Department of Psychology 
                                                                                                                         King Henry Building  
                                                                                                                         King Henry I St. PO1 2DY 
 
The purpose of the study 
The purpose of the interview is to gather information on how and why people engage 
with scams and this information might be used as to prevent scams in the future, such as 
coming up with better warnings. This may help other people to recognise the warning 
signs when they are being scammed.  
 
Explanation of the procedure and what the questions will cover 
The interview will take approximately 1 to 2 hours. It is hard to say exactly how long it 
will take as each person’s experience is different, but it is unlikely to take longer than 
that. The interview can be done face to  
face or over the telephone and it is important that you think of the time when you may 
be able to do it without interruptions. The interview will be audio recorded and the 
recording will be used for the analysis.  I will ask you about the scam you were 
involved in and the questions I will cover are: how did you hear about the scam, what 
kind the information you received about the scam and what were your thoughts and 
feelings regarding the scam or the perpetrator and anything else regarding the scam you 
wish to share with me.  You can stop the interview at any point without giving a reason 
as well as decline to answer any questions that you are not  
happy to answer during the interview.  
 
Your data 
Your answers will be treated according to Data Protection Act, which means that what 
you say to me will be private and confidential. An audio recording of the interview is 
for data analysis and will be used only for this purpose. The audio recording might be 
used by the interviewer’s supervisory team but no one else and will be stored securely 
in a locked cupboard. Once the audio is transcribed, the recording will be destroyed. 
Your name, address or any other features that may connect the audio recording or the 
transcript of the recording to you will not be stored with the audio recording. The data 
from the transcript might be written up and published in research journals but before it 
is published or shared in any way, it will be anonymised. This means that your name, 
descriptive features or anything else about you will not be used alongside the data and 
you will not be able to be recognised.  The data gathered in this interview will be used 
solely for the purpose of the research and you have the right to ask for your data to be 
withdrawn at any time but once the results have been written up and/or published, this 
may no longer be possible. You will be advised of such time in advance. You may 
request to see written results once the research has been written up.  
 
Approval of the research 
This interview study has been reviewed by the Research Ethics Committee, Department 
of Psychology at University of Portsmouth and will be conducted in accordance with 
British Psychological Society’s code of ethics.  
 
Contact 
If you wish to discuss any of the above, please contact the researcher, Martina Dove 
martina.dove@port.ac.uk 
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1.1.2.4 Informed consent; Study 1 
 
 
Name of the researcher: Martina Dove  
Supervisory team: Mark Turner, Darren Van Laar 
Affiliation: Deapartment of Psychology, University of Portsmouth 
Purpose of data collection: Post-graduate research (PhD) 
     Contact details. martina.dove@port.ac.uk, mark.turner@port.ac.uk or  
darren.van.laar@port.ac.uk 
 
 
Please read the statements below and sign and date the consent form to indicate you 
consent to participation in this interview study 
 
I confirm that I have read the information sent to me prior to this interview and that I 
understood what the interview is about and what is expected of me and had time to 
consider all the information and ask any questions and all my questions have been 
answered. 
 
I understand that my participation in this interview is voluntary and that, should I 
choose to, I can change my mind at any time.  I understand that I don’t have to answer 
any questions I don’t wish to and that I don’t need to give a reason.  
 
I have been informed that an audio recording of the interview will be made and I 
consent to this. I consent for the recording to be used for the purpose of the research 
study in question and I understand that audio will be stored securely by the researcher 
until the results are written up and then destroyed securely. The consent form will be 
kept away from the recording of my interview so there is no way of recognition. I 
understand that the audio might be shared with the supervisory team besides the 
researcher. 
 
I have been informed that I can request my recording or any data held about me to be 
withdrawn or destroyed. However I understand that once the results are written up and 
published, this will be impossible. I give consent for my anonymised data to be used for 
post-graduate research and published in scientific journals and I confirm that the 
process of making data anonymous has been explained to me.  
 
I understand that I can contact the researcher about the results of this research or for any 
other queries I may have after the interview.  
 
 
If you have any questions about the consent form, please ask for clarification 
before you sign.  
 
Signed: _____________________________________________ Date: __________ 
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1.1.2.5 Debriefing information; Study 1 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           Department of Psychology 
                                                                                                                           King Henry Building  
                                                                                                                           King Henry I St. PO1 2DY 
 
Name and contact details of the researcher:  
Martina Dove - martina.dove@port.ac.uk, 
Names and contact details of the supervisory team:  
Mark Turner - mark.turner@port.ac.uk 
Darren Van Laar - darren.van.laar@port.ac.uk 
 
Thank you so much for participating in this interview. The information collected, along 
with information from other people who had similar experience as yours, will be used to 
gain better understanding how scams draw people in and what can be done to enable 
people to learn to recognise scams. As there are financial and psychological 
implications of being a victim of a scam, sharing your experience is invaluable and will 
play an important part in promotion of public scam prevention messages. I hope you did 
not find the interview too distressing and that you feel positive about it overall.  
 
If there is anything that you recall and would like to add to your interview or discuss 
with me, please do not hesitate to contact me on the above e-mail address. Equally, if 
you feel there was something you wish to clarify or you have any questions about the 
interview or the study, please contact me. You have the right to request for your data to 
be removed from the study 2 weeks after the interview. After this time it is likely that it 
may not be possible to do so if the results have already been written up but if you have 
doubts about this, do not hesitate to contact me and discuss your concerns to find a 
solution. 
 
If you wish to see the written summary of the results, you can request this at any time 
and you will be kept informed and notified when this is available. 
 
Should you have any particular concerns about the way the interview was conducted or 
any other concerns about the research, you should get in touch with the supervisory 
team using the information above. If your concerns have not been addressed, you can 
contact the Chair of Psychology Research Ethics Committee in writing: Chair of the 
Department Research Ethics Committee, Department of Psychology, King Henry I 
Street, Portsmouth, PO1 2DTY. 
 
If you feel that participating in this study has affected you in a negative way or evoked 
painful memories or negative feelings, you can contact confidential and free counselling 
service available through University of Portsmouth (Phone: 02392 843157) or 
Samaritans (08457 90 90 90).  You can also seek help from Victim support (0845 30 30 
900). 
 
Once again, I would like to thank you for participating in this research. Knowledge 
gained from these interviews is priceless and will aid in prevention of scams in the 
future.  
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1.1.3 Study 2 - Chapter 4 
 
1.1.3.1 Ethical approval  
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1.1.3.2 Invitation letter; Study 1 
 
                                                                               
                                                                                                              Department of Psychology 
                                                                                                                           King Henry Building  
                                                                                                                           King Henry I St. PO1 2DY 
INVITATION LETTER  
Dear potential participant
You have been invited to participate in a short survey.  
The purpose of this research study is to test and understand factors that may influence a 
person’s vulnerability to scams (such as why people find fraudulent offers appealing). 
Understanding these factors is important due to the fact that scams affect so many 
people, who are often unable to get their money back or see their scammer jailed. In this 
study, we will be comparing our measure of scam vulnerability to an existing 
questionnaire. By participating in this study, you will be helping to design better 
campaigns and warnings, which may help people to avoid scams in the future.  
An information sheet with more details about participating in our research can be found 
at the start of the survey.  
We are looking for people aged 18 and over. The survey is likely to take 15-20 minutes 
and you can complete it in your own time by clicking the link below or by copy and 
pasting it into your browser  
 Link to survey   
If you have any questions regarding the study or would like to find out more about it 
before you participate, please email the researcher: martina.dove@port.ac.uk  
Finally, thank you for taking the time to consider participating in our study.  
Martina Dove
Postgraduate Research Student  
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1.1.3.3 Information sheet; Study 2 
 
 
                                                                                                                           Department of Psychology 
                                                                                                                           King Henry Building  
                                                                                                                           King Henry I St. PO1 2DY 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
Principal Investigator: Martina Dove Telephone: 02392 846313
Email: martina.dove@port.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Mark Turner Telephone: 023 92846309 Email: mark.turner@port.ac.uk  
 
STUDY TITLE: What psychological factors are important when interpreting scam 
information?  
We are looking to recruit participants aged 18 and over who are currently living in 
United Kingdom.  
What is the purpose of the study? The purpose of this research study is to learn more 
about the psychological attributes that are related to being vulnerable to scams. 
Understanding these factors is important as scams affect a growing number of people. 
In this study, you will be helping us to develop a new questionnaire designed to assess 
an individual's vulnerability to scams. Your scores on this questionnaire will be 
compared to an existing psychological measure and your assessment of some different 
scam situations. We hope to use the results of our study to promote better scam 
warnings.  
What will happen to me if I take part?  
You will first be asked to consent to participating in our study, after which the survey 
will begin. The survey will take approximately 15-20 minutes of your time. The survey 
has two parts. In Part One you will be asked to answer few questions about yourself and 
a set of questions designed to measure your general thoughts and feelings in different 
situations. In Part Two, part you will then be presented with some brief written 
descriptions that portray different situations in which you might be approached for 
offers or information. We will ask you to evaluate each description with respect to how 
you think you would personally respond to it and whether you have experienced similar 
situations in the past.  
 
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide if you want to 
volunteer for the study. It is unlikely that you will find any of the questions 
embarrassing or upsetting but if you do, please remember that you don’t have to answer 
any questions you don’t want to and you can stop the survey at any time. You do not 
need to have previously been a victim of a scam to take part. However, if you have 
previously been a victim of a scam and find thinking about the experience difficult then 
you may wish not to take part. Some sources of help for those who have been victims of 
scams is provided at the end of this information sheet.  
How will my responses be used?  
Any individual questionnaire responses you provide will be strictly confidential and 
will only be seen by the researcher. When the results of our study are presented, any 
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responses you have contributed will not be personally identifiable to you. You will only 
be asked to provide a contact email address at the beginning of the survey so that we 
can identify you as a participant in case you later wish to contact us after taking part (for 
example, if you later decide you wish to withdraw your answers from the study). You 
will have 14 days after completion of the survey to request your data to be destroyed by 
emailing the researcher at the above email.  
 
What if there is a problem?  
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to the Principal 
Investigator in the first instance if this is appropriate, or the Supervisor. If you have a 
complaint, you can also contact:  
 
a. The Chair of the Science Faculty Ethics Committee – Dr. Chris Markham,  
Chris.Markham@port.ac.uk  
 
b. The University Complaints Officer, 023 9284 3642, complaintsadvice@port.ac.uk  
 
The information presented above will also be repeated once you finish the survey.  
 
Who is funding the research?  
This research is not externally sponsored. None of the researchers involved with this 
research will receive any financial reward for conducting this study, other than their 
normal salary / bursary as an employee / student of the University.  
 
Who has reviewed the study?  
This study has been scientifically and ethically reviewed, and given a favourable ethical 
opinion by the Science Faculty Ethics Committee.  
 
Further sources of help and information about scams  
If you have been personally affected by a scam and do not wish to participate in this 
research then you are free to do so. If you feel that this study may affect you in a 
negative way or evoke painful memories or negative feelings, you can contact 
confidential and free counselling service available through the Samaritans (08457 90 90 
90). Some sources you may contact for advice about scams are Victim support (0845 30 
30 900) and Action Fraud (0300 123 2040). These contact details will also be provided 
again at the end of our survey.  
 
Thank you  
Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet and for considering 
volunteering for this study. If you wish to know more about the study before deciding, 
please email the researcher for further information (contact details provided at the 
beginning of this sheet). If you are interested in the results of the study, a summary can 
be sent to you once the analysis has been concluded and results written up. Please email 
the researcher to register your interest.  
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1.1.3.4 Informed consent; Study 2 
 
INFORMED CONSENT  
 
What psychological factors are important when interpreting scam information?  
Principal Investigator: Martina Dove Email: martina.dove@port.ac.uk  
STUDY DESCRIPTION:The purpose of this research study is to learn more about the 
psychological attributes that are related to being vulnerable to scams. Understanding 
these factors is important as scams affect a growing number of people. In this study, 
you will be helping us to develop a new questionnaire designed to assess an individual's 
vulnerability to scams. Your scores on this questionnaire will be compared to an 
existing psychological measure and your assessment of some different scam situations. 
We hope to use the results of our study to promote better scam warnings. You do not 
need to have previously experienced a scam to take part. However, if you have 
previously been a victim of a scam and find thinking about the experience difficult then 
you may wish not to take part.  
FURTHER IMPORTANT DETAILS:Informed consent is routinely required for 
participants in psychological studies. Please read the information below before deciding 
whether or not to participate in this study.  
1. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time without giving any reason.  
2. I confirm that I have had the opportunity to consider the study information and 
understand the nature of the survey I will be asked to complete. I have had the 
opportunity to contact the researcher before taking part and any questions I have about 
the study have been satisfactorily answered.  
3. I understand that the findings of this study may later be published or presented at 
meetings, however any individual responses I provide will not be personally identifiable 
to me. I give my permission for my data to be disseminated in this way.  
4. I confirm that any responses I contribute can be retained confidentially and may be 
used in future research that has been approved by a Research Ethics Committee.  
5. I understand that if I later wish my responses not to be used in the study, I will have 
14 days after completing the survey to contact the researcher and request that my 
responses are not used in the study. After this period, it will not be possible to withdraw 
my data.  
If you have read and understood the nature of this study and are willing to 
continue please tick the box below to continue with the survey 
* I agree to participate in the study.  
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1.1.3.5 Debriefing information; Study 2 
 
 
 
                                                                                                               Department of Psychology 
                                                                                                                            King Henry Building  
                                                                                                                            King Henry I St. PO1 2DY 
 
Name and contact details of the researcher: Martina Dove -martina.dove@port.ac.uk  
Names and contact details of the supervisory team:  
Mark Turner - mark.turner@port.ac.uk 
Darren Van Laar – darren.van.laar@port.ac.uk  
Alessandra Fasulo – alessandra.fasulo@port.ac.uk  
 
Thank you so much for participating in this study.  
The data gathered from this survey will aid in developing a new questionnaire measure 
that may be used to identify psychological factors connected to scams. The data will be 
used to conduct statistical analyses needed to compare this new scale with existing ways 
of assessing personal susceptibility to scams and explore any other, as yet unidentified 
factors that may be important in how we interpret scam information.  
Identifying new factors connected to scam vulnerability will allow us to create better 
preventive measures, such as more relevant warnings for certain groups of people, or 
more generally, tailored communications and advice that people may find relevant and 
memorable. This may help victims and potential victims avoid future scams.  
If after participating, you feel you do not wish your data to be used, you may request 
your data to be deleted from the study for up to 14 days by contacting the researcher 
using the contact email provided above, after which time it will no longer be possible 
for us to withdraw your data from the study.  
If you would like a written copy of this debriefing information or would later wish to 
receive a summary of our findings once the study is complete these can also be 
requested by contact the researcher.  
Should you have any particular concerns about this research, in the first instance you 
may contact the researcher’s supervisor Dr. Mark Turner via email: 
mark.turner@port.ac.uk or in writing: Department of Psychology, King Henry I Street, 
Portsmouth, PO1 2DY.  
If your concerns have not been addressed, you can contact the Head of the Psychology 
Department Dr. Sherria Hoskins, Head of the Department of Psychology, King Henry I 
Street, Portsmouth, PO1 2DY. Or Tel. 02392 846313.  
If you feel participating in this study has affected you in a negative way, you can 
contact a confidential and free counselling service available through the University of 
Portsmouth (Phone: 02392 843157 - for students only) or the Samaritans (08457 90 90 
90 - for other participants).  For further help or advice about specific scams you can also 
contact Victim support (0845 30 30 900) and Action Fraud (0300 123 2040).  
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1.1.4 Study 3 - Chapter 5 
 
1.1.4.1 Ethical approval  
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1.1.4.2 Invitation letter  
 
 
 
 																																																																																																																	Department of Psychology 
                                                                                                                        King Henry Building 
                                                                                                                        King Henry Street, PO1 2DY 		
Principal Investigator:  Martina Dove  
Telephone: 023 9284 6313 
Email: martina.dove@port.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Mark Turner  
Telephone: 023 9284 6309  
Email:  mark.turner@port.ac.uk    
 
Study Title; An online questionnaire study of respondents' perceptions of the accuracy 
of personality test feedback.   
                                                                        
You are invited to take part in a research study looking into perceptions of accuracy of 
personality test feedback.  The survey takes approximately 20-30 minutes and anyone 
over 18 is welcome to participate.  You will first be asked to answer questions about 
your attitudes and daily activities, after which you will be presented with your 
personality feedback.  Since we are trying to assess if the personality perception 
questionnaire is accurate in delivering personality feedback, you will be asked to rate 
this feedback sentence by sentence on a 1-10 accuracy scale.  
 
 
SURVEY LINK  
 
When you click on a survey link, you will be provided with more detailed information 
about the study. If you have any questions before the survey, or require further 
information, please email the principal investigator; martina.dove@port.ac.uk  
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1.1.4.3 Information sheet 
 																																																																																																																	Department of Psychology 
                                                                                                                      King Henry Building 
                                                                                                                      King Henry Street, PO1 2DY 
 
Principal Investigator:  Martina Dove  
Telephone: 023 9284 6313 
Email: martina.dove@port.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Mark Turner  
Telephone: 023 9284 6309  
Email:  mark.turner@port.ac.uk   
 
 
Study Title: An online questionnaire study of respondents' perceptions of the accuracy 
of personality test feedback.   
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of this study is to help develop a new personality questionnaire, by 
allowing us to examine how people perceive the accuracy of feedback they receive 
about their personality characteristics from the test we are developing.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide if you want to 
volunteer for this survey.  
 
In the first part you will answer questions about your daily attitudes and behaviours. 
This part of the study will take around 20 minutes to complete. You will then be given 
feedback about your personality based on the questionnaire responses you have 
provided. We will ask you to rate each element of this feedback with respect to how true 
you feel it is of you, in order to see how effective our questionnaire is at producing 
accurate feedback. This part of the study will take around 10 minutes to complete. The 
study will also ask you to provide some brief demographic information about yourself. 
Overall, the survey is likely to take around 30 minutes to complete, after which nothing 
further is needed on your part. 
 
You will be asked to indicate that you wish to take part in the study below, prior to 
starting the survey. It is not necessary for you to provide your personal name or contact 
details in order to take part. During the study, you will be asked to create a username. If 
you later decide you would rather not take part, you may stop the survey at any time. 
You may also request that any data you have provided be withdrawn from the study for 
up to 14 days after participation, by contacting the researcher and quoting the unique 
username that you created as part of the study.  
 
Your data will be treated confidentially, and will be kept secure at all times in an 
encrypted file stored on a password protected computer account. Your responses will be 
added to those of other people and used only as a part of a large data analysis. The 
anonymised data set may be kept for future psychological research that has been 
approved by a research ethics committee.  The results of this study are also likely to be 
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disseminated through publications, meetings and conferences. However, at no point will 
your personal details be shared with anyone apart from the research team.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and benefits of taking part?  
We do not foresee any risks connected to taking part in this study, and you may stop 
participating at any time should you wish to do so. It might be possible that you will 
feel some of the feedback you will receive is not a fair description of you, or does not 
paint you in a good light, which might have the potential to cause upset. It is important 
to remember that we are still in the process of refining the feedback produced and that 
you will also have the opportunity of giving your view on the accuracy of the feedback 
you receive. Psychologists are always looking for ways to understand and assess 
personality characteristics better and you will be contributing to the research in this area 
as well as getting personalised feedback after completion.  
 
Who is funding the research?  
This research is not externally sponsored. None of the researchers involved with this 
research will receive any financial reward for conducting this study, other than their 
normal salary / bursary as an employee / student of the University.  
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been scientifically peer reviewed within the Department of Psychology, 
and ethically reviewed by the Science Faculty Ethics Committee, receiving a favourable 
ethical opinion.   
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a query, concern or complaint about any aspect of this study, in the first 
instance you should contact the Principal Investigator (PI) or her Supervisor, using the 
contact details given above.  If you concern is not addressed, or you wish to make a 
complaint about the study, you can also contact:  
 
a. Dr. Sherria Hoskins, Head of department, 023 9284 6321, 
sherria.hoskins@port.ac.uk  
 
b. The University Complaints Officer, 023 9284 3642,  
complaintsadvice@port.ac.uk  
 
 
 
Thank you for taking time to read this information and for considering 
volunteering in our research. If you do not wish to participate you may close the 
survey now.  If you do wish to take part in our study your formal consent will be 
sought on the following page of the survey. 
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1.1.4.4 Informed consent  
 
INFORMED CONSENT  
 
Please read the information provided about this study carefully, before 
continuing.   
 
Participation in this survey is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at 
any time without giving any reason, even after the full completion of the 
survey.  The survey will not ask you to supply any personal details apart 
from your gender and age, and you will not be asked to supply any 
personal contact details that would otherwise identify you.    
 
Whilst some information that could identify you (such your computer’s IP 
address may be automatically logged during the survey, at no time will we 
release or make use of this information, and once each participant’s 
responses have been collected this information will be deleted.   
 
Your individual questionnaire responses will not be used on their own, 
instead they will be combined with responses from other participants. 
These data, will be made anonymous (i.e. free of any features that may 
identify you personally), and stored for at least 10 years within the 
university, in accordance with the university’s Retention Schedule for 
Research Data. The results based on this data will be written up and 
published in academic journals and/or presented at academic conferences 
and meetings. The anonymised data may also be used as part of a future 
research study that has been approved by a Research Ethics Committee.  
 
If you require any further information before deciding whether to 
participate, you may email the researcher (martina.dove@port.ac.uk) to 
request more details before you take part.  
 
Please tick each statement below before continuing to the survey 
questions.  
* I confirm that I have read and understood the study information for the 
above study. 
* I confirm that I have had the opportunity to consider this information, 
ask questions and that any questions I had, have been answered 
satisfactorily.  
* I agree to participate in the study.  
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1.1.4.5 Debriefing information 
 
 
	
                                                                                                                          Department of Psychology 
                                                                                                                          King Henry Building 
                                                                                                                          King Henry Street, PO1 2DY 
	
DEBRIEFING INFORMATION 
 
Principal Investigator:  Martina Dove  
Telephone: 023 9284 6313 
Email: martina.dove@port.ac.uk 
Supervisor: Mark Turner  
Telephone: 023 9284 6309  
Email:  mark.turner@port.ac.uk  	 	
	
Thank you so much for taking the time to participate in this study.  Please read the 
following text below as it contains important information about the study you just 
participated in.  
 
What was the purpose of this study?  
The purpose of this research study was to learn more about the psychological attributes 
that are related to fraud susceptibility and whether these can be predicted. This study 
was designed to test a newly developed questionnaire against a potential scam situation, 
in order to see if the questionnaire could accurately predict responses. Identifying new 
factors connected to scam vulnerability will allow us to create better preventive 
measures, such as more relevant warnings for certain groups of people, or more 
generally, tailored communications and advice that people may find relevant and 
memorable. This may help victims and potential victims avoid future scams. As such, 
during this survey we created a situation to mimic the psychological conditions of a 
scam, which it was not possible to tell you about prior to taking part in the study in 
order to avoid biasing the answers you provided. We apologise for temporarily 
misleading you regarding the nature of the study. If, after considering the information 
below you feel affected by this, several sources of help and advice are provided at the 
bottom of this page.   
 
How did the study work? 
In this study, you completed three questionnaires designed to assess personality 
attributes related to fraud susceptibility, a measure of “locus of control” (or the extent to 
which individuals believe they can control events affecting them) and a measure of 
psychological compliance. Following the completion of the scales you were shown 
feedback which we indicated was based on your personal responses. In fact, every 
person who takes part in our study was given the same feedback consisting of neutral, 
positive and negative statements. Our aim was to identify whether people with certain 
psychological attributes (as measured by the three questionnaires you completed) were 
more or less likely to believe the general feedback that was given to them.   
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Previous studies have suggested that people find generalised neutral statements to be 
highly credible and believe them to be accurate personality feedback, whereas these 
statements are vague and can broadly apply to everyone. This situation (asking people 
to respond to plausible but false information) is often exploited in scams that involve 
cold readings, such as clairvoyant scams.  
 
Studies have found that people also believe positive statements to be very true of 
themselves and negative statements to be more applicable to other people than 
themselves. We are interested in examining whether people who hold overly positive 
view of themselves also tend to exhibit specific scam vulnerability characteristics.  
Feedback and withdrawing your data 
We would also like to hear any feedback you might have on how this study affected 
you. This feedback is not part of the study but is extremely valuable and may be used to 
discuss potential harm to participants where the true nature of the study cannot be 
revealed at the start and to aid designs of studies in the future.  
If after considering the above information, you do not wish your data to be used in the 
study, you may request to withdraw your responses (for up to 14 days) after you 
completed the survey. You do not need to give a reason for this. If you would like to 
request your responses to be removed, please tell us in the box below, or (afterwards) by 
contacting the Principal Investigator via the email address shown above and quoting the 
unique username you created during the study.  
Please use the box provided to leave the feedback, if any or to request your data to be 
removed.  
 
Complaints 
If you have a query, concern or complaint about any aspect of this study, in the first 
instance you should contact the Principal Investigator (PI) if appropriate or the 
Supervisor. 
Both contact details are listed above.   
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to the Principal 
Investigator in the first instance if this is appropriate, or the Supervisor. If you have a 
complaint, you can also contact:  
 
a. Dr. Sherria Hoskins, Head of department, 023 9284 6321, 
sherria.hoskins@port.ac.uk  
 
b. The University Complaints Officer, 023 9284 3642,  
complaintsadvice@port.ac.uk  
 
 
If you feel distressed and need further help 
If you feel participating in this study has affected you in a negative way, you can 
contact a confidential and free counselling service available through the University of 
Portsmouth (Phone: 02392 843157 - for students only) or the Samaritans (08457 90 90 
90 - for other participants). 
 
For further help or advice about specific scams you can also contact Victim support 
(0845 30 30 900) and Action Fraud (0300 123 2040). 
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Thank	you	for	participating	in	this	research	study	If	you	are	interested	in	the	results	of	the	study,	a	summary	can	be	sent	to	you	once	the	analysis	has	been	concluded	and	results	written	up.	Please	email	the	researcher	to	register	your	interest.		
As	a	thank-you	for	taking	part	in	this	research,	we	would	also	now	like	to	
provide	you	with	some	genuine	personality	feedback	based	upon	the	Locus	
of	Control	Scale	and	Compliance	scales	you	completed	during	this	survey.	
Your	individual	scores	on	these	two	questionnaires	together	with	an	overall	
explanation	of	which	each	of	these	scales	indicate	is	provided	on	the	next	
page.		
	CLICK	HERE	TO	RECEIVE	PERSONALITY	FEEDBACK			
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1.2.  Ethical considerations and sampling criteria 
 
Table 1.1 
Ethical considerations and sampling criteria for Study 1, Chapter 3 
 
 
 
Sampling exclusions  
 
Exclusion criteria Rationale for exclusions  
 
Participants under 18 
years of age, those with 
mental illness and over 65 
years of age were 
excluded 
 
Research argues that the reason elderly people are more aggressively 
targeted by scammers is due to diminishing cognitive functions that can 
be part of an ageing process (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001; Callahan et 
al., 2002; Griffiths & Harmon, 2011) as well as other factors related to 
old age, such as loneliness and loss of independence (Martin, 2009). The 
study’s aim was to explore cognitive and motivational factors underlying 
the processing of scam information.  As such, interviewing individuals 
over 60 might have unearthed confounding factors to this process. 
Participants with mental impairments, participants under 18 or those 
with mental illness were also excluded due to their vulnerability as 
outlined by BPS code of ethics. 
 
Romance scams were 
excluded  
 
 
Romance scams were extensively covered in recent research (Witty, 
2013; Witty & Buchanan, 2012; Buchanan & Witty, 2013).  In addition, 
romance scams follow a different path to scams that require careful 
consideration of the scam message.  In addition, romance scams were 
found to cause victims great distress so any recollection of this event for 
research purposes, unless necessary, might have caused further distress.  
                                                                                                 
                                                                                    
Ethical considerations  
 
Informed consent  
 
Participants were given the information sheet on the nature of the study 
prior to the interview and were encouraged to ask questions if they 
wanted to know more. Each participant was reminded at the start of the 
interview that they can terminate the interview at any time and/or request 
for their data to be removed from the study without any further 
obligation.  Participants interviewed face-to-face were asked to sign a 
consent form and participants interviewed over the phone were read the 
consent form and asked if they agreed and their consent recorded.   
 
Confidentiality  
 
Participants data was made anonymous during transcription by changing 
all names, as well as names of places and organisations mentioned (if 
referring to participant’s life). Recordings of the interviews were 
destroyed after the transcribing was completed.  Consent forms were 
kept in a locked cupboard within the Department of Psychology and only 
the researcher had access to participants’ contact details.  
 
Minimising harm and 
discomfort to 
participants 
 
The study was advertised so that anyone wishing to participate would As 
the nature of the topic was sensitive, we anticipated some participants 
would feel distress at recollection of events. Participants were asked 
about their feelings and emotions during the recollection of the events 
and if anything could have been done differently by the researcher to 
minimise the distress. Participants received a full debrief with sources of 
support for victims of fraud as well as counselling services. In addition, 
participants were offered the choice of the interview setting, either face-
to-face (at the location of their choosing, which included the university, 
participant’s home or workplace or a public place) or over the phone, in 
order to make them feel as comfortable as possible during the interview.  
All participants were also offered a summary of findings.  
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Table 1.2 
Ethical considerations and sampling criteria for Study 2, Chapter 4 
 
 
Sampling exclusions  
 
Exclusion criteria Rationale for exclusions  
 
Participants under 18 
years of age  
 
 
Participants under 18 were excluded due to their vulnerability as outlined by 
BPS code of ethics. 
                                                              
Ethical considerations  
 
Informed consent  
 
Consent information was embedded within the survey for participants to 
consider before commencing the survey.  Participants were asked to confirm 
their agreement to take part through a response item shown after the consent 
information.  
 
Confidentiality 
 
The survey was confidential and we encouraged participants to only leave 
their email address if they feel they may want to withdraw their data at the 
later date. IP addresses of participants were deleted as soon as the survey 
closed and data was converted into a data set. Participants were not asked 
for their names and data was only used as a part of a large data set.  
 
Minimising harm and 
discomfort to 
participants 
 
The survey contained questionnaires that pertained to scams, which may 
have been distressing to those who were defrauded in the past.  
A reminder was included in the consent information informing participants 
that they may potentially feel embarrassed or distressed if they experienced 
fraud victimisation in the past, and if they feel this may be the case, they are 
free to change their mind at any point and withdraw from the survey. In 
addition, participants received a full debrief with sources of support for 
victims of fraud and further information about scams and agencies that 
scams can be reported to.  
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Table 1.3 
Ethical considerations and sampling criteria for Study 3, Chapter 5 
 
 
Sampling exclusions  
 
Exclusion criteria Rationale for exclusions  
 
Participants under 18 
years of age  
 
Participants under 18 were excluded due to their vulnerability as outlined by 
BPS code of ethics. 
                                                           
 
Ethical considerations 
 
Informed consent  
 
Consent information was embedded within the survey for participants to 
consider before commencing the survey.  Participants were asked to confirm 
their agreement to take part through a response item shown after the consent 
information.  
 
Confidentiality 
 
The survey was confidential and we encouraged participants to only leave 
their email address if they feel they may want to withdraw their data at the 
later date. IP addresses of participants were deleted as soon as the survey 
closed and data was converted into a data set. Participants were not asked 
for their names and data was only used as a part of a large data set. 
 
Deception 
 
As the study utilised deception, by utilising Barnum effect paradigm as a 
proxy scam situation, the true nature of the study could not be revealed to 
participants prior to participating.  The Barnum effect studies rely on the 
deception (Forer, 1949; Furnham & Varian, 1988), a necessary part of the 
approach to ensure that true assessments of statement accuracy can be 
obtained.  Instead participants were told they would be assessing their own 
personal feedback, based on the scores of psychometric tests they 
completed.  
 
The ethical implications of this methodology have been considered by Beins 
(1993) with respect to the impact of the deception on participants. The 
author found that when participants were appropriately debriefed, the 
number of objections was low, once the nature of the study was explained 
and any distress expressed by respondents was short-lived.  
 
Minimising harm and 
discomfort to 
participants 
 
Due to deception, it was anticipated that participants would experience some 
level of distress, once they receive a debriefing. Therefore time was taken to 
explain the importance of the study and how it relates to fraud research and 
prevention. Since participants were promised personalised feedback when 
consenting to take part at the beginning of the study, they received their own 
genuine feedback on one of the psychometric measures they completed.  
This was done in order to offset any disappointment participants might have 
experienced once the true nature of the study was revealed.  In addition, 
participants were encouraged to leave a feedback about how the deception 
affected them and there were no adverse effects noted, once we considered 
this feedback.  
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1.3. Supplements for Chapter 3, Study 1 
 
Table 1.4 
Reporting path avenues and outcomes experienced by a victim of fraud interviewed in Study 1, Chapter 3 
  
Authority body 
 
Response Outcome 
County court Scammer cannot be reached due to  
registering fake company details. 
 
Additional loss of funds for a court 
fee. 
Local Trading 
Standards 
Helpful response, investigated the  
scammer’s company address. 
 
Due to false details given, they could  
not do anything more as the scammer  
has no presence in the borough. 
 
Action Fraud Raised a claim and added to the  
details on several occasions 
 
Heard nothing from action Fraud and 
no action taken. 
Local police station Told procedures cannot be broken  
and to go back to Action Fraud.  
Police officer tried to call Action  
Fraud on his behalf without success. 
 
No outcome. 
National Fraud 
Authority 
 
Told that he must go back to Action 
Fraud. 
No outcome. 
Action Fraud   
raised a formal 
complaint due to  
no response 
 
Acknowledgement email specifying 
he will get a response in 20 days. 
No outcome. 
Action Fraud  
escalated the  
previous complaint 
 
Acknowledgement letter specifying  
he will get a response in 20 days. 
No response in the given time but  
received an email saying his  
case was lost but that the data will be  
restored. 
 
City of London Police 
because he was  
dissatisfied with  
Action Fraud 
 
Polite and helpful response but told  
procedures have to be followed  
and referred to Action Fraud. 
No outcome. 
VAT office   
reported the  
scammer was using  
fake VAT number 
 
Noted the details. Requested the victim to pay the VAT  
he reclaimed on the scam purchase,   
no further contact regarding the  
fraudulent details.  
 
Companies House   
reported the scammer  
was registered with  
fictional details 
 
Told Companies House does not  
check the information and that he  
should report it to the police. 
Told to repay VAT he claimed for the  
fraudulent transaction. 
Trading standards  
when he finally  
managed to track the 
scammer’s address to  
that borough 
 
Attempted several several phone calls 
and told that someone will call back 
to discuss. 
No reply.  
Action Fraud  
reissued formal  
complaint regarding  
the case for the  
second time 
 
Acknowledgement letter specifying 
he will get a response in 20 days. 
No further response. 
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Authority body 
 
Response Outcome 
Action Fraud   
escalated the  
complaint again 
 
Acknowledgement letter specifying 
he will get a response in 20 days. 
No further response. 
Contacted two MPs in 
order to take his case  
to Parliamentary and  
Health Ombudsman 
 
First MP did not reply, the second 
MP was helpful. 
Submitted the complaint against 
Action Fraud. 
Parliamentary and 
Health Ombudsman 
(PHSO) 
Told he will be given a decision  
within 16 weeks on whether they  
will look into the case. 
No response from PHSO but contacted  
by a researcher and asked to give an  
opinion on his satisfaction regarding  
the fact that his case was closed - 
the victim was not told his case was 
closed by PHSO until that time. 
 
Victim speaks to the 
PHSO researcher 
about his experience 
 
Not applicable Receives the call from the 
Metropolitan Police. 
Victim receives a call  
from the Metropolitan  
Police 
 
Police advise that the case is 2 year 
old now and the evidence is stale. 
Told no further action will be taken  
and advised to go to civil court, the  
first step he started with. 
Notes.  
MP - Member of Parliament 
PHSO – Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman  
VAT – Value added tax 
1.4 Supplements for the pilot study for Study 2, Chapter 4 
 
Table 1.5 
Mean item relevance ratings on a concept for the initial 56 items 
 
 Ratings on a 
concept  
Question   M   SD 
1. I often find myself in difficult situations I can't think how to get out of. 7.38 2.20 
2. I am responsible for deciding what happens to me in every situation. 7.33 2.30 
3. I normally avoid making decisions when I am feeling anxious. 7.72 2.47 
4. I tend to make bad decisions when I am unhappy. * 7.16 2.53 
5. I don't like surprises.  5.97 2.42 
6. I tend to feel unsettled by forceful people. * 8.29 2.42 
7. I normally give in when people pressure me to make a decision. 9.37 2.06 
8. I prefer to take my time to think things through. 7.86 2.64 
9. I avoid making decisions if someone is pressing me to choose. 7.84 2.59 
10. I am always suspicious of people who ask me to make quick decisions. 8.47 2.36 
11. I usually find it easy to agree with others in a group. 7.53 2.59 
12.  People tell me I am easy to persuade. 8.69 2.52 
13. I always do what I think is best, even when I am in the minority. 7.75 2.27 
14. I often find myself agreeing to things I don't really want to do. 9.14 1.95 
15.  I have been talked into buying something I didn’t really want. 8.86 2.43 
16.  I always check the small print. 8.06 2.94 
17. I find it hard to say no to people without seeming rude. 9.20 2.27 
18. I often worry about disappointing people. 7.97 2.66 
19.  I find it easier to lie than say I don’t want to do something. 7.46 2.36 
20. I would prefer to be impolite rather than agree to something I don’t want to do. 7.83 2.84 
21. I am self-reliant. 6.94 2.49 
22. It’s not important to read all of the details before making important decisions. 8.54 1.96 
23.  I prefer to read contracts for myself rather than believe what others tell me is in 
them. 
8.46 1.99 
24.  I often seek advice from friends and family before making financial decisions. 8.63 2.16 
25. I never bother double-checking terms and conditions. 8.77 1.92 
26. I prefer to get decisions over with quickly. 7.77 2.47 
27. I feel others often take advantage of me. 8.34 2.27 
28.  I find it hard to tell if someone can be trusted.  8.09 2.11 
29. I often double-check what other people tell me. 8.34 2.09 
30.  I usually give others the benefit of the doubt. 8.20 1.98 
31.  I feel safe from becoming a victim of crime.  8.14 2.60 
32. Only gullible people fall for scams. ** 7.34 2.97 
33. I believe criminals usually end up getting what they deserve. 5.66 3.07 
34.  Scammers and fraudsters normally will get caught in the end. ** 6.03 2.79 
35. The Authorities, overall are effective at protecting us from crime. ** 6.80 3.13 
36.  People tell me I sometimes make rash decisions. 7.86 2.56 
37.  When I behave impulsively, I normally end up regretting.  7.26 2.58 
38.  I don’t like to rush my decisions. 7.80 2.45 
39.  I find it hard to say ‘no’ to people I like. 8.69 2.39 
40. I tend to believe people I feel I connect with. 8.80 1.95 
41.  I have made mistakes when trusting people in the past. 8.66 2.11 
42. I tend to only buy from companies and brands that I know. 7.71 2.65 
43.  I am always careful to check that emails and websites are real. 8.97 2.48 
44.  You can never be sure if emails and websites are real. 8.86 2.33 
45. I am always careful to check out people and companies if I haven’t bought from 
them before. 
8.60 2.34 
46. When something seems too good to be true, it usually is. 8.23 2.65 
47. I feel compelled to act immediately when I see a bargain. 8.60 2.02 
48. I get a buzz from buying new things. 7.63 2.56 
49. I am prepared to take a risk when buying something I really want 8.34 2.17 
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 Ratings on a 
concept  
Question   M   SD 
50. If I like something, I have to have it straight away. 7.83 2.19 
51. I’m always careful to think rationally about the things I buy. 8.54 2.12 
52.  I find it hard to contain my excitement when lucky things happen to me. 7.40 2.28 
53.  People sometimes tell me that I am cynical. 7.29 2.55 
54. I often try to set myself rules to avoid repeating mistakes.  7.26 2.54 
55. I try hard to understand the reasons for any mistake I make. 7.14 2.45 
56.  When I make a mistake, I don't like to dwell on it. 6.80 2.68 
Notes.  
* Reworded based on feedback from the original sentence: When things are not going right in my life I 
often make decisions I later regret and Forceful people make me uneasy 
** Questions 32, 34 and 35 were kept in order to see if belief in justice and belief that scam victims are 
responsible for their demise would influence fraud vulnerability 
Table 1.6 
Participants' comments for questionnaire items evaluated in the Pilot study, Study 2, Chapter 4 
 
Question  Comment 
 
1.  
I often find 
myself in 
difficult 
situations I can't 
think how to get 
out of. 
1. If people are sucked in to a scam they find it difficult to admit they are being 
scammed and carry on with the scam as a means of trying to get out of it (ex) 
2. If people are sucked in to a scam they find it difficult to admit they are being 
scammed and carry on with the scam as a means of trying to get out of it (ex) 
3. The ever increasing complexity of scams lead to individuals finding themselves 
in situations that perhaps they cannot equate as to what has happened. (ex) 
Not being able to get away from tradespeople without appearing rude is something 
they 'prey upon! (ex) 
4. I think this question is relevant to some scam victims but not all. (ex) 
5. Good open question (ex) 
6. Nowadays there are many resources an individual can access to assist. Also what 
type of situation? Physical Threat, mental stress, financial? (ex) 
7. The statement implies permanency, whereas being a scam victim could be a one-
off, surprise event.  (vs) 
8. I would interpret this statement as relating to an on-going process, repeated 
frauds or recovery fraud where the victim is trying to make back their losses. (ex) 
9. The word "often" is very subjective (ex) 
10. Some  scam victims may not be as vulnerable as the question suggests (ns) 
 
2.  
I am responsible 
for deciding 
what happens to 
me in every 
situation. 
1. I don't think this one is relevant at all to susceptibility in my experience (ex) 
2. Important in determining if person living alone or the level of support network 
(ex) 
3. More and more automated systems are being used, so how much responsibility 
an individual has is a moot point (ex) 
4. I do feel that personal responsibility plays a role in perceiving fraud.  I would 
feel slightly reckless if I knew I fell for a scam. (rs) 
5. Not every situation's outcome depends on our actions. We can sure decide what 
happens to us, but if that actually happens sometimes does not depend on our  
decision. (vs) 
6. The use of the term 'topic' is generally confusing you should be more specific 
about what you want me to assess for susceptibility to scams.  I guess that in this 
case you mean 'being responsible for deciding what happens to me. (vs) 
7. I agree that the issue of personal responsibility is important but I wonder if it will 
resonate with victims of crime. (ex) 
8. "Every" is absolute - and no-one is totally in control of what happens to them all 
the time (ex) 
 
3. I normally 
avoid making 
decisions when I 
am feeling 
anxious.  
1. Quite a lot of scams rely on people being under pressure, either financially or 
social responsibilities (i.e. parenthood) (ex) 
2. Being scammed would no doubt make an individual anxious, by avoiding a 
decision it could be swept under the carpet. (ex) 
3. Somewhat relevant, but only to a small number of people. (ex) 
4. A good protective quality to have. (rs) 
5. We know decision making abilities are affected when we are anxious and/ or 
depressed so this is a very relevant question in this context. I'm glad you said 
"feeling" anxious rather than just "anxious" (rs) 
6. See previous comments do you mean making decisions when anxious or 
avoiding making decisions when anxious (vs) 
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Question  Comment  
 
4. I tend to 
make bad 
decisions when 
I am unhappy.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Somewhat relevant but again to a small number of potential victims (ex) 
2. Not relevant as we probably all do this if honest not just scam victims (ex) 
3. With fraud/scams how much emotion is actually involved in the act. I'd say from 
experience very little, other than greed (ex) 
4. Feedback on this item reflects feedback on the last item. (no 5 previous question) 
(rs) 
5. Making decisions when unhappy or making bad decisions when unhappy (vs) 
6. I can see the logic of trying to determine if the victim is in a hold or cold state 
but is that the same as being 'unhappy'? (ex) 
 
5. I don't like 
surprises.  
1. Not relevant (ex) 
2. A big lure for scam victims, makes them feel wanted! (ex) 
3. Surprises is too broad, they can be good or bad. Being surprised with a bunch of 
flowers always good. A surprise trip to the cinema can be bad if you are tired. (ns) 
4. See previous comments what is the topic - surprises or not liking surprises (vs) 
5. I'm not sure what you hope to infer from a response to this. (ex) 
6. Hard to see what correlation you are looking for - do u ask if a dislike of 
surprises makes someone susceptible to scams? (vs) 
 
6. 
I tend to feel 
unsettled by 
forceful people.  
1. Once people are hooked they find it difficult to get out of the situation if the 
scammer dominates the communication (ex) 
2. Depending on the nature of the scam it is probable that a 'face to face' scam may 
unsettle and convince the individual into making a decision that they wouldn’t 
otherwise have made. (ex) 
3. Highly relevant. This is a classic tactic used by some social engineers to 
emotionally unsettle their victims. (ex) 
4. I could guess that people who are upfront, forceful and persuasive are unsettling 
to people susceptible to a scam. (rs) 
5. Reflects my own image of scam victims being overwhelmed by persuasion, 
without thinking. (vs) 
6. Interesting, as I would suspect that most fraudsters are forceful (ex) 
 
7. 
I normally give 
in when people 
pressure me to 
make a decision.  
1. Again they find it difficult to get out of it (ex)  
2.  Highly relevant again points to classic victim susceptibility when being socially 
engineered. (ex) 
3. Maybe re-phrase - I normally say yes when people ... (ex)  
8.  
I prefer to take 
my time to think 
things through.  
1. If people have time to think things through they aren't likely to fall for most 
scams (ex) 
2. Again this person is potentially liable to a forceful or assertive scammer (ex) 
3. Comes back to the automatic versus the controlled decision making processes... 
have you considered that many people will see themselves as controlled but act in 
an automatic fashion. (ex) 
 
9.  
I avoid making 
decisions if 
someone is 
pressing me to 
choose.  
1. This person won't be susceptible to scams. (ex) 
2. If they back off when pressured they are less likely to go with the scam (ex) 
10. I am always 
suspicious of 
people who ask 
me to make 
quick decisions.  
1. Again if you go into something thinking it's suspicious you are less likely to 
carry on with it (ex) 
2. This is a good question because even suspicious people can still be conned. (ex) 
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11.  
I usually find it 
easy to agree with 
others in a group.  
1. Peer pressure is used a lot to coheres people into going with a scam (ex) 
2. This person is susceptible to social proof and could easily be scammed. (ex)  
3. Better to word it as generally find myself vying in to agreeing with others in 
group   (easy to agree is ambiguous) (rs)  
4. I feel that people who fall for scams would "go along with a group" more often 
than others. (rs)  
5. Being carried along by the crowd, wanting to be part of a group could make 
people make silly decisions (ns) 
6. If scams involve large groups of people (vs) 
 
12.  
 People tell me I 
am easy to 
persuade.  
  
1. Obviously someone who is liable to being scammed. (ex) 
2. Depends upon level of self awareness (ex) 
 
 
 
 
13.  
I always do what 
I think is best, 
even when I am 
in the minority.  
1. If people don't go with the flow of a scam they tend to drop off (ex) 
2. This person isn't liable to social proof but could still be scammed by a persuasive 
conman who convinces them they are doing the right thing. (ex) 
3. Not sure if/how relevant (ex) 
4. Not a good question, in what context is minority being used (ex) 
5. would be interesting to see if this statement reflects stubbornness or 
reflectiveness? (vs) 
6. I can see what you're getting at... cognitive bias (ex) 
7. "Always" is a bit too strong, maybe "typically" or "generally" (ex) 
 
14.  
I often find 
myself agreeing 
to things I don't 
really want to do.  
1. If you are speaking before thinking you are right up there (ex) 
2. Classic (ex) 
3. Better would be 'i tend to follow the general consensus' (ex) 
4. Question is important in my opinion. (rs) 
15.  
I have been 
talked into 
buying something 
I didn’t really 
want.  
1. Top level victim for scammers (ex) 
2. Classic vulnerability (ex) 
3. Similar to previous question? (ex) 
4. Maybe specify - financial products or goods (ex) 
16.  
I always check 
the small print.  
 
1. The small print always gives scams away (ex) 
2. This person is much less likely to be a victim. (ex) 
3. Very important to avoid scams and sharp practice (ex)  
4. Unsure about the literature on people who fall for scams and attention to detail. 
(rs) 
5. Some people may need an example of what small print is. (ns) 
6. Will people be honest? (ex) 
 
17.  
I find it hard to 
say no to people 
without seeming 
rude.  
1. Again if you are not looking for reasons to say NO you're more likely to say YES 
(ex) 
2. Classic victim (ex)  
3. Maybe add a scenario - 'When i am in a shop, I find it hard to... (ex) 
4. the weak gullible, right? (vs) 
 
18.  
I often worry 
about 
disappointing 
people.  
1. This would imply a prior relationship so people don't tend to think it when it's a 
stranger (ex) 
2. Classic victim very vulnerable to being scammed (ex) 
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19. 
I find it easier to 
lie than say I 
don’t want to do 
something.  
1. If you don't care about what you're saying the scammer finds it difficult to follow 
their script and can't finish the scam (ex) 
2. This person maybe able to avoid being conned. (ex) 
3. Not sure how honest people would respond to this question if asked openly (ex) 
4. Being strong in saying no requires strength of character, but consistently and 
convincingly maintaining a lie also requires strength of character, so I'm not quite 
sure which way this question is heading! (ex) 
 
20.  
I would prefer 
to be impolite 
rather than 
agree to 
something I 
don’t want to 
do.  
1. Chances are you wont' be scammed (ex) 
2. Resilient person. (ex) 
3. This and previous few questions imply an exchange of goods/services - If it is 
something personal, does the same apply? (ex) 
21.  
I am self-reliant.  
 
 
1. Could go either way, either resilient or susceptible through arrogance (ex) 
2. I wonder whether victims of different types of scams would answer this 
differently. You can be self-reliant, but still be tricked, but the type of trick may 
vary.(vs) 
3. Self reliant? (ns) 
 
22.  
It’s not 
important to 
read all of the 
details before 
making 
important 
decisions.  
1. Good - refers to previous question about small print (ex) 
2. Laying themselves open to a fall. (ex) 
3. I think that most people do read all the available details (or at least THINK they 
have). You might get a false high score for this question as it does not mean that 
they DO read all details.(rs) 
4. The word "important" twice in the sentence makes it a bit clumsy (ex) 
 
23. 
I prefer to read 
contracts for 
myself rather 
than believe 
what others tell 
me is in them.  
1. Good behaviour (ex) 
2. Good - this is when a person can be scammed (ex) 
3. I know several people who ask others to read over contracts and agreements and 
'summarise' it for them. (rs) 
4. attention to detail - presumably an asset if you don't want to be tricked. (vs) 
24. 
 I often seek 
advice from 
friends and 
family before 
making 
financial 
decisions. 
1. Good behaviour (ex) 
2. Very general question - giving yes or no answer doesn’t highlight any factor (ex) 
25. 
I never bother 
double-checking 
terms and 
conditions. 
1. that's where the scam normally is (ex) 
2. Risky behaviour (ex) 
3. Who reads the fine print? (rs) 
4. attention to detail and a fair dose of suspicion? (vs) 
5. "Never" is absolute (ex) 
26. I prefer to 
get decisions 
over with 
quickly.  
1. if you don't think things through you can't see the scam (ex) 
2. Risky again (ex)  
27. 
I feel others 
often take 
advantage of 
me.  
1. Difficult because if you know people take advantage of you, you're more likely 
to go into the detail a bit more (ex) 
2. Susceptible (ex) 
3.  I am not sure a fraud/scam victim would know if they were being 
scammed/defrauded (ex) 
4. Requires self awareness (ex) 
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28.  
I find it hard to 
tell if someone 
can be trusted. 
1. We all find it hard to tell if someone can be trusted until we build a relationship 
with them (ex) 
2. Stuffed if you can't do this. (ex) 
3. Trust is very important to consider. (rs) 
 
29.  
I often double-
check what other 
people tell me. 
How important is 
this question as a 
factor in sus... 
1. Desirable behaviour (ex)  
30. 
I usually give 
others the benefit 
of the doubt.  
1. Not always wise. (ex) 
2. I don't understand the question. Language problem. (ns) 
31.  
I feel safe from 
becoming a 
victim of crime.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Never take this for granted it could make you vulnerable to online scams. (ex) 
2. Nobody thinks that it will ever happen to them! Until it does. (rs) 
3. Sense of (false) security, especially once past victimisation is forgotten, seems an 
important aspect (vs) 
4. If they have already been a victim they would say no. If never been a victim or 
someone likely to be a victim they would say yes (ns) 
5. Too generic - ranges from petty theft to murder (vs) 
6. Not sure people ever believe they will fall victim to a scam! (vs) 
 
32. 
Only gullible 
people fall for 
scams.  
1. If you believe this you are setting yourself up for a fall. (ex)  
2. A belief which says nothing about the person's actual gullibility (rs) 
3. Good question, but I wonder if scam victims would like to describe themselves 
as gullible. (vs) 
4. Maybe a bit direct and strong if you are surveying people who have been 
scammed - could be taken as offensive (ex) 
 
33.  
I believe 
criminals usually 
end up getting 
what they 
deserve.  
 1. It quickly becomes apparent they don't (ex)  
2. Not relevant at all to susceptibility (ex) 
3. A belief not a personality characteristic  (rs) 
3. Unsure how the attitudes of the criminal's consequences are insightful in light of 
the research context. Unless its an area of inquiry. (rs) 
34. 
Scammers and 
fraudsters 
normally will get 
caught in the end.  
1. You are believing that the system is going to look after you (ex) 
2. Somewhat relevant but is more important to whether a normal person is tempted 
to commit an online crime (ex) 
3. A belief which says nothing about the person's actual gullibility (rs) 
4. Scammers and Fraudsters is better than "criminals" in my opinion and should be 
used throughout. Eliminates confusion. (rs) 
5. My opinion maybe more than anything else! (vs) 
 
35. 
The Authorities, 
overall are 
effective at 
protecting us 
from crime.  
1. Again if you are naïve thinking that, you are exposed to scams, believing them 
because the authorities would be doing something about them otherwise (ex) 
2. We do our best we can with the resources we currently have but scammers 
currently have the edge. (ex) 
3. Important from an enforcement agency point of view (ex) 
4. Not a chance, as we know (vs) 
 
36.  
People tell me I 
sometimes make 
rash decisions.  
1. Again making decisions too quickly can lead to falling victim to scams (ex) 
2. Somewhat relevant if true (ex) 
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37.  
When I behave 
impulsively, I 
normally end up 
regretting.  
1. Do they just not care if they are scammed (ex) 
2. If someone learns from a mistake and wants to avoid feelings of regret they are 
less likely to exhibit risky behaviour. (ex) 
38.  
I don’t like to 
rush my 
decisions.  
1. take your time and you'll find the scammer out (ex) 
2. This person is less likely to be susceptible (ex) 
3. Even taking a long time, doesn’t prevent scamming (ex) 
39.  
I find it hard to 
say ‘no’ to people 
I like.  
1. Again implies a relationship with the person (ex) 
2. Fraudsters are VERY good at befriending victims (ex) 
3. Classic victim (ex) 
4. better - especially in face to face, pyramid selling type scams (ex) 
 
40.  
I tend to believe 
people I feel I 
connect with.  
 
1. you've given them an element of your trust (ex) 
2. Person highly likely to be scammed. (ex) 
3. Very important in terms of fraud via scam mail as they feel that are connected 
(ex) 
41.  I have made 
mistakes when 
trusting people in 
the past.  
1. Someone who may learn to be more careful after being scammed. (ex) 
2. probably applies to everyone (rs) 
3.  
42.  
I tend to only buy 
from companies 
and brands that I 
know.  
 
1. How do they know that it is the company or brand that they know this allows 
the scammer the key to the door if they can pretend to be that company or that 
product (ex) 
2. Good advice if followed. (ex) 
3. Very important. I felt compelled to click on a fake 'Apple' site once. (rs) 
 
43.  
I am always 
careful to check 
that emails and 
websites are real.  
1. Nobody does though (ex) 
2. Someone who exhibits risk averse behaviour (ex) 
3. Very important. (rs) 
4.  It can be surprisingly difficult to tell (vs) 
44.  
You can never be 
sure if emails and 
websites are real.  
1. if you have this stance you are looking into the details and less likely to be 
scammed (ex) 
2. Good advice to follow (ex) 
3. Sincerity. Once you can fake that, you've got it made. (vs) 
 
45. 
I am always 
careful to check 
out people and 
companies if I 
haven’t bought 
from them before.  
1. Good but if the scammer is pretending to be somebody or has a good online 
persona this can be fraught (ex) 
2. Good advice (ex) 
3. This question if taken literally is asking a lot of people - namely that they check 
everything.  Maybe split or limit to just one (people or companies) (vs) 
4. And in my case, I glossed over the warning signs because I wanted to believe. 
(vs) 
46.  
When something 
seems too good to 
be true, it usually 
is.  
1. rule 1 (ex) 
2. Always good to keep in mind. (ex) 
47.  
I feel compelled 
to act 
immediately when 
I see a bargain.  
1. If you are impulsive you are a scammers dream (ex) 
2. This person is highly susceptible (ex) 
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48.  
I get a buzz from 
buying new 
things.  
1. scammers often use things new to the market so a high risk of being a victim (ex) 
2. Potential victim (ex) 
49.  
I am prepared to 
take a risk when 
buying something 
I really want.  
1. risk management (ex) 
2. This person is at risk (ex) 
50. 
If I like 
something, I have 
to have it straight 
away.  
1. Could go either way (ex) 
2. At risk (ex) 
3. Similar question to other questions (ex) 
51.  
I’m always 
careful to think 
rationally about 
the things I buy.  
1. Again pre thought is always a good defence (ex) 
2. Someone who believes this is susceptible to being scammed.(ex) 
3. Are people likely to see themselves as being irrational? (ex) 
52. 
I find it hard to 
contain my 
excitement when 
lucky things 
happen to me.  
1. Impulsive? (ex) 
2. Susceptible (ex) 
3. Speaks to impulse control I guess (ex) 
53.  
People sometimes 
tell me that I am 
cynical.  
  
1. Defensive, which is good (ex) 
2. People should have a healthy cynicism to buying online. (ex) 
 
54. 
I often try to set 
myself rules to 
avoid repeating 
mistakes.  
1. Do we live by rules we've set for ourselves (ex) 
2. Maybe less susceptible (ex) 
3. Personally, I make and edit all sorts of rule sets for dealing with situations. (vs) 
4. Again - is aimed at repeat victims (ex) 
55. 
I try hard to 
understand the 
reasons for any 
mistake I make.  
1. A personal issue not relevant to scams (ex) 
2. Susceptible (ex) 
3. Wisdom comes from analysing your failures, so as not to repeat them. (vs) 
56. When I make 
a mistake, I don't 
like to dwell on 
it.  
1. As long as you dwell on it long enough not to make the mistake again (ex) 
2. Important (ex) 
3. Defining the repeat victim??? (vs) 
4. Learn from it, then put it behind you. That's not really dwelling. (vs) 
Notes. 
ex = expert in the field  
rs = researcher in the field  
vs = victim of scam(s) 
ns = never scammed	
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1.5 Materials used in Study 2, Chapter 4  
 
1.5.1 Susceptibility to Persuasion Scale  
 
Table 1.7 
Susceptibility to persuasion scale (Modic & Lea, 2013)   
 
Subscale  Question  
 
 
Trust and authority 
 
 
I trust in legal authorities to sort my situation if I was defrauded 
I feel safe and legally protected when buying goods from authority figures 
I trust in information offered to me by authorities 
 
 
Social influence 
 
I am easily persuaded to do things by my friends 
My friends do not influence me* 
I often follow the crowd even when that is not in my best interest 
 
 
Self-control 
 
I find it hard to restrain myself from buying things that interest me  
I only buy things when I really need to* 
I cannot easily stop myself from making rash or impulse purchases 
 
 
Need for consistency 
 
I am not very organised 
I often follow a strict schedule* 
I am often late to meetings despite planning to be on time 
 
Notes.  
* reverse item  
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1.5.2 Scam scenarios 
 
Table 1.8  
Scam scenarios adapted from Modic & Lea (2013)  
 
 Type of 
scam 
Scenario 
 
1.  
 
Fake cheque 
scam 
 
 
You are selling a quite valuable item through classified ads. You have been trying 
to sell this for a while. All of a sudden, somebody contacts you and offers to buy 
this item for the list price. They don't even haggle. They post you a cheque (or 
check, if you prefer U.S. spelling) and ask you to send the item as soon as 
possible. You send them the item immediately, wanting to provide a good 
customer experience. The address is a P.O. Box.) and you send them the item 
immediately, wanting to provide a good customer experience.  
 
 
2.  
 
Phishing 
scam 
 
You receive an email from your bank, notifying you that there was some 
suspicious activity detected on your account. You should login through a secure 
link provided and check that everything is in order.  
 
 
3.  
 
Advance fee, 
419 scam  
 
 
You receive an email from an African or Iraqi relative (you never even knew you 
had); a Nigerian dictators’ wife, a Nigerian building subcontractor, a lawyer, etc. 
They promise wealth and riches, but require you to cover initial fees in order for 
the process to successfully conclude. If you have no money, they will sometimes 
provide you with a check that would cover the initial fees.  
 
 
4.  
 
Internet 
auction scam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You found a Lenovo ThinkPad you always wanted on eBay! The sellers feedback 
is quite high (98% +), they are selling their personal machine and the price is just 
too good to pass by. You go from wanting to buying it in two minutes, as you 
know that otherwise somebody else will buy it soon. It is approximately 40% 
discounted. You want to pay immediately. The seller requires payment through a 
bank transfer, claiming that PayPal fees are prohibitive. True. Well, you bought it 
already you might as well pay, if you want to keep your positive feedback score. 
The bank information sent to you by the seller seems to indicate that you are 
transferring money to a bank in Hong Kong, but the seller tells you that the goods 
will be sent from a warehouse in your local country, so that is OK. The seller 
insists on communicating through personal emails, not through eBay emails, as 
they "don't want eBay to spy on them". Makes sense.  
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 Type of 
scam 
Scenario 
 
5.  
 
Investment 
scam 
 
You are contacted by a stock-broker or their assistant offering an investment 
opportunity, buying stocks in a company that is the next Google or Shell or ... 
You are asked to buy stocks and told of huge profits you could make. If you 
decide to invest, the stocks will actually be bought in your name, but you will not 
be able to sell them for a set period of time (usually two years).  
 
 
6.  
 
Pyramid 
scheme 
 
You are contacted by a midsize business with a great idea on how to make money 
with a relatively little effort. There is a small charge for an initial 'business pack' 
that explains everything in detail, but you will be able to make that back very 
quickly as you recruit helpers, who will also make the initial small payment to 
you. You will send a small amount out of those payments to your recruiter (for 
his trouble). Everything else, you will keep. Your recruits will also get to keep 
most of the money they will make from their recruitments, but will send a small 
percentage to you. You will earn more and more as the business expands.  
 
 
7.  
 
In store credit 
card 
 
You are offered an in-store credit card, from a local well-known retailer. * 
 
Note.  
* Not a scam.  
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1.5.3 Email correspondence stimuli  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Example of a genuine email correspondence  
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Figure 1.2 Example of a phishing email correspondence  
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1.6 Additional results for Study 2, Chapter 4 
 
1.6.1 Susceptibility to Fraud Scale (STFS) 
  
Table 1.9 
Proposed Susceptibility to Fraud Scale, factor description and reliability values  
 
1 – Strongly disagree   2 – Disagree   3 – Neither Agree nor disagree    4 – Agree    5 – Strongly agree 
Factor 
 
Questions  Description Reliability 
 
Compliance  
 
1. I find it hard to say no to people without 
seeming rude. 
2. I normally give in when people pressure me to 
make a decision. 
3. I often find myself agreeing to things I don't 
really want to do. 
4. I find it hard to say no to people I like. 
5. People tell me I am easy to persuade. 
6. I often worry about disappointing people. 
7. When I find myself in a difficult situation I 
often make decisions I later regret. 
8. I would prefer to be impolite rather than agree 
to something I don't want to do. * 
9. I feel others often take advantage of me.  
 
High scores on this 
factor indicate that 
the person is more 
likely to comply 
with others due to 
activation of social 
norms or other 
factors, such as time 
pressures, despite 
awareness of the 
vulnerability.   
 
 
α = .87 
 
Vigilance  
 
1. I am always suspicious of people who ask me 
to make quick decisions. 
2. I often double-check what other people tell me. 
3. I am always careful to check that emails and 
websites are real. 
4. I am always careful to check out people and 
companies if I haven't bought from them before. 
5. When something seems too good to be true, it 
usually is. 
 
High scores on this 
factor indicate 
awareness of others' 
motives and 
readiness to cross 
check information 
given.  
 
 
α = .65 
 
Impulsivity  
 
1. I feel compelled to act immediately when I see 
a bargain.   
2. I get a buzz from buying new things. 
3. I am prepared to take a risk when buying 
something I really want. 
4. If I like something, I have to have it straight 
away. 
 
 
High scores on this 
factor indicate lack 
of restraint and 
disregard to risk 
with regards to 
making purchases 
 
α = .73 
 
Decision 
time  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. I prefer to take my time to think things through. 
2. I prefer to get decisions over with quickly. * 
3. People tell me I sometimes make rash 
decisions. * 
4. I don't like to rush my decisions 
 
 
 
High scores on this 
factor indicate 
a preference to take 
more time 
and carefully 
consider information 
when making 
decisions  
 
α = .65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Belief in 
justice 
 
1. I feel safe from becoming a victim of crime. 
2. Only gullible people fall for scams. 
3. Scammers and fraudsters normally will get 
caught in the end. 
4. The Authorities, overall are effective at 
protecting us from crime. 
 
High scores on this 
factor indicate a 
perception that 
justice prevails and 
people get what they 
deserve. 
 
α = .48 
Note.  
* reverse item
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1.6.2 Results of the principal axis factoring analysis in Chapter 4 
 
Table 1.10  
Factor analysis using principal axis factoring extraction of the 45-item questionnaire 
 
Question 
 
                      Component 
   1  
            
   2     3             4    5           
1. I find it hard to say no to people I like. .739 
     
2.  I find it hard to say no to people without seeming rude. .735 
    
 
 
3. I often find myself agreeing to things I don't really want  
    to do. 
.702 
     
4. I normally give in when people pressure me to make a 
    decision. 
.681 
   
 
  
5. People tell me I am easy to persuade. 
 
.642 
 
 
 
 
   
6. I feel others often take advantage of me. .634 
  
 
   
7. I often worry about disappointing people. 
 
.580 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
8. I would prefer to be impolite rather than agree to  
    something I don't want to do. 
-.566 
   
 
 
 
 
9. When I find myself in a difficult situation I often make 
    decisions I later regret.    
.505 
  
 
   
10. I always do what I think is best, even when I am in the 
      minority.  
-.447 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
11. I tend to believe people I feel I connect with. 
 
.433 
 
 
  
 
  
12. I have been talked into buying something I didn’t  
      really want.  
.406 
     
13. I find it hard to tell if someone can be trusted. 
 
.390 
     
14. I usually find it easy to agree with others in a group. 
 
.359 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Forceful people make me feel uneasy. 
 
.323 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
16. I usually give others the benefit of the doubt. 
 
.320 
  
 
 
 
  
17. I don't like to rush my decisions. 
  
.666 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. I prefer to take my time to think things through. 
 
 
 
.566 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. People tell me I sometimes make rash decisions. 
 
 
 
-.470 
 
.334 
 
 
 
 
 
20. I prefer to get decisions over with quickly. 
  -.433   
 
 
21. I prefer to read contracts for myself rather than believe  
      what others tell me is in them.  
.381 
   
 
 
22. I always check the small print. 
  
.368 
    
23. I often seek advice from friends and family before  
      making financial decisions. 
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Question 
 
                      Component 
   1  
            
   2     3             4    5           
24. It's not important to read all of the details before  
      making important decisions. 
 
     
25. If I like something, I have to have it straight away. 
 
  .678 
 
 
 
 
26. I get a buzz from buying new things. 
 
  .627 
 
 
 
 
27. I am prepared to take a risk when buying something I 
      really want. 
  .593 
 
  
28. I feel compelled to act immediately when I see a  
      bargain. 
  
 
 .488 
 
 
 
 
29. I am always careful to think about things I buy. 
 
  
 
 -.431 
 
  
30. I have made mistakes when trusting people in the past. 
 
     
31. I never bother double-checking terms and conditions.       
32. The Authorities, overall are effective at protecting us 
      from crime. 
   
 
 
 
.436 
 
 
33. I feel safe from becoming a victim of crime. 
 
   .402 
 
 
34. Scammers and fraudsters normally will get caught in 
      the end. 
   
 
 
 
.397 
 
 
35. Only gullible people fall for scams. 
 
   .351 
 
 
 
36. I am always careful to check out people and companies 
      if I haven't bought from them before. 
    .565 
 
37. I am always careful to check that emails and websites 
      are real. 
    .539 
 
38. I am always suspicious of people who ask me to make 
      quick decisions. 
    .425 
 
39. I often double-check what other people tell me.     .377 
 
40. When something seems too good to be true, it usually 
      is. 
    .371 
 
41. I tend to only buy from companies and brands that I  
      know.  
    .340 
 
42. I avoid making decisions if someone is pressing me to 
      choose. 
    .320 
 
43. I normally avoid making decisions when I am feeling 
      anxious. 
     
44. You can never be sure if emails and websites are real. 
 
     
45. I am responsible for deciding what happens to me in  
      every situation. 
     
 
Eigenvalues 
 
7.32 
 
3.53 
 
2.37 
 
1.93 
 
1.66 
 
Percentage of variance 16.38  7.85  5.26  4.29  3.70 
Notes. 
Questions of the Susceptibility to Fraud Scale are shown in bold 
Coefficients below .30 not shown 
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1.7 Additional results for Study 3, Chapter 5 
 
1.7.1 Factor analysis of the STFS using principal axis factoring extraction 
 
Table 1.11  
Factor analysis using principal axis factoring extraction of the 26-item Susceptibility to Fraud Scale 
 
 
Question  
                 Component  
 
    1    2    3     4 
1. I find it hard to say no to people without seeming rude. 
 
.771    
2. I normally give in when people pressure me to make a decision. 
     
.736    
3. I often worry about disappointing people. 
 
.717    
4. I find it hard to say no to people I like.  
 
.685    
5. I often find myself agreeing to things I don't really want  
    to do. 
.677    
6. I would prefer to be impolite rather than agree to something I don't     
    want to do. 
.570    
7. I feel others often take advantage of me. 
 
.503    
8. People tell me I am easy to persuade. 
 
.495    
9. When I find myself in a difficult situation I often make decisions I  
    later regret.    
.457  .328  
10. I am always careful to check out people and companies if I  
      haven't bought from them before. 
 .564   
11. I prefer to take my time to think things through. 
 
 .529 -.359  
12.  I am always careful to check that emails and websites are real. 
 
 .508   
13. I often double-check what other people tell me. 
 
 .458   
14.  I am always suspicious of people who ask me to make quick  
      decisions. 
 .410   
15.  When something seems too good to be true, it usually is. 
 
 .313   
16. If I like something, I have to have it straight away. 
 
  .588  
17. People tell me I sometimes make rash decisions.  
 
  -.583  
18. I prefer to get decisions over with quickly. 
 
  -.530  
19. I feel compelled to act immediately when I see a bargain.  
 
  .487  
20. I don't like to rush my decisions. 
 
 .446 -.481  
21. I get a buzz from buying new things. 
 
  .352  
22. I am prepared to take a risk when buying something I really want. 
 
  .345  
23. Scammers and fraudsters normally will get caught in the end. 
 
   .483 
24. I feel safe from becoming a victim of crime.    .466 
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Question  
                 Component  
 
    1    2    3     4 
25. The Authorities, overall are effective at protecting us from crime. 
 
   .461 
26. Only gullible people fall for scams. 
 
 
   .375 
 
Eigenvalues 
 
5.42 2.62 1.78 1.75 
Percentage of variance 
 
20.85 10.07 6.84 6.72 
Note. 
Coefficients below .30 not shown 
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1.7.2 Factor analysis of the STFS using principal components extraction 
 
Table 1.12  
Factor analysis using principal components extraction of the 26-item Susceptibility to Fraud Scale 
 
 
Question  
                 Component  
 
    1    2    3     4 
1. I find it hard to say no to people without seeming rude. 
 
.798    
2. I often worry about disappointing people. 
 
.762    
3. I normally give in when people pressure me to make a decision. 
 
.762    
4. I find it hard to say no to people I like.  
 
.735    
5. I often find myself agreeing to things I don't really want  
    to do. 
.714    
6. I would prefer to be impolite rather than agree to something I don't     
    want to do. 
.644    
7. I feel others often take advantage of me. 
 
.574    
8. People tell me I am easy to persuade. 
 
.553    
9. When I find myself in a difficult situation I often make decisions I  
    later regret.    
.504   .344  
10. I am always careful to check out people and companies if I  
      haven't bought from them before. 
 .667   
11. I am always careful to check that emails and websites are real. 
 
 .613   
12. I often double-check what other people tell me. 
 
 .589  .357  
13. I prefer to take my time to think things through. 
 
 .578 -.394  
14.  I am always suspicious of people who ask me to make quick  
      decisions. 
 .527   
15.  When something seems too good to be true, it usually is. 
 
 .427   
16. If I like something, I have to have it straight away. 
 
   .663  
17. People tell me I sometimes make rash decisions.  
 
  -.647  
18. I prefer to get decisions over with quickly. 
 
  -.614  
19. I feel compelled to act immediately when I see a bargain.  
 
   .580  
20. I don't like to rush my decisions. 
 
 .476 -.523  
21. I get a buzz from buying new things. 
 
    .456  
22. I am prepared to take a risk when buying something I really want. 
 
    .427  
23. Scammers and fraudsters normally will get caught in the end. 
 
   .647 
24. The Authorities, overall are effective at protecting us from crime. 
 
   .617 
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Question  
                 Component  
 
    1    2    3     4 
25. I feel safe from becoming a victim of crime. 
 
   .611 
26. Only gullible people fall for scams. 
 
 
   .545 
 
Eigenvalues 
 
5.42 2.62 1.78 1.75 
Percentage of variance 
 
20.85 10.07 6.84 6.72 
Note. 
Coefficients below .30 not shown 
 
 
